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5 1. Introduction 
1. Introduction 
 
Modern urban change is tightly interwoven with global and international processes that 
become articulated in cities. Studying such changes in Vinh, capital of Nghệ An Province in 
Vietnam (Figure 1 shows the location of Vinh), led to ideas, projects, and plans formulated in 
places far removed from the original object of this study.1 But in the end, they are brought 
together in space, and sometimes in time, in the urban fabric. Some express themselves 
prominently to a visitor, such as housing blocks constructed with assistance of the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR), symbols of economic growth like high-rise apartment and hotel 
buildings, or monuments celebrating the city’s revolutionary history. Others are less visible: 
upgrading of a small former collective housing area or new forms of urban management and 
planning. Such structures were starting points into this study of actors and their visions for 
the city. The goal was to understand the interplay between actors, institutions, projects, 
plans, and the urban landscape itself, that leads to urban change.  
When doing the rounds of introductions necessary to conduct research in Vietnam, the 
importance attributed by officials to GDR assistance in the re-construction of the city in the 
1970s made clear that this study would have to incorporate the experience of this German-
Vietnamese cooperation. It provides insight into a fascinating time of socialist cooperation as 
well as a counterpoint to contemporary processes taking place in Vinh. An early example of a 
transnational project, it differed considerably from projects involving international actors 
carried out since the 1990s. Both the GDR and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
promoted the same vision for the city and for society. In contrast, newer projects bring 
together different views of what a good city is and diverging approaches to urban 
development. However, the projects impacting the city and presented in this study have one 
                                                          
1 Vinh is the place where these different influences come together and where I spent nearly a year conducting 
interviews and archival research, as well and wandering the city. (Interviews conducted serve as important 
sources for this study, but where possible written sources are used as references. In case interviews serve as 
the only available source, they are cited in the text only with reference to the date they were conducted on to 
respect the anonymity of the sources. More detailed information, for example the position of the interviewee, 
might be obtained from the author.) However, studying transnational influences also made necessary an 
international research agenda. As this implied research in four languages, a note on the use of them is in order. 
In this dissertation, all Vietnamese words and names are given in their Vietnamese writing including diacritics, 
apart from the name Vietnam itself and the name of the country’s capital, Hanoi, as these are commonly in use 
in anglophone writing. An exception are archival sources that do not use diacritics or only use some (apparently 
depending on the typewriter used to write the document), in these cases, the reference and the bibliography 
adopt the spelling of the respective document. The inconsistent use of Vietnamese names in other works 
(sometimes the first, sometimes the last name is used to refer to authors) has led me to include the whole 
name of Vietnamese authors to make identification easier. Again, if the source does not include diacritics, 
these are not used in the reference. Finally, all quotations are given in English (translations by the author); the 
original quote is always provided as a footnote. 
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thing in common: they are informed by a specific view of what a city is and what it should be, 
and their implementation aims at changing the city in the desired direction. This goal involves 
not only physical change of the city, but also institutional change in the urban society. This 
study therefore operates with two specific terms: modern projects, and urban change. 
Modern projects here are understood as concrete actions designed by specific actors to 
further the implementation of modern cultural programs. Thus, modern projects are intended 
to achieve concrete betterments in the life of a given social group that point to a vision of 
society beyond concrete actions. Thereby, analysing modern projects allows for insights into 
social and political visions informing respective actors, as well as change resulting from such 
projects. 
Urban Change refers to the effects modern projects have in the urban setting. It refers to 
change in the urban landscape as well as to change in the urban society and the institutions 
and structures that govern the city. In this context, change is aimed at achieving the goals 
formulated in modern projects, and at the same time at the cultural programs underlying such 
projects. However, a multiplicity of change is possible due to transformations resulting from 
the setting in which modern projects are implemented. Change can thus follow different 
paths in different spheres of the society targeted by modern projects. As the relations 
between social spheres differ from society to society, similar changes in one sphere will likely 
have differing effects in other spheres when comparing several cities. At the same time, 
change can result from the interplay of a number of modern projects advanced by different 
actors at the same time. Therefore, changes resulting from the implementation of modern 
projects can differ markedly from change envisioned by the respective actors.  
 
The following part of the introduction presents the theoretical framework of this study. It starts 
with elaborating the idea that urban areas express the political, social, and cultural programs 
of those actors who try to shape them through modern projects, introducing the multiple 
modernities approach to the study of modernity that informs the analytical tool of modern 
projects. Secondly, it presents an actor-oriented approach to the study of urban change that 
is conscious of the power of existing institutional settings. 
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Figure 1  
The location of Vinh on the banks of the Lam River in North-Central Vietam (above picture: Wikipedia Commons: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vietnam_on_the_globe_%28Southeast_Asia_centered%29.svg#filelinks; 
below picture: Vandenpoel, 2011: p.11, based on: Central Intelligence Agency USA: The World Factbook: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/vm.html). 
Hanoi 
Vinh 
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1.1 Urban Centres as Expressions of Modernity 
This study takes the urban landscape as a starting point into visions of modernity put forward 
by social actors. According to Sassen, urban areas provide suitable sites for the study of 
major social processes:  
“Today, as we enter a new century, the city is once again emerging as a 
strategic site for understanding some of the major new trends reconfiguring 
the social order. The city and the metropolitan region emerge as one of the 
strategic sites where major macro- and micro-social trends materialize and 
hence can be constituted as an object of study. Among these trends are 
globalization, the rise of the new information technologies, the intensifying of 
transnational and translocal dynamics, and the strengthening presence and 
voice of specific types of socio-cultural diversity. Each one of these trends has 
its own specific conditionalities, contents and consequences. The urban 
moment is but one moment in often complex multi-sited trajectories.” (Sassen, 
2005: p.457) 
Cities play a major role in transnational processes that articulate and make visible new forms 
of power and politics (Sassen, 2005: pp.459-460; Chang et al., 2004; Korff, 1996; Berner, 
Korff, 1995). Analysing such processes, Smith argues for an “agency-oriented Urban Theory” 
that takes into account actors as well as local and historical settings framing their actions 
(Smith, 2001: pp.6-7; see also Yeoh, 1999). Arguing against a binary global - local dichotomy 
he uses the term “transnational urbanism” to emphasise both the local embeddedness of 
“global” flows and the role of the nation state (Smith, 2001: p.3). 
“[…] despite the claims of some globalization theorists, the state has not 
withered away as a disappearing relic of the end of modernity. Instead, 
contemporary national and local states have differentially but ubiquitously 
mediated the flows of transnational investment, migration, and cultural 
production through their boundaries. Politically constructed state policies, 
legitimating discourses, and institutional practices are key elements through 
which transnational social formations are being constituted.” (Smith, 2001: p.2) 
“To understand social relations […] with any precision requires us to consider 
their formation, deployment, and impact as they become localized in single 
places, articulated with other places in translocal communication circuits, and 
spread out across societies and national borders. When viewed this way, the 
global-local interplay becomes a matter of ‘locating’ both transnationalism and 
globalization on the ground in all of their untidy contingencies as various 
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projects get constructed, deployed, accommodated to, or resisted in specific 
times and places.“ (Smith, 2001: p.3) 
 
According to socio-semiotics, the urban landscape is the product of “social processes 
characteristic of specific social formations”, involving political, economic and cultural activities 
(Gottdiener, Lagopoulos, 1986: p.18; see also Lagopoulos, 1986).2 The urban fabric 
(including architecture) fulfils functional as well as communicative roles through denotation 
and connotation3, whereas the meaning communicated is socially constructed and might 
differ between social groups and over time (Eco, 1986; Ledrut, 1986). This study therefore 
takes urban space as the starting point for investigations into actors and change shaping the 
urban landscape. It analyses how different modern projects were interpreted, transformed 
and are expressed in buildings and the urban landscape. Evers and Korff draw attention to 
the role of actors and social visions in these processes:  
“[…] the building of a city involves many resources, the shape of the city can 
neither be the result of pure chance nor of ‘objective’ conditions. Most 
probably, the shape of the city, the main constructions forming the urban 
structure socially, spatially and symbolically, are results of some sort of 
planning and coordination. The planning of the city follows, we would argue, 
an image of what the city is and should be. In other words, the city itself is 
supposed to carry a message and act as a symbol for society in total. As the 
idea of the city is socially constructed, the symbolism associated with the city 
and formed by its socio-spatial structure is the result of struggles among social 
groups. Those groups dominating society, especially the urban society of the 
particular city, try to concretize their images and visions, so that the city fulfills 
functional as well as ideological requirements.” (Evers, Korff, 2003: p.17) 
This argument points to the importance of urban planning in the production of urban space 
and symbols. In his history of urban planning, Peter Hall traces the various approaches of 
urban planning to a small number of influential thinkers who formulated “utopian, even 
charismatic” visions. Many of them had their roots in the anarchist movement, their planning 
ideas targeted the goal of a new social order: “The vision of these anarchist pioneers was not 
merely of an alternative built form, but of an alternative society, neither capitalistic nor 
                                                          
2 Gottdiener and Lagopoulos differentiate between on one hand production and on the other consumption or 
conception of settlement space (Gottdiener, Lagopoulos, 1986: p.18). Throughout this study, I will mostly focus 
on the production (as well as reinterpretation) of space by actors, as this process is informed by modern 
projects. Interpretations by users of the urban spaces created by modern projects are treated less prominently. 
3 Denotation refers to the communication of a “’primary’ function”, while connotation refers to the 
communication of “a complex of ’secondary’ functions” (Eco, 1986: p.65, italics in original).  
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bureaucratic-socialist” (Hall, 2002: p.3). Other planners and thinkers who did not share these 
roots in anarchism, such as “authoritarian centralist” Le Corbusier or members of the City 
Beautiful movement, also in various degrees expressed social and political agendas in their 
work that pointed at social, cultural or political issues beyond architectural or urban design 
(Hall, 2002: p.2; see also McLeod, 1983).  
According to Hall, “twentieth-century city planning, as an intellectual and professional 
movement, essentially represents a reaction to the evils of the nineteenth-century city” (Hall, 
2002: pp.7, 14-47). Poor housing conditions in large European cities and industrial centres 
prompted large scale urban planning projects aimed at relieving these conditions. The basic 
assumption underlying these projects was a belief in the possibility to alleviate social ills by 
providing better housing conditions. At the same time, improved housing conditions were 
regarded as a political means for system stabilisation by the ruling establishment. In contrast, 
German communists in the late 19th and early 20th century rejected social housing projects, 
as they regarded solutions to social questions, changes in power relations and the political 
system, as preconditions to solving housing issues (Richter, 2006: p.15). The poor living 
conditions of many urban dwellers at that time can be regarded as results of “modern” 
phenomena such as urbanisation, industrialisation or mobility. However, the approaches to 
urban planning described by Hall can be called “modern” especially because of their 
reflexivity regarding the organisation of society and the resulting living conditions, as well as 
because of their aspiration to create a better future. According to Kuder, urban planning in 
the 21st century is still informed by ideals underlying specific projects (Kuder, 2004). While 
research in cities appears as suitable for the study of social processes urban settings are 
particularly suited for the study of modern projects. 
Urban areas allow one to study social processes that led to the emergence of their form and 
structure. Modern urban planning can play a major role in these processes and is inspired by 
visions of a better society. This study therefore takes modern projects of urban planning and 
development as starting points into an analysis of the social and political visions of actors as 
well as into change that results from such projects. Its focus is on projects that involve 
cooperation between local, national and international actors.  
Modernity has spread globally, and so have modern approaches to urban planning. Their 
application in the real world saw them “travelling” to circumstances and implemented by 
mechanisms much different from those envisaged in their formulation. Thereby, underlying 
visions are transformed through their application in local settings and the ways in which they 
entered these settings in the form of concrete projects. Compared to the original intentions of 
early thinkers “the results were often bizarre, sometimes catastrophic” (Hall, 2002: p.3). 
Focusing on international cooperation projects makes explicit the process of “travelling” of 
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concepts and ideas between different localities. Furthermore, international cooperation 
usually implies the formulation of intentions and goals as communication across “interfaces”4 
becomes necessary (Long, 2001: p.65).  
 
1.1.1 The Study of Modern Projects 
As described above, this study takes the urban landscape as a starting point into visions of 
modernity put forward by social actors. These actors try to impact the city through modern 
projects. The term “modern project” builds on newer conceptions of modernity that regard it 
as empirically observable processes and conditions, in contrast to normative views of 
modernity. 
In modernisation theories of the 1950s, modernisation was regarded as development 
directed at overcoming tradition and achieving modernity. In this view, “modernity” referred to 
an institutional set comprising an industrial market economy and a liberal-democratic political 
system, administered by impartial bureaucrats in a secular nation-state (Mergel, 2011). The 
United States were regarded as having achieved the highest form of modernity, marked by 
democratic association, and as the model for development of less modern countries 
(Kössler, 2004: p.3). In this conception of modernisation, tradition is conceptualized as an 
endogenous factor preventing societies from breaking through to modernity, but this stage 
would be overcome in time and with the abolishment of traditions. As mainly endogenous 
factors were regarded as responsible for under-development, outside intervention was seen 
as necessary to overcome these constraints (Long, 2001: pp.10, 30-48).  
According to Mürle, discussions and critiques of modernisation theory have focused largely 
on “great narratives”. Such great narratives claim universal applicability and their ability to 
explain all phenomena in the studied societies (Mürle, 1997: p.7). While different approaches 
and studies are subsumed under great narratives of “modernisation theory”, they had in 
common a teleological thinking which proclaimed that societies would converge on a state of 
modernity, including an industrial market economy and democracy (Mergel, 2011; Arnason, 
2002: p.64; Mürle, 1997: pp.9-10). In contrast to “classical” modernisation theory, 
dependence theory did not regard endogenous factors (e.g. traditions) as prohibiting 
development, but saw the reasons for underdevelopment in the spread of capitalism and 
colonialism, resulting in unequal global power relations and exploitation of the Third World by 
the West. Thus, the factors inhibiting development were seen as exogenous of respective 
                                                          
4 “the concept of  ‘social interface’ […] explores how discrepancies of social interest, cultural interpretation, 
knowledge and power are mediated and perpetuated or transformed at critical points of linkage or 
confrontation” (Long, 2001: p.50). The focus on such projects also stems from my empirical findings on the 
importance of transnational cooperation in Vinh (Korff et al., 2013; Kaiser, 2012). 
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societies, while the general goals of modernisation, namely industrialisation and democracy, 
were upheld (Mürle, 1997: p.15).  
Modernisation theories have been criticized for their teleological orientation (Giddens, 1991: 
p.5), their simplistic modern-traditional dichotomy (Kocka, 2006: p.65; Mürle, 1997), their use 
of arbitrarily chosen indicators (Schwinn, 2006; Kössler, 2004; Wittrock, 2002), and as a 
discourse legitimating imperial policies (Kozlarek, 2007: p.170; Escobar, 1995, 1988). 
However, modernisation theories characterised by a teleological and convergist 
understanding of development continue to influence development policies and academic 
thinking (Schwinn, 2009: p.458; Mürle, 1997; for examples see Schmidt, 2007, 2006; 
Huntington, 2000). They re-gained in popularity in the early 1990s with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, exemplified by writings such as Fukuyama’s End of History and the Last Man 
(Fukuyama, 1992; see also Stark, 1991).  
 
From the critique of modernisation theory grew a strand of academic thinking that describes 
modernity not in a normative way as a goal to be achieved by development, but as a 
condition that characterizes the contemporary era. Giddens describes modernity as a set of 
institutions and structures:  
“’modernity’ refers to modes of social life or organization which emerged in 
Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently 
became more or less worldwide in their influence. This associates modernity 
with a time period and with an initial geographical location […].” (Giddens, 
1991: p.1)  
Modernisation can thus be regarded as an empirically observable process of the spread of 
modernity’s characteristic “modes of social life or organization”. According to Giddens, this 
change is different from change experienced by pre-modern societies due to its pace 
(extreme speed of change), its scope (spanning the whole globe), and the “nature of modern 
institutions” (Giddens, 1991: p.6). He lists a number of basic conditions that mark modernity, 
such as the separation of time and space and the disembedding of social relations from local 
contexts (Giddens, 1991: pp.15, 20). As one core condition of modernity he sees the spread 
of reflexivity to all aspects of life, including one’s own actions, social role and behaviour. 
Modern reflexivity is regarded by him as different from former modes by the recognition of 
the vast “transformative scope” of human agency. In modernity, only what is evaluated and 
approved is accepted, even traditions which continue to play a role in society do so only after 
they passed through this “modern” process of evaluation. Thus, everything is uncertain, as 
everything can be changed if new information requires so (Giddens, 1991: p.36).  
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From the above citation it is clear that Giddens sees Europe as the place where modernity 
first developed. Globalisation for him is one of the fundamental consequences of modernity, 
representing “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in 
such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away” 
(Giddens, 1991: p.64). Globalisation has led to the travelling of two organisational 
complexes, the nation-state and capitalist production from Europe to other parts of the world. 
Thus, in the sense of a spread of these complexes throughout the world, Giddens sees 
modernity as a Western project (Giddens, 1991: pp.174-175). However, as modernity and as 
its consequence globalisation allow for the global travelling of ideas, concepts, etc. modernity 
is no Western project because it enables input from each place into a system of “world inter-
dependence and planetary consciousness” (Giddens, 1991: p.175). Furthermore, the shared 
conditions of modernity allow for a multitude of institutional settings; for example, capitalist 
societies are regarded by Giddens as only one subtype of modern societies (Giddens, 1991: 
p.56).  
Another approach, led by Eisenstadt, takes further the conceptualisation of the transforming 
impact of local settings on common aspects of modernity. The differences between the 
institutional and structural results merit, according to Eisenstadt, a distinction between 
“multiple modernities” (Eisenstadt, 2006a, 2002). As other authors before, this approach to 
the study of modernity rejects the notion of convergence and the equation of modernity with 
a liberal market economy and free trade (Graubard, 2002: p.ix). However, in contrast to 
previous criticism, the “multiple modernities” approach does not stop at refuting 
modernisation theory on the ground of its over-generalisations, but tries to conceptualize the 
differences existing between modern societies and to provide a theoretical framework for 
their analysis (Schwinn, 2006:  p.11). Kozlarek points out that “classical” modernisation 
theory understands societies only in terms of time, in their position on a linear path towards 
modernity. Thereby, comparisons of societies are made only with reference to their 
development and achievements of modernity relative to the temporal position of other 
societies on this path. According to him, this approach inhibits the comparison of spatial 
factors of development and modernity. In this vein, he also criticizes much of the literature on 
globalisation for not appropriately considering the local anchoring of global processes. In 
contrast, taking into account “territoriality and places” would open up space for recognition of 
differences existing at the same time (Kozlarek, 2007: p.166). Therefore, he praises “multiple 
modernities” as a useful approach to the study of manifestations of modernity in different 
locations at the same time.  
In the multiple modernities approach modernity is understood as a cultural condition, which 
rests on the basic and shared premise of the breakdown of traditional legitimations of the 
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political order (Eisenstadt, 2006a: p.3; 2002: p.5). This results from the spread of reflexivity5 
to the political and social arenas:  
“The cultural program of modernity entailed some very distinct shifts in the 
conception of human agency, and of its place in the flow of time. It carried a 
conception of the future characterized by a number of possibilities realizable 
through autonomous human agency. The premises on which the social, 
ontological, and political order were based, and the legitimation of that order, 
were no longer taken for granted. An intensive reflexivity developed around 
the basic ontological premises of structures of social and political authority 
[…]. The degree of reflexivity characteristic of modernity went beyond what 
was crystallized in the axial civilizations. […] It gave rise to an awareness of 
the possibility of multiple visions that could, in fact, be contested.” (Eisenstadt, 
2002: p.3-4) 
According to Fourie, this new conception of human agency was radically new at the time that 
it developed around 200 years ago. “Societies hitherto embedded in a world-view ordained 
by God were freed to re-evaluate the foundations on which they operated and to construct 
new institutions accordingly” (Fourie, 2012: p.56). For Therborn, this created a new time 
orientation: 
“[…] a time conception looking forward to this worldly future, open, novel, 
reachable or constructable, a conception seeing the present as a possible 
preparation for a future, and the past either as something to leave behind or as 
a heap of ruins, pieces of which might be used for building a new future. 
Modernity in this sense does not per se designate a particular chronological 
period or any particular institutional forms.” (Therborn, 2003: p.294) 
The realisation that the future could be different from the past and actively formed by human 
agency resulted, according to Eisenstadt, in the formulation of numerous cultural programs. It 
is through interactions of these cultural programs and societies that specific modernities are 
formed: 
“The idea of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to understand 
the contemporary world – indeed to explain the history of modernity – is to see 
it as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of 
cultural programs. These ongoing reconstructions of multiple institutional and 
ideological patterns are carried forward by specific social actors in close 
                                                          
5 Note that Giddens, as described above, also attributes an important role to reflexivity as a basis of modernity.  
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connection with social, political, and intellectual activists, and also by social 
movements pursuing different programs of modernity, holding very different 
views on what makes societies modern. Through the engagement of these 
actors with broader sectors of their respective societies, unique expressions of 
modernity are realized. These activities have not been confined to any single 
society or state, though certain societies and states proved to be the major 
arenas where social activists were able to implement their programs and 
pursue their goals. Though distinct understandings of multiple modernity 
developed within different nation-states, and within different ethnic and cultural 
groupings, among communist, fascist, and fundamentalist movements, each, 
however different from the others, was in many respects international.” 
(Eisenstadt, 2002: p.2) 
As a cultural condition, modernity itself has no definite institutional or structural form 
(Schwinn, 2006: p.25). For Eisenstadt, the modernity posited as universal by modernisation 
theory (industrialisation, market economy, democracy) is but one of the possible cultural 
projects of modernity, albeit one that serves as reference point for all others as it was the first 
to emerge (Eisenstadt, 2006b). Some aspects of it have become globally universal, like the 
territorial and later the nation-state (Eisenstadt, 2002: p.14). However, societies have 
continuously selected, reinterpreted and reformulated specific themes and patterns of “the 
original Western modern civilization”, thereby these were transformed by “the combined 
impact of […] respective historical traditions and the different ways in which they [respective 
societies] became incorporated into the new modern world system” (Eisenstadt, 2002: p.15). 
It is one of the central aspects of the multiple modernities approach that no cultural program 
can be formulated without reference to modernity. Even programs rejecting modernity do so 
with reference to modernity as the “other”, revealing a modern process of reflection on 
political and social life (Göle, 2002).  
In contrast to early modernisation theory, Eisenstadt regards cultural programs and 
institutional patterns not as evolutionary and potentially available to all societies but as 
resulting from actor interactions and such factors as power differences, elite conflicts or elite-
mass relations (Eisenstadt, 2006a: p.3). According to Wittrock, when put forward by specific 
actors, “institutional programs” are based on “promissory notes” that have to meet six 
conditions to be regarded as modern (Wittrock, 2002: p.36-37; see also Kocka, 2006: p.67): 
- They have to formulate achievements that may be reached by the members of a given 
community. 
- The state to be achieved refers to a community, not an individual. 
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- This state appears to be realistically attainable. 
- Assumptions about the state and the way towards it are based on claims about the nature 
and history of human beings (members of the given society). 
- Prevalent political institutions embody and give expression to a range of promissory notes.  
- Promissory notes have to be put forth in some public forum. In the age of modernity, this 
has been the public sphere. 
Promissory notes form the basis of debates, affiliations and new institutions, as well as for 
their own realisation through projects (Wittrock, 2002: p.38). Thus, modern projects as 
conceptualised in this study have to meet these conditions formulated by Wittrock and aim at 
the realisation of cultural programs. 
While reflexivity represents the core condition of modernity, Eisenstadt sees a major division 
line between cultural programs that adhere either to a pluralistic or a totalistic political vision 
(Martinelli, 2007; Eisenstadt, 2006b: pp.41-45; 2002: p.8). Thus, he regards Soviet 
communism and fascism/national-socialism as the first alternative modernities which 
developed in Europe (Eisenstadt, 2002: p.10). According to Arnason, communism should not 
be regarded as “pre-, anti-, or pseudo-modern“, but as a distinctive version of modernity 
(Arnason, 2002: p.61). Calic et al. present “socialist modernity” as a developmental project 
that aimed at surpassing industrial achievements of capitalist development and at the same 
time avoiding its pitfalls (Calic et al., 2011: p.10; see also Beilharz, 2009: p.xiii; 8-9; Kopstein, 
1994). While communism as a radical ideology developed as a response to conflicts resulting 
from a clash between traditional ways of life and the dynamics of industrial modernity, when 
the October Revolution took place in 1917in Russia, that country had not been characterized 
by industrial modernity. Rather, “Bolshevik policies were in fact an attempt to catapult a 
country perceived as backward into industrial modernity” (Calic et al., 2011: p.10). 
Communist modernisation in its Soviet version shared with capitalist modernisation key 
aspects such as “rapid industrialization”, “organizational and technological upgrading of state 
power” (Arnason, 2002: p.66-67), or “secularization”, and a belief in the transformability of 
people, society, and nature (Calic et al., 2011: pp.11-13). Another shared central aspect of 
both socialist/communist ideology and classic modernisation theory is the teleological view of 
history.  
However, the means to realize the achievements of modernity differed markedly. The 
capitalist program of modernity relied on individual initiative and competition, expressed in 
the market economy and democratic political structures. In contrast, the socialist modern 
program built on an integrative view of society, expressed in three main components: 
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command economy, party-state, and ideological orthodoxy. In this view, the Party performed 
the role of a “super-state”, capable of supervising, coordinating and forming the ideal society 
through centralized processes and structures of planning and command. Political actions as 
well as concrete economic and social projects were legitimized by scientific knowledge6, thus 
removing them from public debate and making them subject to expert knowledge. The 
specific form structures and processes took resulted in part from the critique and rejection of 
existing capitalism, as well as from the goal to overtake Western modernity’s achievements 
(Calic et al., 2011: pp.11-13; Merl, 2011; Beilharz, 2009: pp.1-2; Arnason, 2002: pp.69-73).  
While communist modernity came into practice first in the Soviet Union, Russian legacies 
impacted the “pattern of modernity” that was subsequently applied by other Communist 
countries (Calic et al., 2011). The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) used its 
imperial hegemony to export its model of development to other countries. During this process 
the model was transformed and adapted to local settings (Arnason, 2002: pp.67-68). Thus, 
as modernisation theory and the development discourse partly served to legitimize a 
hegemonic role of the United States and other Western countries, socialist modernisation 
aimed at establishing the Soviet Union as an imperial power (Arnason, 2002: pp.79-80). 
Criticism of the multiple modernities approach has mainly targeted the abstractness of 
concepts it uses to delineate the commonality and differences of modernities (Fourie, 2012; 
Schmidt, 2007, 2006; Kocka, 2006). Much of this line of critique stems from a terminological 
haziness. While the English title “multiple modernities” suggests the existence of a number of 
distinct modernities, the German title “Die Vielfalt der Moderne”, however, speaks of 
modernity in the singular, proclaiming a multiplicity or variants of modernity. This view is also 
closer to the conception laid out in the works of Eisenstadt and others. As Schwinn notes, 
“multiple modernities” is concerned with alternatives in not to modernity. Each alternative is 
contained within modernity (thus its unity) but no alternative realizes all possibilities offered 
by modernity (thus its multiplicity) (Schwinn, 2006: pp.13-14). However, valid criticism 
concerns the unit of analysis. As Fourie shows, modernities are sometimes presented as 
identical with civilisations, sometimes with nation states. Furthermore, she shows that 
inherent in the approach is the danger of essentialising civilisations. While modern influences 
are presented as highly transformable, civilisations are often presented as quite stable 
(Fourie, 2012: pp.59-62). Spohn argues that it is necessary to complement the macro-
orientation of multiple modernities with a meso- and micro-analytical research perspective to 
avoid such pitfalls (Spohn, 2006: p.111). Fourie argues that: 
                                                          
6 Calic et al. note that this was merely “pseudoscience” (Calic et al., 2011: p.12).  
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“[multiple modernities] often-sensitive exploration of the temporal, spatial and 
substantive aspects of modernity has brought important insights from 
sociology into a field dominated, for several decades, by anthropology and 
political science. The approach itself, however, is still in need of further 
development if it is to go beyond the level of critique and make use of 
empirical findings to strengthen its theoretical analysis” (Fourie, 2012: p.66).  
Against this background this work is an attempt to operationalize the multiple modernities 
concept and provide an empirical study of processes taking place when modern projects 
informed by cultural programs are subject to transformation by their application in local 
settings. It is, however, not concerned with analysing a “modernity” or “civilisation”, but takes 
a more moderate approach by following multiple modernities’ arguments with an empirical 
study of actors and change in one medium sized city in Vietnam. As Eisenstadt and others 
stress the importance of actors as well as existing structural, institutional, and historical 
conditions in the adaptation of cultural programs, it regards actor-oriented studies as a useful 
approach to an empirical study of modern projects. 
 
1.1.2 Actors and Urban Change 
 “Actor-oriented studies” are designed to analyse social processes including the role of actors 
and institutional contexts; they have played an important role in development studies since 
the 1980s (Neubert, 2001; see for example Mosse, Lewis, 2006; Bierschenk, 2000). 
“Nourishing (either explicitly or implicitly) this interest in social actors is the 
conviction that, although it may be true that important structural changes result 
from the impact of outside forces (due to encroachment by the market, state or 
international bodies), it is theoretically unsatisfactory to base one’s analysis on 
the concept of external determination. All forms of external intervention 
necessarily enter the existing lifeworlds of the individuals and social groups 
affected, and in this way they are mediated and transformed by these same 
actors and structures. [...] A more dynamic approach to the understanding of 
social change is therefore needed which stresses the interplay and mutual 
determination of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors and relationships, and which 
recognizes the central role played by human action and consciousness.” 
(Long, 2001: p.13) 
According to Long, this approach allows one to understand different local responses to 
similar influences and processes (Long, 2001: p.13; see also Mosse, Lewis, 2006: p.11). 
This is in line with Eisenstadt’s conceptualisation of different modernities resulting from 
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various responses to the shared aspects of modernity, and the role actors play in the 
formulation of cultural programs. On a level less abstract than modernities, where this study 
is located, this points to local specifics resulting from the implementation of modern projects.  
Neubert emphasises the need to take into account constraints and restrictions that are 
placed on actors, as well as to be careful not to “hyper-rationalize” human action (Neubert, 
2001: p.5). Applying the analytical tool of path dependence, studies on eastern European 
transformation have shown that existing institutional settings impact the opportunities for 
action and resulting change. The transfer of Western institutions, market economics and 
liberal democracy, to former socialist countries was not as easily achieved as envisaged. 
Attempts to remodel political and economic systems took little account of the historic 
development of capitalism itself, or of the institutional legacies history (not only socialism) 
had left in former socialist countries (Stark, 1991: p.18). Stark argues that change depends 
on a society’s willingness “to bear the transition costs”, and politicians’ perception of this 
willingness (Stark, 1991: p.19). “It is in the ruins [of socialism] that these societies will find the 
materials with which to build a new order; therefore, differences in how the pieces fell apart 
will have consequences for how political and economic institutions can be reconstructed in 
the current period” (Stark, 1991: p.20).  
“Actors who seek to move in new directions find that their choices are 
constrained by the existing set of institutional resources. Institutions limit the 
field of action, they preclude some directions, they constrain certain courses. 
But institutions also favor the perception and selection of some strategies over 
others. Actors who seek to introduce change require resources to overcome 
obstacles to change. This exploitation of existing institutionalized resources is 
a principal component of the apparent paradox that even (and especially) 
instances of transformation are marked by path dependence.” (Stark, 1991: 
p.21, italics added) 
It is important to note that for Stark, institutional legacies do not only represent constraints, 
but also resources actors can draw on. Central to his argument is the concept of path 
dependence. Developed in historic economics, the concept has become influential in social 
sciences and especially transformation studies (Magnusson, Ottoson, 2009; Pierson, 2000; 
Goldstone, 1998; David, 1997). It breaks with the notion prevalent in economics that the 
evolution of institutions, organisations, or practices purely follows the logic of efficiency 
(Djelic, Quack, 2007: p.163). It is also in contrast to prominent views in political science that 
“emphasize the prevalence of unique, predictable political outcomes, the irrelevance of 
timing and sequence, and the capacity of rational actors to design and implement optimal 
solutions (given their resources and constraints) to the problems that confront them“ 
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(Pierson, 2000: p.251). The core attribute of path dependent processes is “increasing 
returns” (North, 1991: pp.108-109). According to North, “the institutional matrix consists of an 
interdependent web of institutions and consequent political and economic organizations that 
are characterized by massive increasing returns” (North, 1991: p.109). Thus, institutions and 
institutional change are often marked by path dependence, at times only because path 
change would incur considerable costs (Beyer, 2005: p.15; Pierson, 2000: p.263; North, 
1991). On the other hand, path change becomes more probable where its costs are 
expected to be low relative to expected gains (Beyer, 2005: pp.15-16).  
Mahoney argues that path dependence has a wider applicability than only in economic 
history. With regards to sociological analysis, he differentiates four explanations for path 
dependent institutional reproduction: a utilitarian explanation regards institutions as 
reproduced through rational cost-benefit assessment by actors; the functional explanation 
sees the reason for reproduction in the important function of an institution in an overall 
system; according to the power explanation reproduction is due to the institution being 
supported by an elite group of actors; and the legitimation explanation sees actors’ believe in 
the moral justness or appropriateness of an institution as the reason for its reproduction 
(Mahoney, 2000: pp.517-526). According to Stark, path dependent processes can depend 
both on former/existing institutional structures, as well as on decisions taken during critical 
moments (Djelic, Quack, 2007: p.164; Stark, 1991). Path dependence explains why such 
historical junctures can have lasting consequences (Pierson, 2000: p.263). Collier and Collier 
refer to such crucial phases during which the course of developments is set on a path as 
“critical junctures” (Collier, Collier, 2002: pp.27-39). “A critical juncture may be defined as a 
period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in 
other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies” (Collier, 
Collier, 2002: p.29). Legacies do not automatically result from a critical juncture or reproduce 
themselves, a legacy’s stability is rather the result of perpetuation “through ongoing 
institutional and political processes” (Collier, Collier, 2002: p.31). 
Observing an implicit conservatism in social sciences, Beyer warns against emphasizing 
path dependence and stability of institutions and thereby neglecting the analysis of 
fundamental change (Beyer, 2000: p.5; citing Wiesenthal, 2003, 1999).7  He argues that it is 
necessary to take into account mechanisms that stabilize institutions and thereby hint at 
possible forms of path change (Beyer, 2000: p.19). Furthermore, while path dependence 
refers to specific processes, namely those that incur increasing returns, the concept is at 
times unfortunately employed as “not much more than a metaphorical formula that history 
                                                          
7 Note that according to David, processes depend on paths; they are not determined by them (David, 1997: 
pp.15-16). 
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matters and that there is continuity also in processes of social change” (Beyer, Wielgohs, 
2001: p.387; see also Pierson, 2000: p.252). Therefore, a study of social processes has to 
be careful not to overstate the continuation in change, as well as to apply the concept only to 
those processes where it has explanatory value. 
 
The multiple modernities approach points to the importance of actors and local settings in the 
formulation, implementation and transformation of modern cultural programs. Acknowledging 
the possibility for path dependence as well as other possible influences of existing 
institutional, structural and historical factors allows an actor-oriented approach to be sensitive 
to the settings the processes it studies are framed in. Thereby, it becomes suitable for the 
study of modern projects, their implementation and transformation, as well as resulting urban 
change. 
 
1.2 Locating the Study in a Medium-Sized Urban Centre 
As described above, the multiple modernities approach regards modernity as a condition that 
has emerged first in Europe and subsequently spread globally, equally involving the spread 
of cultural programs of modernity. As Kozlarek has pointed out, the notion of globalisation as 
a “dis-embedding” process neglects the necessity to regard even globalisation as locally 
articulated. He therefore calls for studies of modernity to take into account local settings to 
achieve an understanding of local variations (Kozlarek, 2007). According to Kocka, the 
spatial dimension plays an important role in the study of the spread and universalisation of 
travelling concepts (Kocka, 2006: p.63). However, one criticism directed towards multiple 
modernities is the inconsistent choice of its spatial units of analysis, with some studies 
arbitrarily equating modernities with territorial states (see page 17; Fourie, 2012). 
Furthermore, many argue that while national systems are highly structuring and powerful, 
globalisation has significantly reduced their role in many spheres (see for example Quack, 
Djelic, 2007: p.162; Giddens, 1991). As this study aims at analysing modern projects, not 
civilisations or states, it chooses as its setting a medium-sized city in Vietnam. It thus studies 
modern projects that aim at urban change. 
In general, urban research has overly focused on large cities and neglected the study of 
small- and medium-sized urban centres (Bunnell, Maringanti, 2010; Montgomery, 2008; 
Ofori-Amoah, 2007). Especially the study of global and transnational influences has so far 
mainly focused on large and capital cities (Walton, 2000; Yeoh, 1999), as highlighted by such 
terms as World Cities (Friedman, 1986) or Global Cities (Sassen, 2001). McFarlane calls for 
research to be conducted in a larger variety of urban centres to overcome this bias 
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(McFarlane, 2010). Bell and Jayne argue that urban research has focused on “selected cities 
of the Global North”, thereby inhibiting “the development and impact of urban studies in the 
broadest sense. What is lost as a consequence of the bias towards large cities is a full 
picture of urban form and function: the urban world is not made up of a handful of global 
metropolises, but characterized by heterogeneity” (Bell, Jayne, 2009: p.683). While “cities of 
the Global North” have overly influenced general debates of urbanism, cities of Southeast 
Asia have for long been depicted as special or distinctly “Southeast Asian”, thereby research 
in and of these has had limited impact on mainstream urban studies (and social sciences in 
general) (Dick, Rimmer, 1998).8  According to Goh and Bunnell, scholarship on Southeast 
Asian cities has long been dominated by “’metrocentricity’” (Goh, Bunnell, 2013: p.826; citing 
Bunnell, Maringanti 2010).9 Also in Vietnam, research in urban settings has so far focused on 
large urban centres like Hồ Chí Minh City and Hanoi.10 This has led to unduly influence of 
these centres on the general picture of urban dynamics in Vietnam. Even the edited volume 
entitled “The Vietnamese City in Transition” focuses on Hanoi and Hồ Chí Minh City, calling 
for research to be conducted in “medium-sized or secondary cities” (Cusset et al., 2010: 
p.275; Gubry et al., 2010). In addition to a mere diversification of research settings, studying 
a medium sized urban centre can reveal dynamics different from large centres (Korff et al., 
2013). For the case of urban planning, Del Testa argues that “the study of provincial urban 
centres reveals cultural changes that the bright lights and careful planning of capital cities 
may otherwise obscure” (Del Testa, 2007: p.306). It seems appropriate to follow these calls 
by basing this study in a medium-sized provincial urban centre in Vietnam. Apart from 
studying modern projects, this study therefore also aims at contributing to the body of 
research on small and medium sized urban centres in general and in Vietnam in particular. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
8 This is reminiscent of a tendency to regard knowledge deriving from “Western” societies as generalizable and 
globally relevant, while relegating social phenomena observed in other parts of the world to the status of 
“exotic” or “particular” (Kaiwar, Mazumdar, 2011). 
9 For examples see (Douglass, 2005) and the special forum in (Pacific Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4, Winter, 2005/2006) 
or articles in (International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, May 2013, Vol. 37, Issue 3).  
10 Some Anglophone exceptions are (Korff et al., 2013; Schwenkel, 2013, 2012; Jennings, 2011; Del Testa, 2007, 
1999; Hoang Xuan Thanh et al., 2005). Additionally, there exists a large body of official historiography in 
Vietnamese for most areas, including smaller urban centers. However, few of these studies relate their 
research to the size of the respective urban center. One thus has to distinguish between research in and 
research on such centers.   
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Largely building on secondary literature as well as French and Vietnamese archival sources 
a background on Vinh’s history is provided in chapter two. After a short presentation on 
Vinh’s pre-colonial history, the role of colonialism in establishing Vinh as a city is outlined. A 
third part presents the cycles of destruction and reconstruction that marked the city between 
the 1940s and the 1970s, setting the scene for subsequent reconstruction with assistance of 
the GDR.  
The third chapter presents reconstruction efforts that promoted the construction of a Socialist 
City. It traces the origins of this vision of the city and its application in Vietnam and the GDR, 
before moving to the planning and implementation process, highlighting transnational 
influences. Extensive archival research in Germany and Vietnam, as well as semi-structured 
interviews with Vietnamese and German planners, engineers, and architects formerly 
involved in the reconstruction of the city form the basis of this analysis.  
Chapter four is concerned with the interplay of diverging modern projects promoted by 
different actors since the 1990s in Vinh. It presents the Modern and Civilised City that 
functions as a guideline informing provincial and municipal authorities. The projects of 
international actors, on the other hand, are informed by an ideal of a Participatory City. The 
chapter analyses the implementation and outcomes of projects involving cooperation 
between actors promoting different views of the city based on published and unpublished 
documents, as well as semi-structured interviews with actors involved in these projects and 
participant observation at a national workshop on Community Development Funds in Vinh in 
May 2011 and at a training course for public servants organized by the Association of Cities 
of Vietnam and German Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Đà Nẵng in November 2010. 
The fifth chapter presents a final conclusion that ties together the different modern projects 
from the 1970s on. It reviews communalities and differences, and relates urban change 
resulting from the different modern projects to each other.  
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2. The History of Vinh 
As a prelude to the study of modern projects in Vinh and to set them in an historical 
background, this part covers the city’s history from pre-colonial times until Vinh’s destruction 
during the American War in the 1960s. It is divided into three parts: the first part introduces 
Vinh’s pre-colonial history during which a small settlement including a market and barracks 
became a provincial centre by imperial decree. The second part presents Vinh’s colonial 
history, which saw large changes in the economic, political, and social spheres. The third and 
final part covers the transition from French colonialism to the establishment of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the first years of Vinh in the DRV until bombing 
by the United States of America (US) destroyed the city in the 1960s.  
 
2.1 Pre-colonial Vinh (15th Century to 1885) 
In pre-colonial times, Vinh11 mainly served as a market place, imperial outpost and 
administrative centre. A small market and barracks existed in Vinh from the 15th century on, 
forming two separate units: Vĩnh Doanh (Vinh barracks) and Vĩnh Thị (Vinh market). While 
the barracks represented imperial control over the area, the market linked Vinh to regional 
trade networks, with Vietnamese, Chinese, and Javanese traders present. Traded goods 
consisted mainly of handicrafts produced in surrounding villages as well as agricultural 
products (Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: pp.13-17). Until the late 18th century, Vinh’s importance 
remained limited with the provincial administrative centre located in Lam Thành about 10km 
south-west of present-day Vinh, at the confluence of the Lam and La rivers (Nguyễn Quang 
Hồng, 2003: pp.19-20; Bùi Thiết, 1984: p.32).   
The second half of the 18th century was a time of great upheaval in Vietnam, resulting in the 
defeat of the Nguyễn in the South and the Trịnh in the North by a rebellion led by the Tây 
Sơn brothers (Dutton, 2006). During their campaign against the Trịnh in the North, the Tây 
Sơn founded the Phượng Hoàng Trung Độ citadel on Quyết Mountain in today’s Vinh area in 
1786. Chu Trọng Huyến and Bùi Thiết claim the citadel partly served a plan of Nguyễn Huệ, 
one of the Tây Sơn brothers who proclaimed himself Emperor Quang Trung in 1788, to move 
Vietnam’s capital to Vinh (Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: pp.19-20; Bùi Thiết, 1984: p.39-42). 
However, due to the death of Quang Trung in 1792 and the subsequent defeat of the Tây 
Sơn by the Nguyễn with French assistance in 1802, no steps to implement the plan were 
                                                          
11 The name Vinh was not in use until the colonial period and probably results from the French usage of the 
name Vĩnh without diacritics (Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: p.38). Formerly, different names referred to the area 
that today is Vinh City. To make reading easier, I will refer to the settlement that existed in the area of the 
citadel as Vinh, while Bến Thủy and Trường Thi are referred to separately until their merging with the citadel 
area to form the administrative unit of Vinh-Bênthuy in colonial times. The term Vinh is used for the urban 
centre, while Vinh City refers to the administrative unit and respective administrative bodies. For changing 
names of the area see (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.18).  
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carried out and the Phượng Hoàng Trung Độ citadel remained unfinished (Chu Trọng Huyến, 
1998: p.21).  
In 1802, after having defeated the Tây Sơn, Nguyễn Ánh proclaimed himself emperor of all of 
Vietnam under the name Gia Long (Dutton, 2006; Wook, 2004). Gia Long decreed the 
construction of a new site for imperial examinations in the area of Vinh in 1803; a year later 
he ordered to move the provincial administrative centre from Lam Thành to Vinh along with 
the construction of a new citadel (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: pp.22-23; Chu Trọng Huyến, 
1998: pp.21-22).12 According to Nguyễn Quang Hồng, this decision opened up the way for 
Vinh to become the economic, political, and cultural centre of Nghệ An and Hà Tĩnh 
provinces (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.24).13  
As the provincial centre of administration and examinations, Vinh came to form an 
administrative unit combining different functions and the place through which the surrounding 
region was integrated in wider networks of power, trade, and information. As the seat of the 
provincial mandarin, the city linked the region to a centralized system of rule (Nguyễn Quang 
Hồng, 2003: pp.24-27, 68-71; Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: p.23; Bùi Thiết, 1984: p.81). 
However, central policies often met with local resistance and the new citadel appears to have 
partly functioned as an imperial outpost against local revolts (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: 
pp.31, 58). According to Bùi Thiết, 80 years of Nguyễn rule (1802-1885) saw more than 500 
peasant risings, of which many took place in or reached the Vinh area (Bùi Thiết, 1984: 
p.61). 
Vinh becoming the provincial centre elevated the status of its existing market to that of the 
main trading place in the region. Additionally, members of the administration and the military 
located in the citadel provided new and growing markets for surrounding villages (Del Testa, 
2007: p.313). Most traders followed the relocation from Lam Thành to Vinh, where they lived 
in separated areas according to their ethnicity and their occupations. Manufacturing took 
mainly place in surrounding villages, where farmers supplemented their agricultural activities 
with the production of handicrafts (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: pp.41-46; Chu Trọng Huyến, 
1998: pp.33-34). With little production taking place in Vinh itself, its economic role was mainly 
that of a regional trading place. Through its strategic location at the intersection of the 
Mandarin Road and a road linking the coast with Laos and the Mekong, Vinh connected its 
surroundings also to inter-regional and international trade (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.52; 
                                                          
12 Del Testa dates the move of the provincial administration to Vinh to 1778 and the move of annual imperial 
examinations to 1770 (Del Testa, 2007: p.313). However, his is the only text doing so and it provides no 
references for these dates. As I have found no other documents supporting these dates, I refer to the dates 
given by all other sources available to me. In any case, all sources agree that Vinh became the seat of provincial 
administration and examinations around 1800 and regard this decision as the founding of the city. 
13 However, no sources explain the decision to move the provincial centre from Lam Thành to Vinh. 
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Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: p.35). Administrative personnel and economic opportunities led to 
population growth in the 19th century. Del Testa provides the only available population 
number, of “perhaps 3,000 inhabitants” in the pre-colonial time (Del Testa, 2007: p.313). 
As the site of imperial administration and examinations for entry into a meritocratic state 
apparatus, Vinh became the point of articulation of a pre-colonial Vietnamese modernity 
(Woodside, 2006). Increased contacts with “modern” technology and ideas expressed 
themselves in the design of Vinh’s citadel. The citadel constructed under Gia Long’s reign 
starting in 1804 had merely been an earthen fortress with wooden gates, which was 
completed in only one year. However, in 1831, facing peasant revolts, his son Minh Mạng 
decided to replace it with a stone-citadel combining a Vauban-style design with traditional 
local elements and materials (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: pp.28-29; Bùi Thiết, 1984: p.54; 
see Figure 2). The citadel served as the seat of the provincial mandarin and administration, 
as a garrison, an armoury, a prison, and as barracks (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.31; Bùi 
Thiết, 1984: p.59). According to Owen, Minh Mạng had been open to Western technology 
and trade, while at the same time resenting cultural and religious outside influences (Owen, 
2005: p.115). His father, Gia Long, had defeated the Tây Sơn with French military aid. Of 
particular importance in his victory was, according to Mantienne, his citadel in Gia Định, 
designed by Frenchmen Theodore Lebrun and Victor Olivier de Puymanel following a 
Vauban-style (Mantienne, 2003: pp.522-525). While French officers only participated in the 
design of two citadels, 32 Vauban-style citadels were constructed by the Nguyễn rulers 
between 1802 and 1844 to secure their rule throughout Vietnam, one of them was the citadel 
erected on Minh Mạng’s orders in Vinh (Mantienne, 2003: p.525; Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 
2003: p.30).  
“These citadels were quite perfect replicas of Vauban’s designs, but they were 
nevertheless adapted to Vietnamese particularities. First, and most important 
in Vietnamese eyes, all of these structures matched the requirements of 
traditional geomancy: they were built in propitious places where natural 
irregularities in the landscape such as rivers and the hills embodied the 
presence of positive forces and prevented negative ones from reaching them.” 
(Mantienne, 2005: p.528) 
Indeed, the Vinh citadel is located close to the Vinh River and Quyết Mountain. According to 
Nguyễn Quang Hồng, the Vauban-design is altered to include Feng shui elements (Nguyễn 
Quang Hồng, 2003: p.28-29). The citadel represents an early example of foreign influences 
in architecture and planning that were adapted to local conditions. 
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During the 19th century, Vinh became a small but important regional centre of trade and 
administration. However, Nguyễn Quang Hồng argues that urbanisation and modernisation 
processes remained limited, as the imperial administration largely maintained existing social 
structures and economic modes of production, while investments remained limited to the 
construction of the citadel (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: pp.46, 77). It was not until colonial 
rule by France that policies for the development of Vinh were formulated.14 
                                                          
14 Although colonial urbanism can be described as a modern project, the following part will only provide a 
sketch of Vinh’s colonial history. To do justice to the complexity of the interplay between visions, planning, 
actors and implementation, extensive archival research in colonial archives would be necessary. The study of 
colonial urbanism in smaller cities and towns would provide a useful corrective to the focus on large urban 
centres such as Hanoi and Saigon. For a more detailed analysis of late colonial urbanism in Vinh see (Del Testa, 
2007). Wright describes French colonial urbanism in general as a modern project (Wright 1991, 1987; Wright, 
Rabinow, 1982). Jennings and Logan provide analyses of colonial urbanism in Đà Lạt and Hanoi, respectively 
(Jennings, 2011; Logan, 2000).  
Figure 2  
One of the restored gates of Vinh Citadel. As a symbol of Vinh’s pre-colonial history the citadel’s gates have 
been restored in 2004 (picture taken by author, 9.6.2011). 
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2.2 Colonial Vinh (1885 to 1940) 
A permanent presence of the French in Indochina15 started in the 1860s, when emperor Tự 
Đức, son of Minh Mạng, was forced to cede southern provinces of Vietnam (Cochin China) 
as a colony to the French. Over the next decades, the French presence in Indochina grew 
steadily, between 1873 and 1885 the French established protectorates over Tonkin (North 
Vietnam) and Annam (Central Vietnam) (Meyer, 1996; Brocheux, Hémery, 1995). However, 
resistance against the French mounted in July 1885, when the Cần Vương movement called 
for an armed struggle for the restoration of the emperor as the legitimate ruler of Vietnam. 
According to Chu Trọng Huyến, the French captured Vinh’s citadel on 20 July 1885 as a 
direct response to political instability resulting from this revolt, and a move to fight the rebels 
who operated in the mountainous region of Nghệ An and Hà Tĩnh provinces (Chu Trọng 
Huyến, 1998: pp.39-40). Local authorities handed over the citadel and their insignia without 
resistance to the French (Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: p.43; Nguyễn Quốc Hồng, Hoàng Kim 
Oanh, 2005: p.17). Vinh’s first role under colonial rule was thus to serve as a base for the 
“pacification” of its region, a role it had already played as an imperial citadel (Nguyễn Quang 
Hồng, 2003: p.59; Bévin, 1891: p.8). A residency was established in Vinh in July 1885 
leaving intact and relying on the old administrative apparatus and mandarins (Del Testa, 
2007: p.314; Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.61).16  
According to Nguyễn Quang Hồng, the first decade of French rule in Vinh saw little 
development of the city and its economy, and brought little change for its inhabitants as the 
French concentrated on subduing resistance in the countryside. Infrastructure works, such as 
the construction of paved roads in the hinterland and to Laos, served military purposes but 
were also aimed at economic exploitation of natural resources (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: 
pp.79-82). Investments in Vinh itself focused on infrastructure, too, such as raising the 
ground level above that of the surrounding flood plain and imposing a grid pattern on the 
town’s area (Del Testa, 2007: p.314).  
Before the First World War, economic development in Indochina, and especially in Vinh, was 
boosted by newly appointed gouverneur général Paul Doumer’s investment program, 
presented in January 1879 to turn Indochina into a profitable colony. His program included 
public investments in transport infrastructure as well as production and trade led by French 
                                                          
15 Colonial Indochina included the French colony of Cochin China and protectorates over Tonkin and Annam, 
which now form Vietnam. Additionally it consisted of protectorates over Laos and Cambodia as well as an 
enclave in Guangzhouwan.  
16 The establishment of French rule in Indochina had created a dual structure of authority in the protectorates, 
in which the old imperial apparatus was mirrored by a colonial administration. These structures were reflective 
of the semi-feudal/semi-colonial social order described by Nguyễn Quang Hồng (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: 
p.62). However, while the protectorates Tonkin and Annam were formally governed by a system of indirect 
rule, this system over the years became dominated by increasingly centralised power invested in the 
gouverneur général residing in Hanoi (SarDesai, 2005: p.44). 
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capital and based on Vietnamese labour power, focusing on a number of existing and newly 
established urban centres (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.85; Del Testa, 1999). Thus, in July 
1899, Emperor Thành Thái issued a decision to found five urban centres in Annam: Thanh 
Hóa, Vinh, Huế, Faifo (Hội An), and Phan Thiết. After the decision was approved by Doumer 
in August that year, Vinh became a focus of French investment in Indochina (Nguyễn Quang 
Hồng, 2003: pp.82-87). As the first French company in Vinh the Lao Enterprise, a wood 
trading and processing company was established in 1900; the Banque Indochine had 
opened a branch in Vinh already in 1898 (Del Testa, 2007: p.315; Nguyễn Quốc Hồng et al., 
2004, p.18; Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: pp.101-102). In addition, as a distinct administrative 
unit, Vinh also received its own funds, but its budget had still to be approved by the provincial 
resident (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.86).  
Of particular importance to Vinh were Doumer’s plans for railroads that would serve 
economic and military purposes, as well as nation building (or rather, colony building)  by 
facilitating contacts between different parts of Indochina as well as different “races” (Del 
Testa, 1999: pp.319-323; Wright, 1991: pp.181-182).17 The program included eight projects, 
two of which connected Vinh to Hanoi in the north and Đông Hà in the south (Nguyễn Quang 
Hồng, 2003: p.92). Additionally, two minor railroad lines would be constructed in Vinh or its 
vicinity, the Vinh-Bến Thủy line and the Yên Lý-Phủ Quì line, in the early 20th century. The 
Vinh-Bến Thủy line connected the harbour in Bến Thủy and adjacent industries to the 
national railroad line, the Yên Lý-Phủ Quì line facilitated the transport of wood and other 
forestry products, as well as cash crops from Vinh’s hinterland to the national railroad 
(Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.95). The importance that Vinh’s colonial authorities initially 
attributed to the railroad project was expressed by the sprucing up of the city and festivities 
on the day the first train arrived from Hanoi in March 1905 (Del Testa, 1999: p.325-327) 
However, the railroad connections themselves did not bring about the desired economic 
boost, partly because they were finished much later than planned for, partly because their 
dimensions far exceeded actual demand (Hardy, 1998: p.816; Wright, 1991: p.182).18 
Additionally, the vision of racial association in the colonies had been abandoned by the 
French by the time of completion, as had been the railroad by the automobile as the favourite 
means of transport (Del Testa, 1999). Instead, the railroad provided economic impetus to 
Vinh in another way. The first French companies established in Vinh were trading and 
processing wood. The construction of the railroad required large amounts of railroad ties, 
                                                          
17 Doumer’s railroad plan relied on public investment, it passed the French Chamber of Deputies in late 1898 
(Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.92; Del Testa, 1999: p.323). 
18 Doumer’s plans were described as “megalomaniac programmes anticipating by decades the real needs of the 
country” by a contemporary, banker and economist Paul Bernard (Hardy, 1998: p.816; citing Bernard, 1934: 
p.178). According to Wright, the railroads and train stations “demonstrated Western power but did so in a way 
that was at best narrowly partisan exhibitionism, and all too often mindless display” (Wright, 1991: p.183).  
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boosting the business of French wood traders (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.102). The 
largest numbers of industrial workers were employed by railroad associated industries in the 
Vinh depot and the “Atelier de grande réparation de chemin de fer Truong Thi”19. The depot 
was constructed close to the train station (in the area of today’s Quang Trung Housing 
Complex) in 1905, servicing trains and carrying out minor repairs. The more important 
decision was to locate the atelier, Indochina’s second largest railroad repair workshop, in 
Trường Thi, a village east of the citadel. Construction of the atelier began in 1908 and it 
quickly attracted about 1,000-1,200 workers. In contrast to the unskilled workforce of other 
enterprises, many of the atelier and depot workers had undergone vocational training in 
Hanoi and lived in a separate village close to Trường Thi referred to as “Northerner Village” 
due to their training in the capital (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: pp.96-98; Chu Trọng Huyến, 
1998: pp.47-48).  
 
 
Trading in wood and wood products would become the sector in which most French 
enterprises in Vinh invested (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.102).20 Probably the company 
with the largest workforce (300-350 workers) was the Indochina Match Company, founded in 
Bến Thủy in 1903. The company’s products soon drove Chinese matches out of the 
Vietnamese market and were sold in all of Indochina and exported to other French colonies 
(Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.103). Wood products also dominated trade channelled 
through Bến Thủy harbour, which mainly served the export of forestry and agricultural 
products (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.99). While the French dominated industries and 
export trade, Vietnamese, often from Hanoi, were successful in the transport business (Chu 
Trọng Huyến, 1998: p.47; Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: pp.135-137). Many Vietnamese 
worked as unskilled labourers in factories, as porters, hairdressers, tailors, or shoemakers 
(Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.149). Especially employment in factories and as porters 
involved poor working conditions and hard manual labour, women represented a large 
percentage in both occupations (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: pp.100, 180).  
When the First World War broke out in 1914, today’s area of Vinh consisted of three 
separate centres: the administrative and market centre around the citadel, the railroad atelier 
in Trường Thi, and the Bến Thủy area with the harbour as well as wood and trading 
industries. Public investments had mainly consisted of infrastructure projects such as streets 
connecting the three areas, other works focused on the citadel area where most French lived 
                                                          
19 “Atelier for large railroad repairs Trường Thi” 
20 One of the larger wood trading companies was owned by Lê Viết Lới, employing up to 50 workers (Nguyễn 
Quang Hồng, 2003: p.103). However, his company could not compete with large French companies and was 
driven out of the market in the 1930s (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.140).  
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(Del Testa 2007: p.315; Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: pp.91, 104-105). Compared to pre-
colonial times, the economic role of Vinh had grown relative to its administrative function. 
Nguyễn Quang Hồng describes Vinh and its surroundings as an assembly of villages 
interspersed with industrial and trading facilities, rather than an urban centre (Nguyễn Quang 
Hồng, 2003: p.105). However, the population of Vinh alone (not including Trường Thi and 
Bến Thủy) had grown considerably in the first 20-30 years of colonial rule, though estimates 
vary widely. According to Chu Trọng Huyến, Vinh’s population was about 12,000 by 1901, of 
which 40 were Europeans and 161 Chinese (Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: p.49, citing the 
magazine Annam général 1901). The Annuaire Général de l’Indo-Chine provides population 
numbers of Vinh for 1904: about 4,600 (including 68 Europeans, 200 Chinese) (Annuaire 
Général de l’Indo-Chine, 1904: p.562). The population of Vinh in the early 20th century seems 
thus to have grown by 50% to 300% compared to the pre-colonial population estimated by 
Del Testa (Del Testa, 2007: p.313).21   
As the importance of industries and trade located in Trường Thi and Bến Thủy grew relative 
to the administrative function of Vinh, both were elevated to the rank of separate urban 
centres in 1916 (Bến Thủy22) and 1917 (Trường Thi) (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: pp.107-
109).23 After the First World War, French investments in Indochina grew (Hardy, 1998: 
pp.808-810). Again, Vinh benefited mainly from expansion of the railway, the Trường Thi 
atelier’s workforce tripled from a pre-war number of about 1,000 to 3,000-3,200 after the war 
(Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.129). The years after the war saw economic growth and 
public investments in infrastructure; cinemas, a stadium and racially separated swimming 
pools were constructed. Enterprises and wealthy households were connected to a power grid 
in 1922-23, electricity was provided by a coal-fed power plant constructed by the Société 
                                                          
21 Chu Trọng Huyến probably includes the inhabitants of Bến Thủy and Trường Thi; this would explain the large 
difference. However, all numbers have to be taken with caution. Del Testa does not provide any reference for 
his estimate, official figures for the population of Nghệ An and Vinh vary considerably over the years with no 
explanation given. While the Annuaire de l’Indo-Chine gives population number of Nghệ An province for every 
year, the numbers for Vinh are unfortunately only provided in the 1904 issue. According to Del Testa, Vinh’s 
population was 35,000 in 1906, including 350 Europeans, and 100,000 in 1937, including 440 Europeans. 
However, he again does not provide specific references (he summarizes his statistical references on p.312). 
Additionally, it remains unclear if he refers only to the Vinh area around the citadel, or includes Bến Thủy and 
Trường Thi in this number. In any case, while the numbers given in the text above might be underestimates 
especially regarding the Vietnamese population, his numbers seem exaggerated. According to the Annuaire 
Général de L'Indo-Chine 1906, only 181 Europeans lived in the whole of Nghệ An province in 1906 (Annuaire 
Général de L'Indo-Chine, 1906: p.399). That number grew to 280 in 1925 (Annuaire Général de l’Indo-Chine, 
1925: p.278). While the numbers given for the Vietnamese population are very unreliable due to their 
unrealistic changes, I expect the number of Europeans living in Nghệ An to be more accurate, as the Europeans 
were probably better known to authorities. A population size of 100,000 was not reached until after the 
American War, despite considerable enlargement of the city’s area over the years. 
22 While the decision to elevate Bến Thủy’s status to that of an urban centre was taken by emperor Duy Tân in 
1914 and confirmed by the resident-general of Annam the same year, the governor-general of Indochina 
confirmed this decision only in 1916 (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.107; Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: p.50) 
23 All three urban centres, Vinh, Trường Thi and Bến Thủy, shared the same assembly of representatives 
(Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.110). 
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Indochinoise de Forêts et d’Allumettes (SIFA)24 (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: pp.117-120, 
133, 169; Bùi Thiết, 1984: p.154).  
Economic growth after the war saw increasing social and occupational differentiation. The 
industrial workforce grew to about 8,000 during the 1920s, of which most were unskilled 
labourers whose families continued to farm their own land (Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: pp.67-
75). The expanding public service provided white-collar jobs to Vietnamese (Del Testa, 2007: 
p.318). Growing numbers of Vietnamese entrepreneurs benefited from new trade 
opportunities provided by the colonial economy, modern technologies and improved 
infrastructure (Del Testa, 2007: p.321; Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: pp.99, 132-137, 143). 
Chinese traders continued to operate in local trade as well as to sell silk and Chinese 
medicine, a small number of Indians also continued to specialize in trading silk and fabrics 
(Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: pp.145-146; Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: pp.48-49).  
By the 1920s, the formerly prevailing subsistence economy had been largely replaced by a 
money economy in the Vinh area (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.156). However, 
modernisation did not only affect the economy and infrastructure. In 1918 the local school 
preparing for examinations was closed as part of educational and administrative reforms 
abolishing the traditional systems. Instead, a school (trường Quốc học, School for National 
Learning) preparing for positions in a modern colonial administration opened in 1920 
(Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: pp.132-133; Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: pp.54-66; Bùi Thiết, 
1984: p.77-92). Large numbers of students passed through colonial education in Vinh, 
according to Chu Trọng Huyến, 1,090 students were enrolled in secondary schools in 1940 
(Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: p.65). 
 
Due to economic and urban growth, in 1927 Vinh, Bến Thủy, and Trường Thi were merged 
into the urban centre Vinh-Bến Thủy with a population of about 20,000 (Nguyễn Quang 
Hồng, 2003: p.152). Thus, an administrative unit had been formed that incorporated the 
administrative, educational, and trade centre in Vinh, the harbour and industries in Bến Thủy, 
and the railroad atelier in Trường Thi. However, growth and development in the 1920s was 
short-lived. From the beginning, the perceived economic potential of Vinh had relied on its 
harbour that was seen as crucial for exploitation of the region’s resources. Yet, the amount of 
goods passing through Bến Thủy harbour always remained lower than that in Đà Nẵng, 
Central Vietnam’s largest port, and at no point reached the envisaged quantity. Although the 
mouth of the Lam River was repeatedly dredged, it remained too shallow for the operation of 
                                                          
24 The Indochinese Forestry and Match Society. SIFA resulted from a 1922 merger of the Indochina Match 
Company and a wood trading and processing company, it would become the largest company in Annam, 
employing 750-800 workers in Bến Thủy (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.155; Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: p.52).  
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large ships (Del Testa, 2007: p.319; Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: pp.121-124). Plans for a 
permanent solution were regarded as too costly and never implemented (Nguyễn Quang 
Hồng, 2003: p.227; Gouvernement général de l'Indochine, Inspection générale des travaux 
publics publiques, 1930: pp.10-11). The Great Depression starting in late 1929 had severe 
impacts on Vinh’s colonial development. Especially Vietnamese enterprises suffered and had 
to close, while French companies were often large enough to survive the crisis (Del Testa, 
2007: p.321; Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: pp.135-137; Ville de Vinh-Bênthuy, 1933: p.1). 
Public investments in Vinh, especially in its harbour, were cut (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: 
p.194, 227-228). 
As in other parts of Vietnam, the Depression worsened the living conditions of many 
Vietnamese (Duiker, 2000: p.176). Tensions between modernisation, colonialism, and 
tradition proved a fertile breeding ground for resistance against colonialism and feudalism. 
Revolutionary groups had agitated among industrial workers in Vinh since the late 1920s, 
modern printing presses owned by Vietnamese played an important role in disseminating 
works of European thinkers and revolutionary pamphlets (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: 
pp.143-4, 169, 195, 231, 259; Duiker, 2000: p.177; see also McHale, 2004). From about 
1927 on, strikes took place in the railroad atelier, the match factory, and other enterprises 
supported by students and teachers of the National School (Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: pp.79-
80). In 1930, cells of the Indochinese Communist Party existed in most major enterprises in 
Vinh (Nguyễn Quốc Hồng et al., 2004: p.39; Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: p.88; see also Service 
de la sureté du Tonkin et du Nord-Annam, 1931). On 1 May 1930, large demonstrations of 
peasants and workers took place in Vinh, starting a series of uprisings and the establishment 
of peasant-governed areas that came to be known as the Nghệ Tĩnh Soviets (Nguyen Duy 
Quy, 2006; Duiker, 2000: p.179). Vinh as a small urban and industrial centre played an 
important role in the alliance between intellectuals (notably of the Quốc học school), workers 
and peasants. Industrial workers maintained close ties with surrounding villages, in which 
their families lived and to which many returned after their day’s work. These rural-urban 
connections and the small size of the city allowed for flows of information between different 
social groups, which were not as isolated from each other as in larger urban centres (Del 
Testa, 2007: pp.319-320; Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: pp.67-74). It took the French over a year 
to violently crush the uprisings and destroy the Communist Party’s organisations in Nghệ An 
(Nguyen Duy Quy, 2006; Nguyễn Quốc Hồng, Hoàng Kim Oanh, 2005: p.53; Duiker, 2000: 
p.197). Undeterred, strikes and uprisings persisted throughout the 1930s, with Party 
organisations re-established in the mid-30s (Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: pp.129, 135, 152; 
Nguyễn Quốc Hồng, Hoàng Kim Oanh, 2005: p.71). The Dépêche Coloniale of 3.5.1931 
judged that the surroundings of Vinh were the area of strongest communist agitation and 
activity in Vietnam (Dépêche Coloniale, cited by Do Duc Ho, 1938: p.62).  
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Due to the Great Depression and the unstable and dangerous political situation, nearly no 
new investments25 were carried out by the French in Vinh during the 1930s (Nguyễn Quang 
Hồng, 2003: pp.196, 201). The late 1930s saw an “indigenisation” of Vinh as the number and 
importance of Vietnamese in the administration, the economy and in public affairs increased: 
“by 1939, more Vietnamese were in charge of more aspects of the ‘modern’ administration 
and economy than in 1930. By the late 1930s, the Vietnamese effectively ran the modern 
state and economic apparatus the French had created” (Del Testa, 2005: p.317). 
Modernisation under colonialism had, however, not only resulted in widespread changes in 
the economy and the administration. Especially those Vietnamese living in urban areas of 
Vietnam experienced important changes in social life during colonial rule (Dutton, 2012; 
Woodside, 1971). For example, new forms of association and social identity developed in 
Vinh as a Chamber of Commerce or a club for the promotion of traditional music were 
founded (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: pp.166-170, 250-252). 
                                                          
25 Notable exceptions were the enlargement of the Trường Thi atelier in 1938, which doubled its size compared 
to the original atelier constructed in 1908, and the construction of an airport to the north of Vinh (Nguyễn 
Quang Hồng, 2003: p.213; Bulletin administrative de l’Annam, 16.12.1933: p.1973-1974). 
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2.3 The First Two Destructions of Vinh (1940 to 1964) 
Collaboration of the colonial government with the Japanese from 1940 on saw the stationing 
of up to 10,000 Japanese soldiers in Vinh’s vicinity (Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: p.183). The 
French colonial and Vietnamese imperial administration as well as parts of the population 
collaborated with the Japanese who imposed corvée labour, land acquisitions, and new 
taxes (Nguyễn Quốc Hồng, Hoàng Kim Oanh, 2005:  p.100-104; Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: 
p.179). The extraction of resources for the Japanese war efforts, especially of food to supply 
Japanese soldiers, put a large burden on Nghệ An’s economy and the population. In 
addition, bombing by Allied forces destroyed transport infrastructure and prompted the 
relocation of enterprises from Vinh to Hanoi (Nguyễn Quang Hồng, 2003: p.220). Chu Trọng 
Huyến claims that during the 1945 famine in Northern Vietnam 60,000 people starved to 
death in Nghệ An alone (Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: p.185).26 The French administration 
became increasingly powerless during collaboration with the Japanese, according to Del 
Testa “it seems the city was Vietnamese in terms of its political authority in everything but 
name” by the time the Japanese abolished French rule in Indochina and interned most 
French on 9 March 1945 (Del Testa, 2007: p.309).27 
While the Việt Minh, the League for the Independence of Vietnam, held control of Tonkin’s 
northern-most provinces since 1944, they started to establish themselves in Vinh in May 
1945, only after the Japanese had taken the place of the French and established a 
nationalist government under Emperor Bảo Đại. Shortly after the announcement of Japanese 
surrender on 14 August 1945, popular uprisings, at times incited by the Việt Minh, seized 
power throughout North Vietnam (Duiker, 2000: pp.307-308). In Vinh, different groups aiming 
at overthrowing Japanese rule united under their banner (Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: pp.186-
193). After negotiating with the Japanese local commander who agreed to hand over 
weapons and ammunition, the Việt Minh mobilized large groups of peasant and workers to 
seize power in Vinh on 21 August 1945 (Nguyễn Quốc Hồng, Hoàng Kim Oanh, 2005:  
pp.111-112; Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: pp.193-197). On 2 February 1945, Hồ Chí Minh 
proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in Hanoi 
(Duiker, 2002: pp.322-324). 
During Japanese occupation, most of Vinh’s industries had been relocated or abandoned. 
When the Việt Minh took power in Vinh in August 1945, only the railway atelier in Trường Thi 
and the depot by the train station were operational, all private factories had been closed. The 
Việt Minh aimed at establishing a new administration and a functioning state, responding to a 
chaotic and lawless situation in the city. While they had seized power from the Japanese, 
                                                          
26 As estimates of the total death toll in range up to 1 Mio this number seems realistic (Duiker, 2000: p.308). 
27 In contrast, Vietnamese sources emphasise resistance of common Vietnamese against French/Japanese rule 
(Chu Trọng Huyến, 1998: p.178-185; Nguyễn Quốc Hồng, Hoàng Kim Oanh, 2005: p.104-106).  
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they had to cooperate with nationalist Chinese troops that entered the city to disarm 
Japanese forces. Additionally, different political parties and factions sought to gain power in 
Vinh (Hoàng Ngọc Anh et al., 2003: pp.9-33). By mid-1946, the Communist Party had largely 
consolidated control over the city, with the Chinese forces having pulled out in April and the 
leadership of the Vietnamese Nationalist Party in Nghệ An arrested in June and July (Hoàng 
Ngọc Anh et al., 2003: pp.32-33).28 Throughout 1946, tensions between the returning French 
and the newly established Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) mounted, and open 
hostilities broke out in the last month of that year (Duiker, 2000: pp.346-398). In Vinh, 
preparations for hostilities started in October 1946, when fighting escalated in Hanoi in 
December, the 34 French soldiers stationed in Vinh were disarmed and interned together 
with the Chinese population (Nguyễn Quang Vinh, Dương Thanh Bình, 2007: pp.56-57; 
Hoàng Ngọc Anh et al., 2003: pp.39-48).  
Hồ Chí Minh had called for a scorched earth policy29 in case war with the French broke out; it 
was carried out in Vinh over a five-month period starting in early 1947. The city’s population 
and facilities were dispersed throughout the countryside. In total 20,000 tons of materials 
were dismantled; what could not be transported was destroyed, including the citadel, 1,335 
houses (including 301 multistorey buildings), 300 train coaches, and twelve locomotives 
(Hoàng Ngọc Anh et al., 2003: pp.48-55; Bùi Thiết, 1984:  p.52). Throughout the First 
Indochina War (until 1954) only a small population of villagers remained in the area. 
Previously industrial areas became agricultural land again. Who actually controlled the area 
during the war remains unclear in light of sources available to me. While the Việt Minh were 
able to recruit fighters in the area, they and their policies also met with resistance from the 
remaining population (Nguyễn Quang Vinh, Dương Thanh Bình, 2007: p.61; Nguyễn Văn 
Chiến, 2007: p.80; Nguyễn Quốc Hồng, Hoàng Kim Oanh, 2005:  p.138; Hoàng Ngọc Anh et 
al., 2003: pp.78-96). In addition to destruction carried out by the Việt Minh in 1947, the 
French bombarded and destroyed remaining infrastructure such as bridges during the war. 
Thus, when the war ended and the Việt Minh returned to power in Vinh in 1954, the city had 
been nearly totally destroyed (Hoàng Ngọc Anh et al., 2003: p.103).  
 
During the 1950s, DRV authorities focused on the re-organisation of the economy according 
to socialist principles. Popular resistance especially to a land reform prompted the DRV and 
the Vietnam Worker’s Party to abandon the most radical policies. In Nghệ An, protests 
against land reform erupted in violence in late 1956, villagers took DRV soldiers and Party 
officials prisoners (Schwab, 11.1.1957). During rectification of land reform excesses, 
                                                          
28 For a detailed account of the establishment of the DRV in North Vietnam see (Marr, 2013). 
29 Phá hoại để kháng chiến (destroy to resist). 
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between 6,229 and 11,700 families were compensated, 11,646 Party members had been 
falsely accused and were reinstated (Nguyễn Quốc Hồng, Hoàng Kim Oanh, 2005:  p.154; 
Hoàng Ngọc Anh et al., 2003: p.118).  
While during the war, authorities considered moving the provincial centre away from Vinh, 
these considerations were abandoned and from 1954 on, people, institutions, and 
enterprises returned to Vinh (UBKCHC Nghệ An, n.d.). Urban development shows little 
marks of large scale development projects or the formulation of comprehensive policies for 
social reorganisation of the city through urban planning or design until the early 1960s. In 
general, policies focused on the transformation of the economy and the establishment of a 
functioning state. Collectivisation of agriculture in the countryside was mirrored by 
expropriation of entrepreneurs and the establishment of collective ownership and state 
management of their enterprises in the late 1950s. In Vinh, depending on their occupation, 
83% to 99% of workers had been organized in collectives by 1961 (Hoàng Ngọc Anh et al., 
2003: pp.120-122; Nguyễn Quốc Hồng, Hoàng Kim Oanh, 2005: p.159; UBHC Nghệ An, 
UBHC Vinh, 8.9.1961; UBHC Nghệ An, UBHC Vinh, 9.3.1961).30 A multistorey state 
department store became the symbol of the new economic order (see Figure 3; Hoàng Ngọc 
Anh et al., 2003: p.127; see pictures in Thành ủy thành phố Vinh et al., 2003). 
Following a Politburo decision, a public investment program focused on the creation of 
industries and relevant infrastructure. By 1960, 40 factories and enterprises had been 
established by central and local agencies in Vinh, the industrial workforce had grown to 
10,000 workers (Hoàng Ngọc Anh et al., 2003: p.125; Nguyen Sy Thuy et al., 2011: pp.12-
13; Nguyễn Quốc Hồng et al., 2004: p.127). The creation of an electricity network, including 
a new power plant, was assisted by the USSR with experts and 400,000 Roubles (Bùi Thiết, 
1984: pp.152-157). In contrast to colonial times, plans envisaged electricity supplied to all of 
Vinh’s inhabitants (UBHC Nghệ An, 9.11.1954; UBKCHC Nghệ An, 27.9.1954).   
The state also invested in the social infrastructure focusing on re-establishing Vinh as an 
educational centre, including a university and two colleges, as well as a primary school in 
each of the 5 urban areas (khu phố) and secondary schools. Additionally, hospitals (one with 
assistance of the People’s Republic of Poland), cinemas, a theatre, a library, and a museum 
commemorating the Nghệ Tĩnh Soviets were constructed (Nguyen Sy Thuy et al., 2011: 
p.13; Hoàng Ngọc Anh et al., 2003: pp.129-133; UBHC Nghệ An, 28.11.1961; UBKH Nhà 
nước, 27.4.1962).  
                                                          
30 Further documents show that even in agriculture, some families continued to work individually outside 
cooperatives, see for example (UBHC Nghệ An, UBHC Vinh, 30.11.1962). 
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During the 1950s, Vinh’s inhabitants largely constructed their own housing, using mainly 
wood and bamboo. Such buildings were repeatedly destroyed by fires, storms and floods 
(Hoàng Ngọc Anh et al., 2003: pp.105-109; UBHC Nghệ An, n.d.). After large scale 
destruction caused by a fire in August 1961, Vinh for the first time saw a public housing 
program (Hoàng Ngọc Anh et al., 2003: pp.110, 145). In 1961 and 1962, a small number of 
simple three-storey apartment buildings were constructed close to the city centre (Bộ Kiến 
trúc, Công ty Kiến trúc Vinh, 16.12.1961; UBHC Nghệ An, n.d.). Designs, plans, and funds 
were supplied by central agencies, while construction materials were sourced locally (Bộ 
Kiến trúc, Công ty Kiến trúc Vinh, 27.10.1961; UBKH Nhà nước, 20.9.1961). The 
construction of public housing was in line with plans for socialist urban development (Đảng 
Lao động Việt Nam, BCHTƯ 28.12.1961). The early 1960s saw the first important decisions 
for planning and development of Vinh in the DRV. In 1963, Vinh’s status was elevated from 
town to city, after it had been designated to become one of five industrial centres of the DRV 
in 1961 (Hoàng Ngọc Anh et al., 2003: pp.138, 144-146; Hội Đồng Chính phủ, 10.10.1963). 
By 1964, Vinh’s population had grown to 72,000, the city covered an area of 26km² (Nguyễn 
Quốc Hồng, et al. 2004: p.147).  
The Geneva Peace agreement provided for the temporary establishment of two separate 
states in Vietnam, the DRV in the north and the Republic of Vietnam in the south. Common 
elections and unification were to take place within two years. However, the Republic of 
Vietnam supported by the United States of America (US) refused to hold elections. The 
conflict turned into armed struggle in the South between the Republic of Vietnam government 
and the US on one side and the National Liberation Front and the DRV on the other. As the 
situation deteriorated the US turned to bombing the DRV after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in 
August 1964 (SarDesai, 2005: pp.67-100; Duiker, 2000: pp.515-561). On 5 August 1964, the 
US bombed Vinh for the first time. In May and June 1965, most inhabitants as well as goods, 
machines and institutions were evacuated (Hoàng Ngọc Anh et al., 2003: pp.167-175). As 
Vinh and nearby harbours were important nodes in the transport of supplies and troops to the 
war in Southern Vietnam, US bombing especially targeted transport infrastructure (Nguyễn 
Văn Chiến, 2007: p.112; Bùi Thiết, 1984: p.143). While a number of workshops as well as 
the power plant remained in Vinh, intensified bombing in 1968 prompted the evacuation of 
nearly all remaining facilities and inhabitants (Hoàng Ngọc Anh et al., 2003: p.187). Bombing 
of the DRV by the US put a hold on urban development in Vinh and totally destroyed the city. 
Plans for its reconstruction envisaged the creation of a Socialist City. As the next chapter will 
show, two attempts were made to implement this modern project.  
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Figure 3  
The state department store, once a 
symbol of socialist economic 
development was destroyed during US-
bombing in the 1960s (National 
Archives Centre III Tài hiệu ảnh giải 
đoàn 1954-1985 (LIV) Quyển 1/764). 
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3. The Socialist City 
 
The American War saw the total destruction of Vinh. At the time of the city’s reconstruction, 
modern urban planning had become the norm in the DRV. As in other socialist countries, 
modern urban planning was assisted, promoted and thereby influenced by the Soviet Union 
(see for example Zarecor, 2011; Stanilov, 2007; Regulska, 1987; Carter, 1979; Werwicki, 
1979). As has been described above, socialism as it came into practice in the USSR 
presented a particular form of modernity, that was influenced by national factors of Tsarist 
Russia and the Soviet Union, theoretical input derived from Marx and other writers, as well 
as from the contestation of the first, Western cultural program of modernity. With regards to 
cities, developments in the USSR had led to a socialist variant of modern urban planning, the 
Socialist City, a modern project aimed at furthering socialist development and society 
through the intentional design of urban space (French, 1995).  
When the DRV government turned to other socialist countries for help in the reconstruction of 
its cities, the choice for assisting in the reconstruction of Vinh fell to the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR). The following parts will first introduce the concepts and elements of the 
Socialist City of the Soviet Union. After that, the application of this modern project in the 
reconstruction of Vinh with the help of the GDR is presented and analysed. As the 
reconstruction of Vinh is the result of the interplay of international politics and urban planning 
in the DRV and the GDR, the background on urban development in the DRV from 1954 until 
1973 and in the GDR from 1945 to 1973, as well as on the relationship between the two 
countries, is also provided. 
  
Detailed planning to achieve the creation of a Socialist City started in Vinh in the mid-1960s 
under the leadership of the Institute for Urban Planning31 of the Ministry of Architecture (MoA, 
which would later become part of the newly formed Ministry of Construction) (UBHC Nghệ 
An, 25.7.1966). Apart from reconstruction, planning aimed at enlarging Vinh’s area to create 
an administrative unit able to rely on internal food supply. While the initiative to enlarge the 
administrative area originated from Nghệ An’s Provincial Administrative Committee (PAC), 
responsibility and decision-making power for such an administrative reorganisation lay with 
                                                          
31 The Institute’s name changed several times or is abbreviated differently in different documents. Names given 
are for example Institute for Urban Design and Planning, Institute for Urban and Rural Design and Planning. For 
readability, I will refer to the institute as Institute for Urban Planning in the text; references give the 
designation used in the relevant documents.  
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the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Interior, to which the PAC addressed its request for 
enlargement (UBHC Nghệ An, 13.10.1966).  
Guidelines issued by the National Reconstruction Committee in July 1968 highlight attempts 
to establish central control over provinces and especially cities (UBKTCB Nhà nước, 
1.7.1968). These guidelines stipulate standards for planning and reconstruction of Vietnam’s 
cities after the war. They assigned responsibility for planning to provincial authorities, while 
plans had to be presented to and approved by the Council of Ministers, the National 
Reconstruction Committee, the National Planning Committee, and the MoA. Not only did this 
document in detail prescribe the planning process, it also formulated strategies for new and 
re-constructed cities. These posited industrialisation and production as a city’s most 
important functions. Guiding concept was the compact city, in which the widespread 
construction of multistorey buildings makes economic use of space and resources, as well as 
provides an urban appearance. Housing complexes were supposed to hierarchically 
structure the urban area. The target of 6m² living space per person is supposed to be 
achieved 15 years after the end of the war. The city centre is regarded as expressing the 
cultural and political function of the city, incorporating local natural conditions, as well as 
symbols of revolution, history, and technological progress, to be achieved by the construction 
of impressive high-rise buildings and monuments. While the document forecasts that 
economic conditions after the war will heavily impact such ambitions, it emphasises the 
communicative effect of the city centre; therefore the construction of several permanent high-
rise buildings in the city centre is projected for the immediate time after the war. The city 
centre is also highlighted by the envisioned Central Place surrounded by administrative and 
cultural buildings. In addition to ideological symbolism, reconstruction priority lies on the 
restoration of pre-war buildings and structures, avoiding pre-war mistakes. Reconstruction 
would thus focus on industries and public buildings; self-supplied temporary shelter is 
regarded as sufficient for the urban population (UBKTCB Nhà nước, 1.7.1968). 
Important elements of an ideal Socialist City are exemplified in this directive: centralized and 
hierarchical planning, the city as a centre of socialized production and egalitarian 
consumption, the city centre as a symbol of a new society and its achievements, the 
importance of the Central Place, housing complexes as structuring urban units, standardized 
housing conditions. The next section will show how these elements became central to the 
modern project of the Socialist City, and how the relative importance of these elements 
shifted. Most influential for theorizing on the Socialist City were urban development and 
planning in the Soviet Union. As a hegemonic power and the centre of world revolution, 
concepts developed and applied in the USSR became influential in other socialist countries, 
among them Vietnam and the German Democratic Republic.  
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3.1 The Origins of the Socialist City 
The October Revolution of 1917 made the USSR the first socialist state; therefore the 
institutions of existing socialism in other countries were heavily influenced by the forms 
socialist modernity took in the USSR (Arnason, 2001). It also became the place where ideas 
and theories of a Socialist City as a modern project were first developed and applied. The 
Socialist City can be described as a modern projects based on thoughts and plans 
concerning cities in socialist countries, as well as from the implementation of these plans. 
Theories and results were, however, not particular to socialist countries. Specifics resulted to 
a large degree from the application of ideals and theory in the respective institutional setting. 
The following parts will describe the characteristics of the Socialist City, resulting partly from 
planning ideals, partly from the application of these ideals. In addition, it will show how urban 
policies that subsequently became influential in other countries were to a large degree 
influenced by national politics and power struggles within the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU). 
 
3.1.1 Planning Ideals  
Cities were nearly exclusively seen as a desirable form of living in the USSR (French, 1979: 
pp.76-77). As the urban and industrial proletariat played a leading role in the writings of Marx 
and the Russian Revolution, the city was perceived as the place where production and 
proletarian culture could best be developed (Harloe, 1996: p.1; French, 1995: p.3). At the 
same time, cities were regarded as the social environment that would further collective 
identity, production, and consumption to achieve an ideal socialist society (Smith, 1996: 
pp.70-71; French, Hamilton, 1979: p.7). The construction of cities was therefore regarded as 
contributing to the construction of Socialism (Humphrey, 2005). The roots of poor conditions 
in existing cities were seen in the capitalist or feudal structures these cities were embedded 
in. Thus, a new Socialist City would be necessary, shaped by new social and political forces 
as well as expressing these (Häussermann, 1996: p.214; French, 1995: p.3; Bater, 1980: 
p.1).  
The search for such a city on the one hand followed international discourses on urban 
planning and architecture; on the other hand the USSR provided a setting for the formulation 
of utopian models of social organisation and social experiments.32 Most regarded housing in 
buildings following a “modern“ style, standardized housing in multistorey buildings in a 
universal “modernist” architecture using concrete and glass as prominent materials, as the 
                                                          
32 Large numbers of West European architects participated in these debates (the largest group were German 
architects), partly because of ideological/idealistic reasons, partly because earlier attempts to apply their ideas 
of social housing had failed in their home countries and partly because employment opportunities were rare 
due to the world economic crisis (Richter, 2006: pp.24-26; Durth et al., 1998a: pp.36-37). 
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suitable form for socialist living. The theoretical argument for this style largely resulted from 
the rejection of old architectural forms and symbols. This not only symbolic rejection of old 
social norms also led to experiments with communal living and the rejection of family life 
(French, 1995: pp.30, 37). However, such experiments were soon abandoned and 
apartments for the nuclear family became to be regarded as the most desirable form of 
accommodation; housing in dormitories or of several families in one apartment was later due 
to economic necessities, not theoretical or idealistic reasons (French, 1995: pp.37-40, 81; 
Smith, 1996: p.70; Reiner, Wilson, 1979: pp.60-61; Humphrey, 2005: pp.44-45; see also 
Footnote 34). The search for socialist living and housing forms created diverse debates and 
lines of thought during the 1920s (Bater, 1980: pp.23-24). According to French most planners 
and architects in the USSR during that time regarded themselves as “experts” or artists, who 
planned for people but not with them. Through their art, plans and concepts they wanted to 
change society, often with little regard to the wishes of those who would populate their cities 
and buildings, at the same time they shared a strong believe in new modern technological 
solutions (French, 1995: pp.33-34, 38-39). Socialisation of the means of production and 
centralized power of the state were seen as providing the means for effective implementation 
of planners’ ideals (Smith, 1996: pp.72, 75). 
Especially the garden city concept became influential in the search for a Socialist City. 
Ebenezer Howard’s ideas presented a way to dissolve the differences between city and 
countryside and to form a new society by creating a new living environment. Howard put 
emphasis on sufficient space and green areas for inhabitants, in a city that was planned as a 
whole unit. His work and the garden city movement had been influential in Russia even 
before the October Revolution. A section of the International Garden City Society had been 
formed in St Petersburg in 1913 and was re-established in Moscow in 1922. First garden 
cities had been constructed during Tsarist rule. The chief planner of one of the showcase 
projects, a railroad worker dormitory in Prozorovka, would later be responsible to prepare the 
General Plan for Moscow in 1935. After the revolution, garden cities had been constructed as 
suburbs of Tver’, Ivanovo, and Bryansk. The lasting influence of the garden city concept on 
the Socialist City lies in its generous open and green spaces as well as in the idea to plan 
whole cities as one complete unit (Howard, 2001; French, 1995: pp.24, 31-32).  
Many of the differences to cities in capitalist countries result from fundamental differences in 
the economic and political system: “The nationalization of all resources, and the substitution 
of centralized planning for the market to develop and allocate them, has obvious 
consequences for the city” (Bater, 1980: p.3). This translates into a number of characteristics 
of socialist urbanism. As privatism is supposed to be abolished, standardized state-owned 
apartments were seen as the ideal housing form, although due to economic difficulties 
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privately and cooperatively owned housing was accepted. Still, land for the construction of 
these was allocated by the state, as were state-owned apartments (Bater, 1980: p.3). 
Standardisation and norms were supposed to attain equality of living conditions. As the 
market was abolished, ideal allocation and distribution were to be achieved by planning, in 
the Soviet Union by centralized planning by the state bureaucracy. “The assumption is that 
the Soviet leaders know what is best for the state, that the central planning apparatus can 
determine the best course of action, and that such directives are implemented all the way 
down the line” (Bater, 1980: p.4). 
Centralised planning is one of the most important aspects of the Socialist City. In contrast to 
a capitalist city, in which land use and allocation is largely determined by the market, the 
socialized ownership of all means of production and the pre-dominant role of the state in the 
economy of socialist states ideally allow for  
“active planning, that is the active projection of economic activities (allocation 
of resources, distribution of income) as opposed to the passive forecasting of 
spontaneous development. Though in certain Western  countries  there  is  
some element  of  active  planning,  this is the universal  characteristic  of  
socialist planning.” (Fisher, 1962: p.251) 
According to Fisher, socialist theory of urban transformation regards the plan as the means 
to achieve politically defined ideals of a Socialist City (Fisher, 1962: p.251). The planner’s job 
is to organize the built environment in such a way as to balance different types of land use by 
scientific means. The city is to be planned as one, creating no distinction or division between 
different areas of the city in terms of access to services or the quality of residential areas. 
One goal is to do away with spatial segregation between different income groups among the 
inhabitants (Fisher, 1962: p.252).  
Among those elements that form part of the ideally planned Socialist City, the city centre 
takes a special place, because it is one that is functionally different from residential and 
productive areas. The city centre came to play an important role in the representation of 
Soviet power and the new society (Bater, 1980: pp.27-30). Contrary to centres of capitalist 
cities, where commerce and finance dominate, the socialist centre was to be the “political-
cultural-administrative center” of the city, the region or the nation corresponding to the 
respective city’s position in the urban hierarchy (Fisher, 1962: p.255). The centre therefore 
served as the place for important public buildings and monuments, main roads and squares 
were to provide avenues and place for the staging of large scale demonstrations and 
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parades.33 According to Bater, the imperial aspect of the Socialist City is most visibly 
expressed in the city centre (Bater, 1980: pp.27-30).  
The socialist housing complex has been described as the most indicative element of socialist 
urban planning (Smith, 1996: p.76; French, 1995: p.81). The term refers to a residential 
complex complete with infrastructure. The complex’ size was calculated based on 
reasonable walking distances, the number of its inhabitants was calculated on the capacity of 
a primary school, usually numbering between 3,000 to 4,000, sometimes rising to 7,000 
(Richter, 2006: p.34).34 The housing complex served as the lowest unit for provisions with 
public goods and collective consumption; the next higher order of residential planning and 
administration was the mikrorayon, consisting of several housing complexes and providing 
housing for about 8,000-12,000 inhabitants. They included relatively large areas of open and 
green space, institutions for child care, education, and health as well as shops and other 
services catering to daily needs (Bater, 1980: p.102). The next higher unit was the residential 
complex of 30,000-50,000 inhabitants, followed by the urban district of 100,000-300,000 
inhabitants and the urban zone of about 1 Mio inhabitants (Smith, 1996: p.75). This hierarchy 
was supposed to provide each urban resident with equal access to public services.35 Fisher 
argues that, “all the preceding features of socialist planning have gradually merged to 
support an elaborate division of the city into self-contained units. The planned structure of the 
population defines the ultimate size of the city, and thus indicates the size and number of 
neighbourhood units and the relationship of each unit’s centre to the administrative core” 
(Fisher, 1962).36 
The housing complex as an ordering principle became particularly prominent with the 
construction program beginning under Khrushchev in the 1950s (Smith, 1996: pp.75-76; 
French, Hamilton, 1979: p.60). Apart from abandoning the ornate architectural style of the 
Stalin era, this marks another instant in which socialist urban planning re-aligned itself with 
modern concepts. Although Smith sees the wide-spread application of the mikrorayon 
system as one of the characteristics of socialist cities in Eastern Europe, he also describes
                                                          
33 These ideals are for example expressed in the planning of East Berlin’s centre (Durth et al., 1998b: pp.202-
290). 
34 While housing in these units had been envisioned as communal living in the 1920s, the USSR had decreed the 
construction of apartments for families as the norm in 1932 (French, 1995: pp.42-43, 81; French, Hamilton, 
1979: pp.9-11). As the family was considered the basis for living and housing, communal living referred mainly 
to housekeeping activities (Richter, 2006: p.35). 
35 According to Smith this goal has largely been achieved within mikrorayon, but not between different ones 
(Smith, 1996: p.77). 
36 This paradox of the separation into self-contained units of a city planned as a whole is exemplified by 
Richter’s presentation of Hans Schmidt’s article in “Deutsche Architektur” in 1958, in which Schmidt accused  
urban development in West Germany as twisting the genuinely socialist concept of the housing complex and 
producing neighbourhood-units that lead to the dissolution of large urban centres, while socialist housing 
complexes produced the qualities of a small town (Richter, 2006: p.34-35, citing Schmidt, 1963). 
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the mikrorayon as reflective of ideals internationally prevalent in modern urban planning 
(Smith, 1996). According to Richter, socialist housing complexes since the inception of 
Khrushchev’s housing program conformed to the international ideal of a loosely built-up and 
functionally structured city, where construction of apartment blocks largely followed the 
needs of industrialized construction. Standardisation and the paternalistic “scientific” 
production by experts of housing and urban design were by far no unique feature of socialist 
urbanism (Hall, 2002; Wright, 1991; McLeod, 1983), neither was industrialized construction 
(Richter, 2006; Hall, 2002). The construction of large housing complexes and new urban 
centres under Khrushchev can be regarded as a Soviet combination of Howard’s Garden 
Towns and Le Corbusier’s “machines for living”. A Western interpretation of both concepts 
was for example Great Britain’s New Towns (French, 1995: pp.69-95). It is the large number 
of such complexes and their dominance in the urban fabric, made possible by central 
planning and state-ownership of land, that make them a characteristic of the Socialist City 
(French, 1995: p.93). Additionally, in contrast to such housing complexes in capitalist 
countries, open space of socialist housing complexes was communal space only (Richter, 
2006: p.35). 
 
3.1.2 Unplanned Characteristics  
Apart from planning ideals and theoretical considerations, some features have been 
described as characteristic of the Socialist City that result from the application of these ideals 
and considerations in the institutional setting of state-socialism and the course of 
development chosen by the USSR (Szelenyi, 1996: p.287).  
Fast, and partly forced, industrialisation relied on massive migration of rural dwellers to urban 
areas and newly established industrial centres. This resulted in difficulties as the urban 
environment and living conditions were ill-adapted to the rural lifestyles of many migrants 
(Enyedi, 1996: p.117; Hamilton, Burnett, 1979). Fisher supports this view: “Peasants with 
rural attitudes and mores were incorporated into the newly constructed urban environment. 
The social consequences have often been disastrous for the individual” (Fisher, 1962: 
p.262). Planners in many cases underestimated the problems resulting from the fast 
transition from rural to urban lifestyles. However, Fisher indicates that the uncertainties 
experienced by individuals during this transition were at times part of the construction of a 
new socialist society:  
“The rural newcomer, housed in a temporary dwelling with little or no privacy, 
was unwittingly engaged in building the socialist future. His initial bewilderment 
provided the opportunity for a new set of attitudes to be ingrained in his mind, 
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where the only element of stability within his unstable world was the apparent 
strength of the Party.” (Fisher, 1962: p.262) 
In most cases plans were oriented towards a politically defined ideal; participation of those 
who would eventually live in the new apartments was lacking and took place mainly in the 
form of voicing opinions at organized exhibitions (Enyedi, 1996: p.114). Being oriented 
towards the ideal city, plans did not take economic realities sufficiently into account. 
“Standard” living space soon became the maximum space available; housing was in many 
cases of poor quality and in short supply (Bater, 1980: p.98). Despite the programs to supply 
adequate housing to all citizens of the USSR, this goal had not been achieved when the 
Soviet Union fell apart. Furthermore, it resulted in the construction of housing in mikrorayon 
without accompanying public services and infrastructure. In many cases, these were added 
after the buildings had been occupied by their inhabitants for many years (French, 1995: 
pp.93, 107-109). Economic priorities and shortages also compromised the ideal of housing 
constructed and owned by the state for every citizen. Throughout its existence, the USSR 
had to rely on housing constructed and owned privately or cooperatively to alleviate housing 
shortages (Smith, 1996: pp.78-82; French, 1995: p.75; Bater, 1980: p.99). 
The ideal of equal access to housing, services, or consumer goods of equal quality and 
quantity was only partly achieved. While the fact that very large numbers of urban residents 
lived in mikrorayon indicates some measure of equality in living standards, Bater maintains 
that in no area was the gap between ideal and reality wider than in the equal access to 
housing space and quality (Bater, 1980: p.97; Fisher, 1962: p.263). While spatial segregation 
along the lines of cities in capitalist countries was avoided in cities of socialist countries, 
segregation largely resulted from the provision of housing by enterprises or institutions, with 
some being able to provide better apartments and services than others (Matthews, 1979). 
Access also depended on knowing the right people and how to work the system (Smith, 
1996: p.80). Additionally, the new social hierarchy was reflected in access to better housing 
conditions: “The first class residential areas do not now belong to the capitalists, but to the 
Party and to the governmental and industrial elite” (Fisher, 1962: p.259). The best 
apartments were centred in Moscow, where the elites also had access to better facilities and 
public services. While equal living conditions for all where propagated, access to and 
distribution of housing in the Soviet Union reflected and reproduced existing inequalities and 
social hierarchy (Smith, 1996: pp.81-98). 
Individual and institutional power did not only affect access to housing. Despite centralized 
planning structures in the USSR, urban planners and officials had neither the resources nor 
the authority to enforce implementation of their plans. While urban development was 
supposed to be the domain of the urban administration, it was the result of a political process 
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(political here referring to elite-politics of the Communist Party and the socialist state). Land-
use planning or the relocation of factories affected vested interests in state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) which often defied these policies (Bater, 1980: pp.94-95). Formally cities 
were supposed to construct and administer housing in their respective areas; however, this 
function was often taken over by departments of central agencies or SOEs (Bater, 1980: 
p.105). According to Häussermann, SOEs often played the same role as the landlords of 
feudal Russia (Häussermann, 1996: p.221).  
The problems associated with urban planning in the Soviet Union resulted in major individual 
and societal deviation from the plan. While urban planning was supposed to provide the 
politically defined ideal environment for the socialist society, the above described 
shortcomings resulted in a less-than-ideal reality. Thus, the distorted implementation of 
“rational” plans promoted “irrational” behaviour of urban residents. Where the ideal 
environment for the socialist society was flawed, it did often fail to facilitate “socialist” 
behaviour or values, at times promoting “undesirable” or “un-socialist” behaviour (Hamilton, 
Burnett, 1979). Where planners did not take into account the needs of rural migrants, these 
raised pigs on balconies (Fisher, 1962: p.256). When consumer goods were in short supply 
or housing not conforming to peoples’ needs, these resorted to the black market or second 
economy (Enyedi, 1996: pp.105-106; Alexeev, 1995; Sampson, 1987). As economic growth 
and attractive jobs were concentrated in large urban centres, attempts to restrict migration 
were unsuccessful (Fisher, 1962: p.262).  
 
3.1.3 National Politics and Power Struggles 
National politics impacted the discourse on the Socialist City and the application of its 
elements. Thus, the landscape of cities in socialist states was not only expressive of 
theoretical ideals and their application (or lack thereof), but also of power struggles within the 
CPSU. Much of the debates on urban planning in the 1920s ran parallel to real developments 
without much connection between the two. As such, many new cities were constructed in the 
Soviet Union during the first Five Year Plan (from 1928 on) following no ideal or plan; 
pressing needs and economic restraints resulted in fast and cheap construction of poor 
quality (French, 1995: p.41). Such problems eventually led to a radical change in the USSR’s 
construction policies under Stalin. In 1931, the CPSU endorsed the official line that the 
USSR’s cities were already socialist because the bourgeoisie was expropriated, the means 
of production socialized, and the Communist Party in power (Durth et al., 1998a: p.50; 
French, 1995: p.4; Bater, 1980: p.26).  
The end of debate on the ideal Socialist City was supposed to achieve a shift from theory to 
action. To this effect, urban planning was centralized and an apparatus set up that was to 
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carry central decisions down to republic and city-level planning agencies in the 1930s (Bater, 
1980: p.26). Still, achievements during Stalin’s rule did not meet expectations. The emphasis 
on accelerated industrialisation to catch up with capitalist countries relegated concerns for 
urban planning to a backseat. Cities were largely seen as providing resources for industries, 
they grew both in numbers and inhabitants until World War 2 (French, 1995: pp.52-53). 
However, industrial growth was not accompanied by residential construction on a 
corresponding scale. Although multistorey apartment buildings were seen as ideal, the 
concentration of resources on industrial development and urban growth meant that even in 
newly established settlements the largest percentage of housing took the form of huts, tents, 
barracks, or one-storey buildings. More than 1/3 of the nation’s total housing stock consisted 
of privately erected wooden houses in 1940. Where people received housing erected by 
authorities or enterprises, apartments were divided on a one family per room basis. In 
general, overcrowding increased in the large urban centres (French, 1995: pp.56-57).  
Architecturally, the Stalin period marked a departure from the modern style that was 
influential during the 1920s. As no new form of living was required anymore for the new 
Socialist City, the new “content” of the socialist society was to be expressed symbolically and 
appealing to the masses relying on designs incorporating “national traditions” (Durth et al., 
1998b: p.49). In Moscow and other cities, representative ornate housing blocks of relatively 
high standard were erected along boulevards, providing apartments to the new elite of the 
Party, the security apparatus, and state administration, as well as to leading academics and 
artists (French, 1995: p.58). The same style was applied to public buildings such as the 
Lenin Library, the never built Palace of the Soviets, and the Campus on Lenin Hills. These 
buildings were intended to express hierarchy, order, the grandeur, power, and greatness of 
socialism (Durth et al., 1998b: pp.49-50).37 As construction costs for this kind of buildings 
were high, they lined major squares and roads, but their number remained small compared 
to the actual need for housing. The contrast between prestige projects and the housing 
situation of most of Moscow’s inhabitants became even more pronounced after World War 2, 
from which the USSR emerged as a major power. Stalin himself had promoted this 
development, deciding personally on designs and urban development plans (French, 1995: 
pp.60-62).   
“Usually, the lines of Stalinist blocks formed a showy façade along […] 
principal arteries. Behind them remained one- or two-storey pre-revolutionary 
                                                          
37 According to Richter, the reasoning behind this emphasis on imposing ornate buildings lies mainly in their 
ability to inspire awe and a feeling of the grandeur of the new regime.  In contrast modern architecture had 
been enthusiastically embraced by intellectuals but often criticized for its lack of emotional appeal (Richter, 
2006: p.29). Schwiedergoll sees the promotion of “national traditions” in architecture and planning as an 
attempt to make affluence and status of Tsarist Russia’s bourgeoisie symbolically attainable for the mass of the 
USSR’s population (Schwiedergoll, 1998: p.46). 
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houses, often of wood and even more often dilapidated. It was façadism, in a 
latter-day version of the Potemkin village.” (French, 1995: p.59) 
The USSR’s embrace of traditional symbolism in the Stalin era marked an important shift in 
its relation to the international mainstream of modern urban planning and architecture. In the 
1920s discussions on urban planning, design and architecture in the USSR were part and at 
the forefront of a global modernist discourse. Rejecting this discourse as part of a nation-
building agenda put the USSR on a conservative course that drew its inspirations more from 
imperial city designs than from urban and architectural forms hitherto associated with social 
progress. With Khrushchev‘s rise to power and the accompanying process of de-
Stalinisation, this situation changed again. Despite continuing ideological and linguistic 
emphasises on differences between “socialist” and “capitalist” cities, socialist urbanism after 
the Stalin period can be described as a partial convergence with modern urban planning in 
capitalist countries (Richter, 2006: p.32-34; French, Hamilton, 1979: p.18). 
In the power struggle following Stalin’s death in March 1953, Khrushchev’s rise partly built on 
his promises to solve the pressing issues of housing shortages and the poor living conditions 
prevalent in the USSR in the early 1950s.38 In late 1954, Khrushchev criticized construction 
under Stalin as too expansive, calling for abandoning the ornate and imposing styles. The 
provision of housing space for the masses came to replace symbolic representations of 
power as a legitimizing strategy (Richter, 2006: p.30). After Khrushchev’s secret speech 
denouncing Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, housing and planning policies also 
became part of de-Stalinisation (French, 1995: p.69).  
Freed from the restrictions of Stalinism, debates on urban development and architecture 
picked up on concepts that had already been discussed in the 1920s and contemporary 
developments outside the USSR, notably the British New Towns, which were themselves 
indebted to Howard’s Garden Cities (French, 1995: p.69; French, Hamilton, 1979: p.2). 
Architecture saw a return to the simple modern styles that had been applied in the 1920s and 
had become the norm in the construction of housing complexes in capitalist countries after 
World War 2. Fast and cheap construction on a massive scale under Khrushchev required 
the abandoning of brick building techniques and industrialisation of the building process. 
Most experiments with industrial production and construction in the USSR had ended with 
the shift under Stalin from the 1930s on. However, from early on industrialisation of 
construction had been associated with the provision of mass housing and had been 
promoted as being able to solve the social problem of housing through advanced technical 
means (Richter, 2006: p.13). Techniques of on-site assembly of prefabricated concrete 
                                                          
38 According to French, the housing situation at the time of Stalin’s death was similar to that in capitalist Europe 
during the industrial revolution (French, 1995: p.75). 
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elements had been developed in the US at the beginning of the 20th century and been 
applied in social housing programs in Europe from the 1920s on. The decades after World 
War 2 saw the application of industrial methods in construction on a large scale worldwide, 
and from the 1960s also in the USSR (Richter, 2006: pp.14-21). By 1972, half the new 
housing in the USSR was constructed using prefabricated concrete panels (French, 1995: 
p.77).39  
The drive for industrialized construction of housing started with Khrushchev, but it was to 
characterize urban development in the Soviet Union until its falling apart. Under Khrushchev, 
the housing shortage meant that nearly all existing housing space had to be kept, however 
poor its quality, and construction of new mikrorayon took place mostly on the fringe of 
existing cities. Well before the beginning of perestroika in the 1980s, the USSR leadership 
recognized the inability of existing planning techniques to bring about desired social change. 
Thus, the task of the planner shifted to satisfying the growing demands for improvements in 
the quality of life and the material situation of the population (French, 1980: pp.198-199).  
With advances in production and increasing resources channelled to the construction sector 
large scale urban renewal took place; building heights and living comfort increased. The 30 
years from 1956 to 1986 saw the construction of 2,092,600,000m² of housing in urban areas 
of the Soviet Union. However, despite these achievements 20% of the urban population still 
lived in shared apartments or “houses fit to be condemned” in the late 1980s (French, 1995: 
p.97). 
“By any standard, the Soviet achievement in housing construction over the 30-
odd years after 1957, when Khrushchev began the programme, has been truly 
colossal. The spread of new housing has been accompanied by the provision 
of services, which in the early 1950s had been seriously lacking. By 1990, 93 
per cent of State and co-operative housing had mains water and 91.8 per cent 
had sewerage […]. In consequence, the desperate conditions, which formed 
Stalin’s legacy to the Soviet City, have been enormously alleviated.” (French, 
1995: pp.76-80)  
                                                          
39 However, industrial building had from its inception on been criticized as producing dull, uninspiring “cages” 
or “boxes” (Richter, 2006: p.20). With the large-scale application of industrial methods and pre-fabricated 
elements, criticism grew as technical necessities of the construction process dominated over stylistic, 
architectural or social concerns as well as over questions of convenience or “inhabitability”. Norms, typologies 
and uniformity were seen as prerequisites of effective provision with housing units. At the same time they 
attracted criticism that saw them as turning construction and architecture into engineering (Hall, 2002: pp.221, 
360-61). 
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Writing in 1962 Fisher had noted that “The contemporary cities fall far short of the ideal 
socialist goal. Housing is inadequate and extreme overcrowding exists” (Fisher, 1962: 
p.265). However, he expressed hope that planners might learn from their mistakes, realizing 
the planning goals in the internal urban structure and population distribution in cities of 
socialist countries, thereby making them “truly the cities of socialist man” (Fisher, 1962: 
p.265). More pessimistically, French concluded in 1995: 
“The USSR developed technical skills that led the way into space and the 
priorities for heavy industry weakened from the day that Stalin died. Yet the 
last 30 years did not see the Soviet city progressing towards the ideal goals. 
Far from bringing about a better life for town dwellers in terms of democracy, 
social relations, fairness between individuals and groups, welfare and material 
benefits, the urban plan under the command economy produced minimal 
results. In consequence, life in the Soviet town was in few, if any, respects 
better than in its capitalist equivalent; in many respects it was just as bad and, 
far too often, it was distinctly worse.” (French, 1995: p.201)  
 
As this overview has shown, the characteristics of the Socialist City of the USSR are a result 
of the interplay between theorizing on the goals and forms of socialist urban environment, the 
means to construct this environment, decisions of powerful individuals, and international 
developments in the field of urban planning and development as well as the institutional 
setting of the USSR. The next part will present how the modern project of the Socialist City 
was applied in Vietnam. 
 
3.2 The Socialist City Travels to Vietnam 
The Communist Party of Indochina40 had from early on called for the liberation of art and 
architecture from feudal and colonial influences and the building of a “new culture”. However, 
it was not until the end of French colonialism in Vietnam and the ascent to power of the Việt 
Minh, that this goal could be translated into actual policies (Logan, 1995: p.445, see also 
Marr, 1981). “Socialist” urban planning had been introduced to Vietnam after the end of the 
anti-colonial war against France in 1954 and the establishment of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (DRV) in the north and the Republic of Vietnam in the south. In the 1950s, the 
USSR became the main sponsor of the DRV established in the north (Forsberg, Kokko, 
2007: pp.2-3; Fforde, Paine, 1987).  
                                                          
40 The Communist Party of Indochina was founded in 1930. It was renamed the Vietnamese Workers’ Party 
(VWP) in 1951, and named Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in 1976.   
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During the first years of reconstruction after the war the DRV government focused on 
industrial recovery (Đặng Thái Hoàng, 1999: p.57). Urban planning and housing did initially 
not follow comprehensive policies; where housing was erected by the state it was to supply 
desperately needed living space for state employees and mainly took the form of temporary 
wooden buildings with minimal provision of infrastructure (Trinh Duy Luan, Nguyen Quang 
Vinh, 2001: p.52; Đặng Thái Hoàng, 1999: pp.62-63). The first “Soviet-style” flats were 
erected in Hàng Tre Street in Hanoi’s Ancient Quarter (Logan, 1995: p.454).  
The late 1950s saw the creation of bureaucratic structures to guide urban development and 
architecture, as well as to ensure centralized control and coordination with the country’s 
economic and political development (Logan, 1995: p.445). At the same time, large numbers 
of Vietnamese students started to be educated in the USSR and other socialist countries. 
This was to have a profound impact on urban development in socialist Vietnam, as those 
returning to Vietnam were trained in Soviet-style urban planning and architecture and were to 
form an influential group among Vietnamese architects (Đặng Thái Hoàng, 1999; Logan, 
1995: pp.446-447).41 Still, socialist Vietnam relied heavily on the expertise and aid of other 
socialist countries until the end of the Soviet Union. In the field of architecture and urban 
planning, the colonial education system, the interruption of training programs, and the heavy 
human losses during the anti-colonial war resulted in a lack of skilled professionals (Logan, 
1995: p.446).  
Large scale construction by the DRV started with the first Five Year Plan in 1960. Most 
construction of “socialist” kind took place in Hanoi, either in the form of state-supplied 
housing or public buildings (Thong Tho Thi Minh, 1978: table 1). In September 1959 the 
Vietnamese Workers’ Party declared that in the reconstruction and enlargement of Hanoi, the 
city had to have a “worthy appearance”42 and to serve the living of the working people as well 
as the political and cultural centre of the whole country (Đặng Thái Hoàng, 1999: p.60). Thus, 
as the country’s capital, development there was to symbolize the new regime and new ways 
of living. Planning of Hanoi’s political centre around the Ba Đình Square followed the 
Socialist City’s ideal of providing a system of large streets and squares for mass-
demonstrations and parades, combined with iconic buildings of Socialist struggle (Đặng Thái 
Hoàng, 1999: pp.60-61; see also Kurfürst, 2012: pp.76-84; Thomas, 2002: p.1617). 
Representative public buildings emphasizing the new regime and socialist solidarity, such as 
the Lenin statue, the Hồ Chí Minh Mausoleum, the Soviet-Vietnamese Cultural Palace, or the 
Hanoi People’s Committee Building, came to dot Hanoi’s cityscape (Logan, 2000). As the 
                                                          
41 A number of Vietnamese architects had been trained at the Indochinese Collège des Beaux-Arts. Having 
mostly worked on the design of colonial villas, their skills were oriented towards the needs of the colonial 
regime and were difficult to adapt to the request of the new regime (Đặng Thái Hoàng, 1999: p.59).  
42 “bộ mặt xứng đáng” 
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architectural style in the Soviet Union had already moved away from the ornate, bombastic 
buildings of the Stalin period by the time it became influential in Vietnam, the design of these 
buildings largely followed the modern international style. 
From 1960 on, large apartment complexes were constructed on the outskirts of Hanoi. 
Among the early examples are the complexes of Nguyễn Công Trứ and Kim Liên. As they 
provided new and modern ways of urban living, they were intended to house deserving 
workers, veterans, and civil servants (Schwenkel, 2012: p.449). Nguyễn Công Trứ, the first 
multistorey housing estate in Hanoi (constructed 1959-1961) was constructed with Chinese 
assistance (Vandenpoel, 2011: p.37; Geertman, 2007: p.238). In its 16 four-storey housing 
blocks one staircase usually served two “living groups”, each group consisting of shared 
facilities and three to five rooms each occupied by one family.43 Construction relied on 
carrying brick walls, cement, concrete, and steel, and was mainly carried out manually, using 
only small construction machinery like small cranes (Đặng Thái Hoàng, 1999: p.64). As the 
Nguyễn Công Trứ complex was located within the old urban area of Hanoi, dedicated public 
services and buildings remained small in number (Vandenpoel, 2011: pp.37-38, Đặng Thái 
Hoàng, 1999: p.63).  
The Kim Liên project marked the beginning of the large scale application of industrial 
construction techniques and pre-fabricated construction elements that came to form a belt of 
“neighbourhood units” surrounding the older areas of Hanoi (see Figure 4; Trinh Duy Luan, 
2001: p.15; Đặng Thái Hoàng, 1999: p.65; Logan, 1995: p.454). Buildings were constructed 
with brick walls and pre-fabricated concrete ceilings (Engemann, 20.4.1970). This complex 
followed the socialist model of the mikrorayon, intended to provide their inhabitants with 
equally distributed housing space as well as access to public services and communal 
consumption according to norms and standards. Planning and construction of the complex 
was assisted by experts and aid from the USSR, financial support came also from North 
Korea. Apart from residential housing, Kim Liên contained a guesthouse area for foreign 
experts (Vandenpoel, 2011: p.40; Marr, 2006). Construction of Kim Liên was carried out in 
two phases, 1960-65 and 1965-70. Upon completion Kim Liên housed more than 20,000 
inhabitants (Vandenpoel, 2011: p.40; citing Decoster, Klouche, 1997 p.30). In the early 
phase of construction, up to seven families shared sanitary and cooking facilities. This ratio 
dropped to two families per shared facilities in the buildings constructed later on 
(Vandenpoel, 2011: p.46, Geertman, 2007: p.240). However, Đặng Thái Hoàng indicates that 
many apartments were originally designed as single family apartments, consisting of two 
rooms, a kitchen, and sanitary installations (Đặng Thái Hoàng, 1999: p.65).  
                                                          
43 However, Geertman claims that “The socialist ideology is introduced through collective kitchens and sanitary 
areas on the second floor” (Geertman, 2007: p.239), although floor plans rather supports Đặng Thái Hoàng’s 
description.  
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Figure 4  
This picture taken by GDR experts in late 1973 shows the on-site production of pre-fabricated concrete panels 
on a construction site in Hanoi. The building in the background contains two-room apartments complete with 
individual cooking, washing and sanitary facilities, as well as loggias (Bundesarchiv Koblenz BArch DH 1 Bild-
28565-04-01). 
 
According to Schwenkel, most public housing in Hanoi had been constructed in a collective 
(tập thể) style, i.e. collective kitchens and sanitary areas.44 This style was often referred to as 
“Vietnamese” or “Chinese”, a characterisation seen as “historically inaccurate and culturally 
problematic” by urban planners and architects. Schwenkel sees the propagated adequacy of 
collective housing as conforming to traditional, rural lifestyles of the Vietnamese as a 
justification for difficult and inadequate living conditions (Schwenkel, 2012: p.450). Geertman 
on the other hand uncritically states that “this type of living invited the communal lifestyles of 
the villages to continue here” (Geertman, 2007: p.249). Evertsz attributes the communal 
kitchen, bathrooms and toilets to “the socialist ideal of a collective society” (Evertsz, 2000: 
p.41). This argument is also advanced by Trinh Duy Luan, who states that collective housing 
areas “reflect the idea about collectivism in accordance with the socialist model implemented 
in the Soviet Union during those years” (Trinh Duy Luan, 2001: p.15). 
It is questionable if communal living and shared facilities were advocated because of their 
suitability to local traditions or because they reflected a “socialist ideal”. As shown above, 
                                                          
44 Tập thể means collective. The term for such housing areas is khu tập thể, meaning collective (housing) area. 
It is used by many synonymously with all apartment buildings constructed between 1954 and the late 1980s.  
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communal housing had been abandoned as the socialist ideal in the Soviet Union, whose 
experts advised on the designs and construction of Kim Liên, already in the 1930s.  Đặng 
Thái Hoàng recounts how difficult and at times unsanitary living conditions associated with 
communal living and shared apartments in Kim Liên had prompted architects and planners to 
introduce individual apartments. While apartments continued to be shared, he attributes this 
to poor planning, as their large size was not suited to the housing shortage (Đặng Thái 
Hoàng, 1999: p.67; see also Vandenpoel, 2011: p.46; Geertman, 2007: p.241). In 1970, 
plans for the reconstruction of cities after the American War aimed at providing families with 
more than four members with private kitchens and sanitation, only those with up to 4 
members would have to share these facilities with one other family (Engemann, 20.4.1970). 
Shared facilities and apartments in Vietnam’s housing estates seem to have been the result 
of economic difficulties and housing shortages, rather than idealistic or theoretical reasoning. 
The severity of the housing shortage becomes apparent in a report of GDR experts visiting 
Hanoi in 1970:  
“Most families are living in one room, some even in corridors which are 
separated into berths, without sunlight. The construction of apartments is 
taking place only in small numbers, uncoordinated and therefore effecting no 
changes on the appearance of Hanoi.”45 (Engemann, 20.4.1970 attachment 1) 
In the eleven years between attaining independence in 1954 and the intensification of the 
war against the US in 1965, urban planning had followed the example of other socialist 
countries, mainly that of the USSR. Thus, planning ideals of the Socialist City became 
influential in the DRV, visible in plans for the centre of Hanoi, in the application of the 
mikrorayon concept, as well as in the architectural style. However, actual construction and 
implementation of plans remained largely restricted to Hanoi, and even there construction by 
the state could not keep up with demand. In the years 1965-72, the war economy and threats 
of bombing by the US Air Force meant that little construction took place. “Many architectural 
projects and the planning of new districts started in the late 1960s and early 1970s were not 
finished until after the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement in 1973 and the withdrawal of 
American troops” (Logan, 1995: p.445). However, planning for the reconstruction and peace-
time development of the DRVs cities continued throughout the war time period. As had been 
the case in the construction of Nguyễn Công Trứ and Kim Liên, other socialist countries were 
to play an important role for reconstruction and urban development after 1972. One of those 
countries, the German Democratic Republic had sent a group of specialist to Hanoi in 1970. 
In March and April 1970, the GDR delegation spent five weeks in the DRV to explore 
                                                          
45 “Die Familien wohnen in der Mehrzahl in einem Raum z.T. sogar in Hausdurchgängen, die in Kojen unterteilt 
sind, ohne direkte Belichtung. Der Bau von Wohnungen erfolgte nur in geringem Umfang, zersplittert und 
dadurch ohne Effekt auf die Veränderung des Stadtbildes von Hanoi.”  
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possibilities for cooperation in the field of urban housing and related policies. The report on 
that journey gives an in-depth view on the state of Vietnam’s construction industry in 1970, 
the country’s plans for reconstruction, and prospects of future collaboration (Engemann, 
20.4.197046).  
When the delegation visited the DRV in early 1970, little actual construction took place in 
Hanoi, and much less outside that city. Only in Kim Liên did the construction of apartment 
blocks continue, using a combination of traditional and industrial techniques: brick walls with 
pre-fabricated concrete ceilings and pre-fabricated elements such as staircases. While 
production of building materials took place in several factories around the city, coordination 
and centralisation of construction and planning was weak. To carry out its tasks, the Ministry 
of Architecture (MoA) relied on a number construction enterprises and construction material 
factories, as well as on its Office for Urban Planning consisting of about 1,500 employees. 
Although nominally the MoA was responsible for the construction of industrial facilities and 
housing, the war had made necessary a dispersal and de-centralisation of related industries 
and agencies. Several other ministries ran their own construction enterprises and produced 
their own construction materials. In addition, provincial enterprises for construction and 
construction material production were under the control of eleven different provincial 
authorities. Provincial construction enterprises typically comprised a workforce of 2,000-
6,000 workers; technical expertise and mechanisation in these enterprises were usually 
much lower than in those of the MoA (Engemann, 20.4.1970). 
Planning for the reconstruction and development of the DRV’s cities after the war continued 
despite the above described problems in coordination and the organisational structures. 
Although shortcomings were acknowledged, Vietnamese authorities saw them as being 
easily overcome once the war was finished and thus took little account of them in their plans. 
While American bombing had damaged cities in the northern part of the DRV, destruction in 
its south had been devastating. There, the report claims, 20 cities had been almost totally 
destroyed and nearly all villages had been severely damaged. Thus, cities were a major 
priority in the reconstruction policies of the DRV, placing more importance on industries than 
on the provision of housing. Furthermore, it was expected that reconstruction in the DRV 
would take place while the war in the South continued, putting further emphasis on industries 
and war-efforts on the expanse of the construction of housing (Engemann, 20.4.1970). 
                                                          
46 The following section is an excerpt of this report.  
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Despite the provision of housing ranking relatively low in priority, the urgent need for the 
creation of living space in urban areas was acknowledged. In the DRV’s cities, the average 
housing space was 3m² per person in 1970; many inhabitants had to endure unsanitary 
conditions. The strategy to alleviate this shortage consisted of two parts: in the short run, 
brick building would be rationalized through new techniques and better coordination. In the 
meantime, industrialisation of the construction process would be completed during the first 
Five Year Plan 1971-1975. Typing and standardisation were seen as the most important 
factors for rationalisation of the building process. Only two types of accommodation would be 
applied during reconstruction: three-room apartments for families, and dormitories. These 
would also provide more comfortable and sanitary living conditions, for example running 
water provided by a centralized water supply system instead of open-air water wells or roof-
tanks. This strategy was seen as requiring large changes in the material-technical basis, in 
the organisation of the construction process, as well as in the training of workers and 
planners. Construction industries would be centralized under the control of the MoA, and 
reorganized as construction combines. The GDR experts judged these plans as very 
ambitious and partly unrealistic, as workers were not sufficiently trained and skilled. 
Members of the delegation repeatedly emphasised the importance of brick building as more 
suitable to the economic situation of the DRV47 and generally criticized the DRV’s plans for 
not being realistic and too ambitious (Engemann, 20.4.1970). 
One such ambitious project was the construction of New Hanoi, a completely new urban 
centre located in Đạo Tú village, Tam Dương District, Vĩnh Phúc Province, about 60 
kilometres north-west of Hanoi. This settlement was to lessen population pressure in Hanoi, 
from where 700,000 of its 1,100,000 inhabitants would be relocated. In Hanoi itself, only 
reconstruction would take place. The old city was seen unfit for further development as it was 
located in valuable agricultural land, large parts of it lying below the water level of the Red 
River, its soil providing only limited load carrying capacity, and the ground-water level being 
too high. Cooperation between the DRV and the GDR specifically focused on the GDR 
supplying a factory for the pre-fabrication of construction elements and panels as the core of 
New Hanoi (Engemann, 20.4.1970).48 
 
                                                          
47 For example, the DRV had to import all steel, a requirement for industrialized construction, from the USSR 
and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  
48 When construction of the factory finally took place, plans for New Hanoi had been scrapped and apart from a 
small number of housing blocks for its own workers, the factory was largely abandoned soon after its 
completion in the early 1980s (Knöfel, 2011: p.27; Hansen, February 1981). 
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Urban planning in the DRV had by the 1960s firmly embraced the ideal of the Socialist City. 
After the war, this model was to be applied through centralized planning structures 
throughout the country. The large scale reconstruction of the DRV’s cities was centrally 
planned, with authorities in Hanoi issuing guidelines to be applied by provincial authorities. 
The MoA played an important role, especially through its Office for Urban Planning, which 
was directly involved in urban planning of the country’s cities. Plans for the more important 
cities were to be approved by the highest national authorities (UBKTCB Nhà nước, 
1.7.1968). 
As the war against the French ended in the same year as the USSR shifted its policies away 
from an emphasis on monumental buildings following the national traditions, socialist urban 
construction in the DRV followed the more functionalist approaches emphasised since 
Khrushchev’s housing programs. It was thus also more in line with international modernist 
architecture and planning ideals. The planning of Socialist Cities in Vietnam constituted a 
transnational modern project as concepts and ideas developed in the national framework of 
the USSR were applied in Vietnam as a means to create an urban environment that 
expresses and advances the construction of socialism. The next part will return to the 
planning of Vinh by Vietnamese planners during the late 1960s and the early 1970s, 
providing an example of how the Socialist City was applied in the DRV. 
 
3.3 Vinh as a Socialist City 
Planning for the reconstruction of Vinh had started in 1961 with Politburo resolution 32-NQ-
TW calling for Vinh to become a “Socialist City, to serve well industrial development, for 
production and material as well as cultural life of the urban working population”49 (Dang Lao 
dong Viet Nam, Ban chap hanh trung uong, 28.12.1961). While planning rested mainly with 
the Provincial Administrative Committee, it had to be approved by the provincial Party 
Committee and the Institute for Urban Planning of the Ministry of Architecture. From the 
beginning, the Party Committee called for an architectural and symbolic emphasis on the role 
of Vinh in the revolution and the war against the United States (Tỉnh Ủy Nghệ An, 
29.7.1966).  
As described above, central authorities in Hanoi issued guidelines for the reconstruction of 
the DRV’s cities along the lines of the Socialist City (see also UBKTCB Nhà nước, 1.7.1968). 
By 1968, these guidelines had been incorporated into a draft plan for the reconstruction of 
Vinh by the Institute for Urban Planning of the MoA, emphasizing Vinh’s role in the 
                                                          
49 “thanh phô xa hôi chu nghia, phuc vu tôt cho ciêc phat triên công nghiêp, cho san xuât và doi sông vât chat, 
văn hoa cua nhân dân lao dông thanh phô”. As the original document does not contain all diacritics, it is cited 
here as in the original.  
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construction of socialism (Bộ Kiến trúc, Viện quy hoạch thành phố, 1968; Viện Qui hoạch 
Thành phố, 1.2.1968). This plan set out most important aspects for the reconstruction of Vinh 
as a Socialist City, although following plans would make slight changes in the urban design 
and adjust technical aspects, for example on the water supply and sewerage systems, or 
increase the percentage of five-storey houses to be built (Bộ Kiến trúc, Viện quy hoạch thành 
phố, 1968).50  
The plan stipulated the reduction of countrywide standards for housing space and the built 
environment (including space used for housing, public buildings, greenery and public space) 
per person in Vinh’s specific conditions. Housing was to be provided mainly in three to five-
storey buildings (65%) and two-storey buildings. The city’s population was planned to be 
50,000 five years after the war, rising to 100,000 inhabitants 15 years after the war. For the 
first two years, its population would be restricted to 20,000 persons essential for 
reconstruction and the functioning of factories and authorities. As Vinh’s future was seen as 
that of an industrial city all destroyed centrally and locally run factories were to return and 
expand in Vinh.51 
The urban layout of Vinh would adhere to the principle of a compact city, moving agriculture 
out of the city centre. The plan divided the city into four zones: administrative buildings would 
be clustered in Trường Thi and along Nguyễn Thái Học road; the area of Quang Trung 
Street and the market would serve as the seat for state owned enterprises and banks. The 
industrial area would be split in two zones: one close to the harbour in Bến Thủy would 
consist of heavy and sea-related industries; the North-Western Industrial Zone to the north of 
the former citadel would mainly cater to transport-related businesses. Each of these 
functional zones would be accompanied by a designated housing area: workers and 
employees of the industrial zones would be housed close to their workplaces near the train 
station and the harbour, respectively. Employees working in public institutions in the citadel 
area and Trường Thi would be housed in a complex in Tân Vinh (located approximately 
between the two places). Thus, zoning was intended to result in a clear separation of working 
and housing areas. At the same time spatial segregation according to employing enterprise 
or institution would take place. To create an “urban face”, construction of multistorey housing
                                                          
50 Later planning for example specified that five years after the war, 80% of Vinh’s inhabitants would live in the 
three housing areas Tân Vinh, Bến Thủy, and Trường Thi, and that apart from the representative multistorey 
buildings along the major roads, housing would to a large part consist of temporary houses during the first 
years of reconstruction. Other temporary solutions would be applied in the early years, such as a temporary 
system for the treatment of wastewater (Bộ Kiến trúc, Viện quy hoạch thành phố, 10.7.1969). 
51 The occupational structure was intended to first shift more to industries, with 38% of workers employed in 
this sector. Over time it was estimated that this percentage would fall to 32%, with people increasingly being 
employed in the service sector. However, employment in every sector would continue to rise in absolute 
numbers. 
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was to take place first along the major roads, such as the road leading from the train station 
to the city centre.  
In the initial years, only housing groups would be constructed, which would later be upgraded 
to form housing complexes. A mixture of collective housing and family based apartments was 
planned for these complexes, with a clear emphasis on the latter. During the first five years, 
family based housing would accommodate 25,500 people, 12,800 people would live in 
collective housing. Additionally, some privately erected houses would be allowed in the Bến 
Thủy housing area. The number of apartments, schools, nurseries, hospitals, etc. to be built 
was calculated from standardised figures for the provision of housing space and public 
services per person. The number of persons in turn was derived from the planned number of 
employees of the factories, enterprises, and institutions to be located in Vinh, plus their 
“dependents” (Bộ Kiến trúc, Viện quy hoạch thành phố, 1968). 
In addition to industrial, administrative, economic and residential areas, the city’s landscape 
would be dotted by symbols representative of socialist victory. At the central square a Victory 
Monument would be erected; a Monument to the Martyrs was planned to be placed at the 
southern entry to the city centre. Vinh’s revolutionary history would be represented by a 
monument to the Nghệ Tĩnh Soviets in Bến Thủy. Other historical sites would be 
reconstructed buildings destroyed during US bombardments or museums telling of the 
history and revolutionary past of Vinh and Nghệ An (Bộ Kiến trúc, Viện quy hoạch thành phố, 
1968). 
 
3.3.1 First Reconstruction Efforts and the Third Destruction of Vinh  
While no plan had been approved by central authorities by then, reconstruction of Vinh 
started after the US had stopped their bombing campaigns as part of their negotiations 
strategy in late 1968 (Turley, 1986: p.94). Enterprises began to return to Vinh in the following 
year (Nguyễn Quốc Hồng et al., 2004: pp.181-182; Hoàng Ngọc Anh et al., 2003: p.198). By 
1969 the Institute for Urban Planning of the MoA had prepared detailed projects for the 
reconstruction of the city (electricity, roads, water, wastewater etc.). Because of Vinh’s 
political and strategic importance, fast construction of representative buildings was required. 
The provincial Party and state authorities pressed for buildings such as an international 
guesthouse, the Nghệ Tĩnh Soviet Museum, a cinema and stadium, as well as the road, 
electricity and water networks, to be finished in late 1969 to serve the 1970 New Year 
festivities. The Department of Architecture was to prevent the private construction of wooden 
housing that did not conform to design regulations (UBHC Nghệ An, 22.9.1969). However, 
these were piecemeal developments, as no final plan had been approved. 
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Further work on the plan for reconstruction put additional emphasis on the Socialist City in 
1970: “The construction of Vinh has to be based on the national guidelines and plans for 
economic and cultural development, it has to build on the city’s current conditions (re-) 
constructing Vinh to become a socialist industrial city, a political, economic and cultural 
centre of Nghệ An province”52 (Bộ Kiến trúc, 1970: p.2). Reconstruction was also seen as a 
chance to solve previous problems such as pollution resulting from poor siting of factories or 
the vulnerability to fire because of the prevalence of wooden housing and the hot dry Lao 
winds in summer. General guidelines were translated into concrete measures. During the 
first three years of reconstruction, the plan aimed at providing 30,000m² of housing space to 
10,000 inhabitants. Public facilities to be built were schools, kindergartens, a restaurant, and 
a new market, as well as a cinema (Bộ Kiến trúc, 1970).  
More details on the role of the city centre and different housing styles to be distributed 
according to social status and occupation are provided in a 1970 draft plan by the provincial 
Party organisation. The city centre would provide space for buildings of the governing 
institutions of the socialist state, most prominently for the provincial, not the city’s, authorities 
and administration. The provincial and city leadership would be provided with “private 
houses”.53 At the same time, the largest part of the urban population would be housed in the 
three above mentioned housing complexes, “following the socialist style”. Another form of 
housing would be in two to three-storey houses along major roads with shops on the ground 
floor and living space on the upper floors. The central government would be asked to provide 
funding for the housing complexes, while funding for the semi-commercial buildings would be 
shared between central and local authorities (Đảng bộ Nghệ An, 1970). 
The system of housing complexes was further elaborated in a 1970 draft plan by the MoA’s 
Institute for Urban Planning. The timeframe for reconstruction in this draft was 15 years 
(1970-1985). By that time Vinh’s population would rise to 150,000, these inhabitants would 
live in six to eight housing areas.54 Each housing area would consist of three to five sub-
areas with 4,000 to 6,000 inhabitants and a size of 16 to 42ha each. The largest inner-city 
housing area would be Tân Vinh, one of the originally planned three housing areas, with a 
size of 120ha and a population of 24,000 people. Thus, all inhabitants of Vinh would be 
organized according to the mikrorayon concept, spatially separated according to their 
occupation and employer. Distribution of services and consumption in the city would also 
                                                          
52 “Nhiệm vụ xây dựng thành phố Vinh phải căn cứ vào đường lối và kế hoạch phát triển kinh tế, phát triển văn 
hóa của Nhà nước, phải xuất phát từ tình hình thành phố hiện nay mà xây dựng phục hồi làm cho Vinh trở 
thành một thành phố công nghiệp xã hội chủ nghĩa, một trung tâm chính trị kinh tế văn hóa của tỉnh Nghệ An.” 
53 The original draft says “villas“, but the word is crossed out and replaced with “private houses” by hand.  
54 The term “housing area” is a literal translation of the term “khu nhà ở” used in this document. The 
description of its structures and functions given in the plan suggest that “housing area” is a different term used 
for “housing complex” or “mikrorayon”.  
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follow this hierarchical structure: housing group – sub area – housing area – city, a perfect 
application of the mikrorayon system. An elaborate system of provision according to 
standards and norms based on this hierarchical system is attached to the plan. It was 
estimated that of all costs required for the reconstruction of Vinh, excluding industrial 
development, about 60% would go into the construction of housing (UBHC Nghệ An, Ban 
KTCB, 1970).  
Planning for the reconstruction of Vinh thus offers a fine example of the principles and 
elements of the Socialist City: leadership of state and Party in planning and implementation, 
centralized planning by experts according to standards and norms, a clear division of zones 
for living and working, a city centre emphasising the power of the socialist state and the 
communist Party, the city-wide application of the hierarchical mikrorayon system, spatial 
division of groups according to occupation and employer, mass housing in state-supplied 
apartment and dormitory blocks.  
 
A secret report by the PAC gives an overview on reconstruction efforts during the first quarter 
of 1970 (UBHC Nghệ An, 23.3.1970). Efforts focused on the return of enterprises and public 
institutions (such as schools or the provincial hospital) to their former location in the city. 
Upon return, they were housed in temporary wooden buildings. Roads were repaired, 
focusing on National Highway 1 and regional roads. Reconstruction of enterprises focused 
especially on the production of construction materials. Efforts were undertaken to increase 
the local production of bricks, as construction continued to rely on traditional techniques. 
Another priority was the reconstruction of enterprises supplying foodstuff to returning 
residents (Bô Xây dưng, Viện Thiết kế Quy hoạch thành phố và nông thôn, August 1973). 
In general, reconstruction was much slower than envisioned: in the first three month of 1970, 
only 1/3 of planned investments for that period had been carried out. Among the most 
important shortcomings was a shortage in experienced and skilled cadres; those present 
lacked the capacity to comply with too complicated administrative procedures. Planning, 
implementation, and administration took place uncoordinated, resulting in time-lags and the 
waste of funds despite a sufficient number of workers. Although a draft plan had warned that 
it was based on experiences from the peace period of the 1950s and 1960s, and not on 
actually available economic data, overly optimistic estimates about the DRV’s economic 
situation resulted in a lack of construction material. Both national production and imports did 
not reach the plan’s targets (UBHC Nghệ An, Ban KTCB, 1970).  
Despite efforts to alleviate these problems and increasing productivity, reconstruction still 
lagged far behind plans in 1971. However, this seems to have resulted as much from 
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unrealistic and overly ambitious planning as from actual shortcomings in the implementation 
of plans (UBHC Nghệ An, 24.6.1971). It became increasingly clear that many of the 
structures-to-be-built, such as Quang Trung Street, were poorly designed and not adapted to 
local conditions (UBKH Nghệ An, 12.8.1970). Another example is a building at a tile-
production site in Thanh Lương that had to be torn down and rebuilt immediately after its 
completion due to its poor quality. Many other projects were started all over the province, but 
were not completed or of very poor quality (UBHC Nghệ An, Ty Kiến trúc, 23.7.1971; UBHC 
Nghệ An, 24.6.1971).  
While these problems affected the whole province of Nghệ An, a draft report by the City 
Administrative Committee (CAC) of September 1971 describes the situation in Vinh as 
particularly serious (UBHC Vinh, 21.9.1971). By that time, Vinh’s population had already 
grown to nearly 54,000 registered inhabitants (despite plans to limit its population to 20,000 
in the first two years of reconstruction and to 50,000 in the first five years), of which more 
than half were engaged in agriculture. This diluted the envisioned clear separation of urban 
from rural areas. To this number have to be added military personnel stationed in the city, as 
well as 3,000 to 4,500 visitors each day. It was estimated that because of returning 
administrative offices, the number of inhabitants would rise to 80,000 by the end of 1973. 
Planning had estimated this number to be reached about five years later. Clearly, 
construction and administration could not keep up with the influx of people. Apparently, little 
had so far been achieved in the supply with state-owned housing, as the CAC urgently called 
for the beginning of reconstruction of the Tân Vinh housing area and reparations to be 
undertaken on existing buildings in other areas in 1972. People constructed their own 
wooden housing, most enterprises and offices also erected wooden buildings, leading to the 
danger of destruction by fires. Because these buildings were usually only one storey high, 
space for the construction of housing in the city was soon in short supply. At the same time, 
agricultural land in the city’s surroundings was reserved for the much needed production of 
food. While the lack of state-supplied housing could be alleviated by private efforts, 
shortages in the supply with food, services, and consumer goods could only to some part be 
lessened by the market. Of the daily visitors to Vinh, about 1,000 had to sleep at the bus and 
train station or along the city’s roads, because accommodation was lacking. Roads were still 
of poor quality and crowded by vehicles, leading to numerous accidents and deaths. 
Schools, hospitals, and sanitation could not keep up with fast growing numbers of 
inhabitants. As the police force lacked personnel and equipment, law enforcement was 
nearly absent. Enforcing migration control was seen as the best measure to alleviate these 
problems. However, the CAC regarded some of them, like the lack of foodstuff, as 
unsolvable. As the city itself had little control over resources, its main approach to solve 
problems was to ask for help from higher-order authorities (UBHC Vinh, 21.9.1971). 
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Reconstruction of Nghệ An Province slowed in 1971. During the first nine month of that year, 
investments only reached 81.1% of those in the same period in 1970. While construction of 
housing in Vinh had begun in 1971, investments only reached half of the plan and no 
information is available on actual achievements. The reasons given for these failures are the 
same as above: lack of skilled cadres and workers, uncoordinated efforts, lack of materials 
and machinery (UBHC Nghệ An, 23.10.1971; UBHC Nghệ An, Ty Kiến trúc, 17.10.1971). 
Due to these shortcomings, the reconstruction of Vinh in 1968 to 1972 took place without 
much reference to the plans formulated for the city’s development after the war. As offices, 
public services, as well as factories and enterprises returned to the city, its population grew 
much faster than had been imagined. All of the principles of the plan had been compromised. 
Construction of housing took place individually; separation of housing and work place as well 
as between rural and urban areas was not enforced. The city’s authorities did neither have 
the capacity nor authority to steer urban growth. At the same time, centralized authority at 
the provincial level was not able to effectively coordinate the efforts of different actors for 
reconstruction of the city. While planning had failed as an instrument projecting urban 
development, the structures of government and administration struggled with even reacting 
to unplanned urban growth. Hence, a first attempt at creating a Socialist City in Vinh had 
failed. 
 
As part of their negotiation strategy, the US resumed to bombing the DRV in April 1972 
(Turley, 1986: p.141). Already in late 1971 preparations had begun for renewed defence of 
Vinh against air strikes; from early 1972 on enterprises and offices were evacuated again to 
the countryside. Only about 3,000 people remained in Vinh to ensure air-defence and the 
protection of remaining facilities, as well as to carry out repairs on the vital transport network 
(Nguyễn Quốc Hồng, 2004: p.187). Bombing of Vinh resumed in the early hours of 10 April 
1972 with an air strike bombing an area of 6km² (Hoàng Ngọc Anh et al., 2003: p.206). 
During 1972, the city was repeatedly bombed, the harbour in Bến Thủy and the Lam River 
were mined. As during the 1960s, bombing mainly targeted transport infrastructure (Hoàng 
Ngọc Anh et al., 2003: pp.211-212). When bombing stopped as the Paris Peace Agreement 
took effect in January 1973, nearly all effort for reconstruction carried out in 1968-1972 had 
literally been reduced to nothing (Nguyễn Quang Vinh, Dương Thanh Binh, 2007: p.89).55
                                                          
55 According to Hoàng Ngọc Anh et al., during the eight years of air strikes Vinh had been bombed 4,700 times. 
250,555 tons of explosives had been dropped on the city, equalling more than 4 tons per former inhabitant 
(Hoàng Ngọc Anh et al., 2003: p.217). However, no reference is given for these numbers.  
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 In late December 1972, planning for the reconstruction of Vinh began anew with a meeting 
of municipal and provincial leaders (UBHC Nghệ An, 29.1.1973). Urban development after 
the war would continue to follow the same plans and directions as during the period of 
reconstruction 1968 to 1972. Learning from the shortcomings of that period, the PAC 
emphasised the need for cooperation between provincial and municipal authorities to 
achieve better coordinated reconstruction. First steps of reconstruction would again focus on 
transport and sanitary infrastructure as well as the provision of electricity. In the years 1974 
to 1975, the city was supposed to ensure the return and stable production of those industries 
and enterprises that had been located in Vinh before the war, as well as the return of offices, 
schools, hospitals etc. Compared to earlier plans, the population would increase to around 
60,000 people during the first three years (formerly 50,000 after five years). During the first 
years, 66% of housing would be in temporary one-storey houses, the rest in blocks of four to 
five-stories (Bô Xây dưng, Viện Thiết kế Quy hoạch thành phố và nông thôn, August 1973). 
For the second time, reconstruction of Vinh would follow the ideal of the Socialist City. This 
time, however, with assistance of the German Democratic Republic.56  
 
3.3.2 GDR Assistance in the Reconstruction of Vinh (1973 to 1980) 
The German Democratic Republic had assisted the DRV in the field of urban planning and 
construction from 1970 on. However, the two countries had a much longer history of 
diplomatic relations and cooperation in different areas. The next part will give an overview of 
the shared history of both countries, highlighting forms of cooperation and political 
considerations. The GDR-DRV relationship provides an important background on 
cooperation in Vinh, as it was influenced by Cold War politics and political considerations that 
would also impact decisions regarding Vinh’s reconstruction. 
  
3.3.2.1 GDR – DRV Relations and Cooperation  
The Geneva Agreement of July 1954 paved the way for formal recognition of the DRV by the 
GDR, and to expanding cooperation in a wide range of fields.57 According to Lulei and 
                                                          
56 Surprisingly, documents as late as August 1973 make no mention of the GDR, although negotiations on the 
assistance by that country in the reconstruction of Vinh had started already in March that year.  
57 Diplomatic relations between the two countries had a complicated start. Although the official date of mutual 
recognition was back-dated to 3 February 1950, Joachim Krüger, GDR-diplomat and later historian in the GDR, 
dates the real beginning of diplomatic relations to 8 December 1954. That day, the GDR and DRV ambassadors 
to China signed a communique agreeing that the two countries would exchange diplomatic missions (Krüger, 
2011: pp.23-24). According to him, back-dating to 1950 served political causes. As the DRV had already been 
declared a sovereign state in 1945, by custom it would have to recognize the GDR upon its foundation in 1949. 
However, as the DRV was embroiled in the anti-colonial war against France, recognizing the GDR was not of 
priority. Furthermore, as the USSR and France had to some extend cooperated as occupying powers in 
Germany and the Cold War had not escalated by then, the GDR did also not seek recognition by the DRV 
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Schleicher, aid and cooperation between GDR and DRV can be distinguished in two 
categories: those initiatives and projects run by the state on the one hand, and voluntary, 
non-state “solidarity” on the other (Lulei, Schleicher, 2011: p.91).58 Solidarity in the GDR was 
largely a product of the “anti-imperial” war in Vietnam (Wernicke, 2011). In 1954, the year of 
the Geneva Agreements, the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED, 
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) turned the former Aid Committee for Korea into 
the Aid Committee for Korea and Vietnam under the National Council of the National Front. 
Its mission was to coordinate solidarity projects and donations with state-run projects (Lulei, 
Schleicher, 2011: pp.87-88). In 1965, the Vietnam Committee was founded as part of the 
Solidarity Committee, an organisation separate from the organisational structures of the 
National Front, taking over the tasks of the Aid Committee (Muth, 2000: pp.91-92). According 
to Zahlbaum, Secretary of the Vietnam Committee from 1965 to 1975, the establishment of 
the Vietnam Committee served the political interests of the SED (Zahlbaum, 2011: p.76, see 
also Wernicke, 2011: p.61). The Solidarity Committee increasingly played the role of a 
clearing house for aid and cooperation funded by donations of the GDR population. It was 
also an important instrument in the foreign policy of the GDR, carrying out development aid 
in Latin America, Africa, and Asia (Muth, 2000: p.92). Vietnam was always the largest 
recipient of solidarity funds donated by the GDR population (Lulei, 1993: p.9). During the 
American War, the Solidarity Committee organized information campaigns, blood donations, 
and fund raisers under the slogan “Solidarität hilft siegen”59 (Lulei, Schleicher, 2011: pp.88-
94; Zahlbaum, 2011: p.75). From 1973 on, under the new slogan “Solidarität – jetzt erst 
recht”60, the committee mobilized contributions for the reconstruction of the DRV, including 
projects such as the reconstruction of the Vietnamese-German Hospital in Hanoi and an 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(Krüger, 2011: p.13). The issue of diplomatic relations became more pressing as the State of Vietnam with Bảo 
Đại at its head was recognized by France in 1949. At the same time, the DRV’s efforts were bolstered by the 
victory of the communists in China. Thus, in January 1950, the DRV declared its willingness to establish 
diplomatic relations with all countries in the world. The GDR leadership did not respond to this call, nor to 
direct letters asking for diplomatic relations between the two countries, probably because of interventions by 
the USSR which was concerned about its relationship with France (Krüger, 2011: pp.15-18). Nevertheless, 
cooperation between the two countries took place before 1954. Since 1950, the GDR had supported and 
financed propaganda aimed at German soldiers in France’s Foreign Legion, and had cooperated with the DRV in 
the repatriation of German Foreign Legion deserters (Krüger, 2011: pp.15-20). From 1953 on, the GDR 
supported the DRV with medicines and medical equipment, part of which was financed by a “top-down 
initiated solidarity movement” (Krüger, 2011: p.21). The first four Vietnamese students arrived in the GDR in 
October 1953 (Krüger, 2011: pp22).  
58 However, this distinction is blurred by the actual practices and the role of the state and Mass-Organisations 
in initiating, organizing and carrying out “solidarity” projects. As I will show below, both forms of cooperation 
were intertwined in the reconstruction of Vinh. 
59 “Solidarity helps to win”. 
60 “Solidarity – now even more”. 
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orthopaedic centre, or the equipment of schools (Lulei, Schleicher, 2011: pp.96-97, 
Schleicher, 2011: p.7).61  
The largest part of GDR assistance to Vietnam took the form of inter-state cooperation 
financed by trade-agreements, loans or non-refundable assistance. According to Schäfer, 
Vietnam was the most important recipient of aid from the GDR, and no other country assisted 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam62 (SRV) after 1975 in such a variety of fields as the GDR 
(Schäfer, 2011: p.13). The most important institution for the coordination of aid and 
assistance was the Committee for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation between 
the GDR and Vietnam (CESTC) in which both countries’ State Planning Committees played 
leading roles. Negotiations in this Committee formed the basis for yearly mutual trade-
agreements (Knöfel, 2011: p.20).  
Classic socialist reconstruction aid was, according to Schäfer, characterized by the supply of 
complete production facilities planned and designed in the GDR, and subsequently 
assembled in Vietnam by Vietnamese workers (partly trained in the GDR) under the 
guidance of GDR experts63 (Schäfer, 2011: p.15). They were financed by no-interest loans 
(Knöfel, 2011: p.23). Among such projects were the construction of a printing plant for the 
Communist Party (1956 to 1958), a steel plant (1975 to 1976), and a glass factory in Hải 
Phòng (Schäfer, 2011: p.15). Assistance after 1973 focused in many cases on facilities that 
had been constructed with GDR help but had been damaged or destroyed during the war 
(Knöfel, 2011: pp.23-28). While some of these projects played an important role for the 
economic development of Vietnam, this kind of cooperation proved costly and many projects 
took much longer than initially planned. Some projects, such as factories for the production of 
tableware and thermos bottles, were never finished (Knöfel, 2011: p.28). Local infrastructure
                                                          
61 To a large degree, these activities complemented official cooperation projects. Lulei and Schleicher as well as 
Zahlbaum maintain that coordination by the state and the Party was necessary for the efficient use of 
donations (Lulei, Schleicher, 2011: pp.91-93; Zahlbaum, 2011: p.76). However, Wernicke argues that activities 
of the Vietnam Committee also aimed at raising the GDRs prestige, especially in the light of Cold War politics 
and rivalry between the two German states. He also shows how the SED had a firm hold on these activities and 
the solidarity movement in the GDR (Wernicke, 2011). Decisions on the use of donations also show the 
influence of the state. Based on agreements between the governments of the GDR and the DRV/SRV, the 
Council of Ministers of the GDR specified how solidarity funds would be used. From 1965 on, the use of these 
funds was subject to negotiations in the “Committee for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation 
between the GDR and Vietnam” (CESTC) and part of governmental agreements (Lulei, Schleicher, 2011: pp.91-
93). Following a decision of the Politburo in November 1982, funds of the Solidarity Committee were 
increasingly used for activities formerly financed by the state, such as the education of foreign students (Lulei, 
Schleicher, 2011: p.99). 
62 The SRV was established on 2.7.1976, uniting Vietnam after the DRV victory over the Republic of Vietnam in 
1975. 
63 GDR experts working in development projects in other countries were called “Spezialisten” (specialists).  
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 was underdeveloped, supply with electricity and construction materials was not sufficient. 
Projects prepared in the GDR did in many cases not take local conditions sufficiently into 
account (Schäfer, 2011: p.15). Thus, when the GDR started to assist in the reconstruction of 
Vinh, its policies had moved away from classic reconstruction aid towards cooperation in all 
aspects of planning and implementation, as well as towards reliance on locally available 
materials.
This shift became more pronounced in projects that started after the reconstruction of Vinh. 
Realizing earlier problems and the possibility that Vietnam would probably not be able to 
repay its debt, assistance in the 1980s shifted to cooperation for mutual benefits. This took 
the form of investments mainly in the production of foodstuff and clothing. From 1981 on, the 
GDR provided loans and assistance for the production of coffee in Đắk Lắk province, 
including the settlement of 10,000 workers, transport, and processing machinery, as well as 
the equipment for a 12 MW water power plant (Kaulfuss, 2011; Knöfel, 2011: p.29; Schäfer, 
2011: p.16). 50% of the yearly crop would be delivered to the GDR over 15 years, starting in 
1986 (Kaulfuss 2011: 41). From the mid-1980s on, the same system was applied in the 
production of rubber (also in Đắk Lắk province), pepper (in Quảng Trỉ province), and 
coconut-products (in the Mekong delta) (Knöfel, 2011: p.30).  
By 1990, Vietnam’s debt towards the GDR had reached 150 Million US Dollar, it was 
estimated that the export of these products would allow the SRV to repay this sum by 2011 
(Schäfer, 2011: p.16). State-assistance in these projects was coupled with solidarity 
activities, like the donation of medical supplies and school materials. Solidarity donations 
also paid for the salaries of GDR specialist working in these projects, further blurring the 
distinction of solidarity and official assistance (Knöfel, 2011: p.29, Kaulfuss, 2011: p.41). 
Investment in the production of clothes built on the cheap and abundant labour force in 
Vietnam, the GDR supplied most machinery and raw-materials, as well as training (Knöfel, 
2011: p.31). These forms of cooperation for mutual benefits were not unlike today’s Foreign 
Direct Investments. 
 
3.3.2.2 Preparing Cooperation 
Although the GDR and the DRV had had close relations and assistance from the GDR in the 
construction of a socialist state had a long history, cooperation in the field of urban planning 
and development had only started in 1970. A GDR delegation’s visit in the DRV in 1970  
resulted in a 1972 agreement on the construction of a plant for the production of pre-
fabricated panels in the Đạo Tú area that was supposed to start production in 1975, as well 
as in the exchange of documents on industrial and standardized construction (Präsidium des 
Ministerrates der DDR, 7.3.1973: p.10). The GDR leadership had expected to widen its 
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assistance in the building and construction industry in the following years. However, renewed 
bombing had put a hold on projects for the reconstruction of Vietnam’s cities and the DRV 
had asked for a temporary suspension of joint projects. Nevertheless, during preparations for 
the 1972 CESTC meeting the GDR leadership expected DRV-requests for further 
cooperation in the construction of housing and a cement factory (Büro des Ministerrates der 
DDR, 1.11.1972, Appendix: pp.2-6). However, no such request seems to have been 
forthcoming at this meeting.  
The Paris Peace Agreement of January 1973 created a new situation, in which cooperation 
could focus on the reconstruction in the DRV. In March, a delegation of high ranking GDR 
officials64 travelled to Hanoi to assure the DRV leadership of the GDRs willingness to deepen 
relations and to assist in the reconstruction of the country on the way to socialism (Präsidium 
des Ministerrates der DDR, 7.3.1973). As in the previous year, the GDR expected requests 
for cooperation in housing construction and was ready to provide assistance in the 
construction of apartments (Präsidium des Ministerrates der DDR, 7.3.1973: p.3). To the 
apparent surprise of the delegation, during a meeting on 16 March 1973, DRV Prime Minister 
Phạm Văn Đồng asked for the GDR’s help in project planning for the reconstruction of Vinh. 
Willi Stoph, Politburo Member, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and head of the 
delegation, answered evasively but Phạm Văn Đồng insisted on the GDR’s help in this 
particular project, revealing the plan to assign each of the large cities to one socialist country 
for help in its reconstruction: 
Phạm Văn Đồng: “Another problem that I would like to mention again is 
planning and reconstruction of Vinh. We have not yet heard your opinion on 
our proposal.” 
Willi Stoph: “It is difficult for me to answer this question. We will naturally 
consider this proposal with appropriate seriousness. We have no idea yet what 
is connected to this. You will understand that we cannot agree to this casually, 
when we do not know which tasks and material efforts are connected to this. 
We will seriously and responsibly consider your proposal.” 
Phạm Văn Đồng: “Comrade Lê Thanh Nghị might talk to you about this again. 
Because it is our plan to reconstruct each destroyed city in North Vietnam, for 
example Hải Phòng and Thanh Hóa, with the help of a socialist country. For 
Hanoi we count on the help of the Soviet Union. And we count on your help for 
                                                          
64 Members of the delegation included Willi Stoph, Member of the Politburo and Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers; Gerhard Weiss, Candidate of the Central Committee and Deputy Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers; Oskar Fischer, Member of the Central Committee and Deputy Minister of Foreign Relations; Werner 
Fleißner, General Lieutenant and Deputy Minister of National Defence and Kurt Fenske, Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Trade.  
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Vinh, because this is the most severely destroyed district capital and in 
addition to that the home of Hồ Chí Minh”.65 (no author, 16.3.1973: pp.54-55) 
While the GDR had been prepared for requests for aid in the construction of housing, this 
proposal by Phạm Văn Đồng clearly came as a surprise. Additional requests of the DRV 
included the delivery of a plant for pre-fabricated concrete elements for the use in 
industrialized housing construction and the delivery of a cement plant with a capacity of 1 
Mio tonnes per year, as well as assistance in the construction of a textile and clothing 
industry for mutual benefits. The DRV asked for these three projects to also be located in 
Vinh, thereby the city would become the centre of GDR assistance in the DRV. At that time 
the delegation could only agree to provide assistance in the reconstruction of workshops and 
facilities formerly constructed with help of the GDR, the construction of apartments, 
equipment of the textile combine, as well as in the training of Vietnamese in the GDR (no 
author, 16.3.1973).  
On 19 May 1973, the DRV Prime Minister repeated the request of the Vietnamese Workers 
Party and the Government of the DRV in a formal letter to Willi Stoph, expressing “deep trust 
that […] our people will continue to receive valuable assistance from the brotherly German 
Democratic Republic”66 (Phủ Thủ tướng, 19.5.1973). On the same day, similar letters were 
delivered to the ambassadors of other socialist countries requesting help in the 
reconstruction of one city or province (Doering, 19.5.1973).67 Sources available to me give no 
clear evidence on which criteria the pairing of cities and countries is based. Schwenkel 
claims that the decision to assign Vinh to the GDR might have been based on the GDR’s 
superior experience in the reconstruction of its own cities after World War 2 (it remains 
unclear if her informants were actually involved in or privy to the decision of matching cities 
and countries) (Schwenkel, 2012: p.446). This explanation was seen as unlikely by three of
                                                          
65 Phạm Văn Đồng: “Auch ein anderes Problem möchte ich noch einmal erwähnen, die Projektierung und den 
Aufbau der Stadt Vinh. Wir haben Ihre Meinung über diesen unseren Vorschlag noch nicht gehört.“ 
Willi Stoph: “Es ist für mich schwer, sofort eine Antwort auf diese Frage zu geben. Wir werden diesen Vorschlag 
selbstverständlich mit dem gebotenen Ernst prüfen. Wir haben noch keine Vorstellung, was damit verbunden 
ist. Sie werden verstehen, daß wir nicht leichtfertig eine Zusage geben können, wenn wir nicht wissen, welche 
Arbeiten und materiellen Aufwendungen in welchem Umfang damit verbunden sind. Wir werden diesen Ihren 
Vorschlag mit dem notwendigen Ernst und Verantwortungsbewusstsein prüfen.“ 
Phạm Văn Đồng: “Genosse Le Thanh Nghi wird dann vielleicht mit Ihnen oder mit Genossen Weiss noch 
darüber sprechen. Wir haben nämlich die Absicht, jede zerstörte Stadt in Nordvietnam, z. B. auch Haiphong 
und Thanh Hoa, mit Hilfe irgendeines sozialistischen Landes neu zu projektieren und aufzubauen. Für Hanoi 
rechnen wir mit der Hilfe der Sowjetunion. Mit Ihrer Hilfe rechnen wir für die Stadt Vinh, weil das die am 
meisten zerstörte Bezirkshauptstadt und außerdem die Heimatstadt Ho Chi Minhs ist.“ 
66 “tin tửơng sâu sắc rằng, […] nhân dân chúng tôi sẽ tiếp tục được sự giúp đỡ quý báu của nước Cộng hòa dân 
chủ Đức anh em” 
67 The letters assigned the following cities to the respective countries: Soviet Union – redesign of Hanoi and 
construction of New Hanoi; Poland-Hải Phòng and nearby Đồ Sơn; Hungary-Quảng Ninh province; Bulgaria-Thái 
Bình; Czechoslovakia-Thanh Hóa; Romania-Phủ Lý; PRC-Thái Nguyên.  
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 my informants who participated in the reconstruction of Vinh.68 One argued that other 
socialist countries had also extensive experience in the reconstruction of its cities. Two 
voiced the possibility that the decision to assign Vinh to the GDR might have had an 
ideological base, as Vinh is located close to the home of Hồ Chí Minh and Germany the 
home of Karl Marx. In his request cited above, Phạm Văn Đồng indeed refers to Vinh as the 
home of Hồ Chí Minh, and of it being the most severely destroyed city in the south of the 
DRV. While no conclusive explanation can be reached based on the sources available, it is 
likely that the decision to assign Vinh to the GDR was influenced by the city’s national 
importance. Vinh had not only been one of the most severely destroyed provincial capitals, it 
had also been the most important industrial centre in the southern region of the DRV before 
the war. Additionally, it served as a transport node and provided important services for the 
support of the war in the South. The experiences of 1969 to 1972 had shown that the DRV 
lacked the capacities to rebuild the city according to the Socialist City model on its own. 
While the Soviet Union would be involved in urban development of Hanoi and New Hanoi, 
the reconstruction of Vinh as the most important city in the south would require assistance of 
an economically advanced socialist country with large resources and wide experience in 
industrialized urban construction.69 Indeed, the GDR was among the most industrially 
advanced socialist states, in the field of industrialized construction it was among the most 
experienced countries in the world (Leinauer, 1998: p.164; Shoup, 1975: pp.11-16). 
 
3.3.2.3 Urban Planning in the GDR 
To evaluate the influence of the GDR on urban planning in Vinh as well as on the 
developments in that field that informed GDR actors, this section will give an overview on the 
development of urban planning and construction in the GDR, before the next parts return to 
Vinh for a detailed account of GDR-Vietnam cooperation in the modern project of creating a 
Socialist City. Three phases can be distinguished in the development of urban planning and 
construction in the GDR. The first phase took place immediately after World War 2 when 
conflicts between the USSR and the other occupying countries were less intense. The 
second phase began roughly with the establishment of the GDR on 7 October 1949 and 
lasted until Khrushchev’s speech after Stalin’s death called for a turn in architecture and 
housing policies. The third phase lasted from mid-1950s until the end of the GDR in 1990. 
This phasing already reflects the strong influences of Cold War politics and the Soviet Union 
on the development of urban planning in the GDR.   
                                                          
68 However, none of my interview partners claimed to know the exact reasons. 
69 This explanation is supported by the Phạm Văn Đồng quotation above. The GDR had already assisted in the 
reconstruction of the city Ham Hung in North Korea after the Korean War (Kang-Schmitz, 2010; Frank, 1996). 
However, I could not find any indication that this played a role in the decision. 
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First Phase of Urban Planning in the GDR (1945-1949) 
Urban planning in the GDR was most importantly informed by its competition with the other 
German state, the Federal Republic of Germany, on the one hand, and the dependence on 
the USSR on the other (Richter, 2006; Düwel, 1995). During the first phase, however, both 
influences remained relatively weak. According to Stabenow, political considerations played 
little role in initial planning for the reconstruction of cities in the Soviet Occupation Zone 
(SBZ, Sowjetische Besatzungszone) (Stabenow, 1998). While Bauhaus architecture and 
urban planning had been scorned by the National Socialist regime, attempts were made by 
architects and planners to revive its principles after the war. In Berlin, this approach, 
represented by the Baukollektiv, competed for influence with the Zehlendorfer Amt that stood 
for an approach to urban planning in the tradition of its work for Albert Speer during National 
Socialism (Durth et al., 1998a: pp.81-99). Architects and planners from all areas of Germany 
participated in competitions during this period (Stabenow, 1998: p.130). The plurality in 
discourse and approaches was reflected by decentralized for urban planning and 
reconstruction (Stabenow, 1998: p.123; Düwel, 1995: p.93). Nevertheless, this period also 
saw the beginning of centralisation of planning and the increasing modelling of the SBZ’s 
structures along those of the USSR (Düwel, 1995: pp.46-52). Formally, the establishment of 
the GDR saw the creation of a sovereign state. In practice, however, the Soviet Union 
continued to exercise its influence in numerous ways. In the case of urban planning and 
architecture, this resulted in the application of the Socialist City in the GDR. As this model 
had so far been applied on a large scale only in the USSR, experiences in that country 
served as examples (Barth, 1998: p.12). Close control over the course of urban planning in 
the GDR was ensured in different ways. All decisions had to be in line with political 
guidelines formulated by the SED in close coordination with the Soviet Union (Durth et al., 
1998a: p.12). The USSR’s influence was also ensured by the presence of its advisors during 
meetings of the Department for Construction of the SED Central Committee (Düwel, 1995: 
pp.53, 57). Additionally, German architects and cadres who had lived and worked in the 
USSR during the war played important roles in the application of Soviet guidelines in the 
GDR (Düwel, 1995; Kosel, 1989; see also entries in Fürst et al., 2000). Building on these 
structures established during the first phase, in the second and third phase the GDR closely 
followed developments in the USSR.  
Second Phase of Urban Planning in the GDR (1949 – mid 1950s) 
The second phase saw the application in the GDR of the Socialist City as it was promoted in 
the USSR under Stalin. After the establishment of the GDR as a member of the socialist 
camp, the SED Politburo sent a number of study groups to the USSR to study Soviet-style 
development and state-management. Among those groups was a delegation for the study of 
urban planning consisting of architects and cadres. Until then, no official direction had been 
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proclaimed for architecture and urban design in the GDR (Düwel, 1995: pp.68-71). According 
to Durth et al., this journey proved a decisive moment in the adoption of Soviet guidelines. 
Study visits to Kiev, Leningrad, and Stalingrad, as well as discussions with Soviet experts 
emphasised elements of the Socialist City under Stalin: monumentalism, open space and 
axial roads for demonstrations and parades, the compact city, accentuation of the city centre, 
as well as the expression of “national traditions” in design and architecture. Modern 
architecture as well as the works of German architects of the 1930s in the USSR were 
vehemently criticized (Durth et al., 1998a: pp.40-146). Some of the presentations and 
recommendations of the Soviet officials were nearly literally taken over as part of the 
decisions and guidelines of the GDR’s Ministry of Construction that were most prominently 
expressed in the 16 Principles of Urban Construction (Durth et al., 1998a: p.120; Düwel, 
1995: pp.72-76). In addition to adopting Soviet guidelines in design and architecture, the 
organisational structures of planning and construction were also reformed along the Soviet 
model (Bernhardt, 2005; Düwel, 1995: pp.43-84).  
While the guidelines emphasised “national traditions” as an integral part of architecture and 
design, the search for such traditions proved to be difficult. Both Richter and Düwel 
emphasise the dilemma that the national traditions were in fact expressions of Soviet 
guidelines (Richter, 2006; Düwel, 1995: p.16). Hermann Henselmann’s “Hochhaus an der 
Weberwiese” came to be regarded as most aptly applying and expressing the national 
traditions and served as reference in the design of the first section of the Stalinallee (Düwel, 
1995: p.113). The Stalinallee, as its name suggests, was the most important project in the 
early years of urban reconstruction in East Berlin. After two arcade apartment buildings had 
been constructed in 1949/1950, construction stopped because they were not in line with the 
politically determined style. In 1952, construction started anew, this time following the 
politically correct design. The avenue’s axial layout, intended for mass-demonstrations, 
emphasised the entry towards the city centre through a series of gates formed by apartment 
towers. It was lined by a sports hall, a Stalin statue, and “Palaces for Workers” in a richly 
ornamented style. These were to symbolize the rule of the new regime by offering workers 
the best and most beautiful apartments. It was further intended to prove to the population 
that socialism was able to achieve the promises it held and to express a bright future 
(Leinauer, 1998; Schwiedergoll, 1998).  
While the Stalinallee exemplifies the architecture and design of the national traditions, the 
ideal Socialist City is most prominently expressed in new founded urban centres such as 
Stalinstadt (now Eisenhüttenstadt) (Bernhardt, 2005). The city was founded in 1950 to house 
workers of the newly established Ironworks Combine East. “Stalinstadt documents a finished 
period of socialist urban planning. It was characterized by ideal planning and ideal 
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architecture, expression of high-flying expectations”70 (May, 1998: p.151, italics in original). 
Although much of the plan was never realized, it is an expression of the goal to harmoniously 
incorporate the elements of a Socialist City of the time into one whole complex: emphasis on 
the city centre with the central square, hierarchical organisation of distribution and 
consumption, a compact city body, design and architecture in line with national traditions 
(May, 1998).  
As has been noted above, the concept of “national traditions” was highly ambiguous, but it 
came to play an important role in the ideological conflict between East and West Germany. 
Lothar Bolz, GDR Minister for Reconstruction and Deputy Prime Minister saw architecture 
and urban planning as elements of cultural policies that aimed at an international profile 
distinct from the West Germany (Durth et al., 1998a: p.126). After World War 2, urban 
planning and architecture in West Germany was oriented towards concepts prevalent in 
capitalist countries, such as modern architecture in the International Style and the ideal of the 
hierarchically ordered city (Düwel, 1995: p.12). In this context, propaganda praised the GDR-
city as the real German city, in contrast to cities in West Germany that expressed the wish of 
capitalist forces to erase Germany’s national identity (Richter, 2006: pp.29-30). Thus, efforts 
were made to create legitimacy not only by expressing the virtues of socialism in the cities of 
the GDR, but also by presenting them as truly German, thereby underlining claims to the 
legitimate representation of the whole of Germany.  
The period from 1949 to 1955 also saw the beginnings of industrialisation of the construction 
process through the application of scientific methods, norms, and standards. From 1950 on 
each year an improved housing type was distributed to provincial authorities for construction 
in their territories. While these were not as elaborately decorated and provided a lower living 
standard than the Palaces for Workers, they were much better adapted to the pressing 
housing needs (Durth et al., 1998b: pp.156-158, Leinauer, 1998: p.165). Standardisation and 
the use of pre-fabricated concrete elements were attempts to lower construction costs 
(Richter, 2006: p.36). However, the first buildings constructed by pre-fabricated elements hid 
those construction techniques under the ornaments of “national traditions” (Richter, 2006: 
p.31, Düwel, 1995: p.132).  
 
Third Phase of Urban Planning in the GDR (mid 1950s – 1990) 
Khrushchev’s speech in November 1954 criticizing Stalin-era architecture and ornamentalism 
marks the beginning of the third phase of urban planning in the GDR, one that saw an all-out 
embrace of industrialized construction techniques and the widespread application of 
                                                          
70 “Stalinstadt dokumentiert eine abgeschlossene Phase sozialistischen Städtebaus. Sie war gekennzeichnet von 
idealer Planung und idealer Architektur, Ausdruckskunst hochfliegender Erwartungen.” 
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“scientific” knowledge as the base to achieve the technical revolution. Khrushchev’s speech 
in fact strengthened those who had already argued in this way, among them Gerhard Kosel 
(Düwel, 1995: p.256). Kosel had worked as an architect and planner in the USSR from the 
1930s on. In September 1954 he returned to the GDR to play an important role in the drive 
towards industrialisation of the buildings process in the positions of undersecretary and 
Deputy Minister of Construction, and as President of the German Academy of Construction 
(Müller, 2000: pp.128-129; Durth et al., 1998a: p.466; Kosel, 1989). 
Khrushchev’s new line of building faster, cheaper and more was soon taken up by the SED 
leadership (Düwel, 1995: p.257). In January and February 1955, the Central Committee 
prepared a resolution criticizing the former modes of construction and design and laying out 
the most important tasks for the construction of the GDR’s cities. This turn was accompanied 
by a restructuring of responsibilities, putting urban planning under closer control of Ulbricht 
as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Durth et al., 1998a: p.353). In April 
1955, a conference on urban planning and architecture, co-organized by Kosel, paved the 
way for rigorous, countrywide industrialisation of construction and planning; in autumn that 
year Kosel led a delegation of cadres and architects to the USSR to study the use of pre-
fabricated concrete elements and panels (Durth et al., 1998b: p.76; Düwel, 1995: pp.258-
259; Werner, 1981: p.37).71 
While the shift to industrialized modern construction methods and designs was theoretically 
executed in 1955, the countrywide application of such methods began in the late 1950s. The 
first standardized apartment block designs applied in the GDR during the 1950s used 
traditional brick buildings techniques, bricks were only slowly replaced by large concrete 
blocks as a transition to wall-high pre-fabricated panels. The first series’ of buildings using 
                                                          
71 This shift did not go without resistance. Proponents of the national traditions-designs objected and in general 
scientists had difficulties to theoretically justify the rejection of their former ideals (Düwel, 1995: pp.131-133, 
256). As I have described above, the ideal Socialist City under Khrushchev closely resembled that of modern 
urban planning in capitalist countries. Reuther and Schulte see the shift as a convergence to the Charta of 
Athens of the Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne (CIAM) and its ideals (Reuther, Schulte, 1998: 
p.120). The ordering element of the housing complex followed similar principles applied in West Germany 
(Leinauer, 1998: pp.165-66; Werner, 1981: p.33). Therefore, while the shift towards modern styles of 
architecture and urban design had been triggered by developments in the USSR, it appeared as if the GDR had 
taken over Western ideas (Richter, 2006: p.32; Durth et al., 1998a: p.141). While the shift in architecture in the 
USSR had been a part of de-Stalinisation, in the GDR it complicated the distinction from the West German state 
(Düwel, 1995: p.255). According to Richter, Danish, and French systems of construction became most 
influential in the GDR, as Denmark and France were more advanced in the industrialisation process than the 
USSR (Richter, 2006: p.32). This dilemma on the one hand led to attempts to construct theoretical distinctions 
between capitalist and socialist forms of housing (Leinauer, 1998: p.166; Richter, 2006: p.34; Werner, 1981: 
p.34). On the other hand, attempts were made to present the GDR as the legitimate heir to socially progressive 
Bauhaus; while arguing that Western Germany had taken over ideas from the GDR. At the same time, GDR 
guidelines for urban planning and construction were re-interpreted as a critical progression of the Charta of 
Athens, when formerly it had been presented as an anti-thesis (Richter, 2006: p.33; Weber, 1998; Kosel, 1989: 
p.289). 
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pre-fabricated panels were introduced from 1959 on (Richter, 2006: p.36).72 From around 
1970 on, housing constructed using pre-fabricated panels and based on standardized 
catalogue designs became the most widely applied construction method in the GDR (Richter, 
2006: p.37; Durth et al., 1998a: pp.536-537). Industrialisation also resulted in the further 
socialisation and centralisation of the construction industry, as it required nationwide 
coordination of production, transport, and assembly of elements and machinery (Werner, 
1981: pp.34, 43).  
The scientific-technical revolution was proclaimed as a patent to solve all problems (Durth et 
al., 1998b: p.79). The application of scientific methods in the industrial production of housing 
space was propagated as ideologically derived from Marxism and as the means to achieve 
higher productivity, in turn leading to victory of the socialist system and the construction of 
communism. The techniques of the scientific-technical revolution were: standardisation of 
construction elements, mass production, industrialisation, and scientifically founded planning 
methods (Kosel, 1989: pp.286-287).  
According to Durth et al., the construction of Halle-Neustadt is an expression of these 
principles (Durth et al., 1998b: p.80). Construction of that city and the related factory for pre-
fabricated panels began in 1964, under the direction of Chief Architect Richard Paulick, who 
was replaced by Karl-Heinz Schlesier in 1969 (Weber, 2000). The goal was “to build more, 
faster, cheaper and better, this amounts to nothing else than the consequent implementation 
of the scientific-technical revolution in construction and urban planning” (Büro für Städtebau 
und Architektur des Rates des Bezirkes Halle, 1972: p.161).73 Furthermore, the construction 
of the city was also presented as a contribution to the creation of socialism:  
“The construction of Halle-Neustadt symbolizes the powerful development of 
the German Democratic Republic, it tells of the significant growth of its 
economy and of its peace-policy. The construction of the city of chemistry 
industry workers results consequently from the social development of the 
German Democratic Republic and is an element in the complex design of the 
environment of socialist society”.74 (Büro für Städtebau und Architektur des 
Rates des Bezirkes Halle, 1972: p.11). 
                                                          
72 Early examples of the application of the new techniques are the second phase of the Stalinallee and the 
second Socialist City Hoyerswerda (Durth et al., 1998a: pp.484, 511; Leinauer, 1998). 
73 “mehr, schneller, billiger und besser bauen, und das bedeutet nichts anderes als die konsequente 
Durchsetzung der wissenschaftlich-technischen Revolution im Bauwesen”  
74 “Der Aufbau von Halle-Neustadt symbolisiert den kraftvollen Aufschwung der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik, er kündet vom bedeutenden Wachstum ihrer Wirtschaft und von ihrer Friedenspolitik. Die Errichtung 
der Chemiearbeiterstadt leitet sich folgerichtig aus der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik ab und ist Bestandteil der komplexen Gestaltung der Umwelt der sozialistischen 
Gesellschaft.“  
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As in other countries, industrialized building in the GDR had from the beginning been 
criticized as producing unsatisfactory results. Criticism focused on boring, uniform 
appearances of housing complexes and individual blocks, as well as on uncomfortable 
apartment designs and inappropriate sizes (Richter, 2006: pp.39-44). Furthermore, targets in 
cost reductions could not be achieved. As Gerhard Kosel had been among those responsible 
for the early drive towards industrialisation, he was removed from his post as Director of the 
Academy for Construction in 1965 and lost his seat in the Central Committee in 1967 (Kosel, 
1989: pp.315-317). However, the question of how industrial construction could be visually 
attractive and varied continued to trouble decision makers in the GDR. Apart from prestige 
projects, such as the Lenin Square (now the Square of the United Nations) in Berlin, the 
possibilities offered by the design series’ were not applied due to cost considerations; the 
layout of socialist housing complexes was determined by the mechanical construction 
process (Richter, 2006: pp.44-51). According to Hannemann, it was the pragmatic 
application of an industrial workflow that expressed itself in urban and apartment designs of 
the GDR (Hannemann, 1996: pp.111-112). Nevertheless, the power of social engineering 
through a designed urban environment continued to be emphasised, the planning of cities 
continued to be regarded as a modern project in constructing socialism (Büro für Städtebau 
und Architektur des Rates des Bezirkes Halle, 1972).75 
Throughout its existence, the GDR had closely followed political developments in the USSR. 
With regards to urban planning, this included shifting from costly, ornamentally decorated 
buildings in the style of national traditions to an emphasis on cheap and fast construction. In 
the decades following this shift, the GDR had become a leading nation in the use of pre-
fabricated concrete panels and industrialized construction; its achievements at the time of 
cooperation in Vinh are exemplified in the construction of Halle-Neustadt.76 Drawing mainlyon 
archival sources and interviews with former GDR experts, the next part will present the 
Vietnamese-German cooperation in the reconstruction of Vinh as a Socialist City. 
 
                                                          
75 This was also expressed in apartment designs. According to Hannemann, apartment designs in the GDR 
emphasised the nuclear family (two-generation households) as the smallest unit of society. In GDR ideology, 
the socialist family played an important role in the development of its members as socialist persons. No 
ideological distinction between the private and the public existed; family and apartments were regarded as the 
lowest unit of social and spatial organisation of society, respectively (Hannemann, 1996: p.104). 
76 According to Hannemann, between 1955 and 1990, 2.1 Mio apartments had been constructed using 
industrialized techniques. Of these 1.45 Mio are constructed using pre-fabricated concrete panels, from the 
1970s on most apartments were constructed using this technique. Most apartments were constructed from 
1976 on (1.26 Mio), after cooperation in Vinh had started (Hannemann, 1996: p.22). 
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3.3.2.4 First Steps of Cooperation 
The GDR Council of Ministers on 23 May 1973 decided to help in planning and the 
reconstruction of Vinh (Büro des Ministerrates der DDR, May 1973). This went further than 
the official letter of the DRV, which had asked for assistance only in planning of the city (Phủ 
Thủ tướng, 19.5.1973).77 Sources available to me do not fully explain this difference. 
However, according to Schäfer, the GDR had generally realized that projects planned by 
German experts and implemented by Vietnamese in the DRV were beset with problems 
(Schäfer, 2011: p.15). This is reflected in the GDR’s refusal to conduct planning of apartment 
blocks and a concrete factory in the GDR without involvement of Vietnamese experts 
(Engemann, 20.4.1970). Furthermore, documents related to the March 1973 delegation show 
that GDR officials were sceptical towards the DRV’s abilities to carry out urban 
reconstruction on its own, as well as their willingness to cooperate in physical construction 
projects (Präsidium des Ministerrates der DDR, 7.3.1973: p.6). Additionally, visible 
contributions to the reconstruction of the DRV as well as to the victory of socialism over the 
US were important political assets in the Cold War.78 With a letter dated 20 June 1973, Willi 
Stoph informed Phạm Văn Đồng of the decision of the SED Central Committee and the GDR 
government to aid and assist in the planning and reconstruction of Vinh (Stoph, 20.6.1973).79 
This decision was soon followed by the first visit of a GDR delegation to Vinh consisting of 
high ranking representatives of GDR planning and construction institutions80 (Bộ Xây dựng, 
18.7.1973). Gerhard Kosel describes his first impressions of Vinh as follows: 
 “One had a view over the city’s area from the top of a hill next to the Blue 
River. The term “city’s area” is not chosen accidentally, because nothing was 
left of the city itself. There are terrible pictures of destroyed Minsk and 
Stalingrad, of the ruins of Coventry and Dresden, here in Vinh there were not 
                                                          
77 However, in the initial request Phạm Văn Đồng spoke of planning and reconstruction (see pages 70-71). 
78 That the GDR leadership saw aid and assistance to other countries as a means of foreign policy has been 
mentioned above. That this policy also related to the reconstruction of Vinh will be described below. 
79 Note that in general official documents of the time always emphasise hierarchy by putting Party before state, 
both in the GDR and the DRV. This also applies to positions held by people: the more important position, 
namely in the Party, is always listed before the position in government or administration.  
80 Most prominently Gerhard Kosel (Ministry of Construction state secretary), Rolf Schüttauf (Vice-President of 
the German Academy of Construction), and Hans Grotewohl (Chairman of the Vietnam Task Force of the 
Ministry of Construction). Hans Grotewohl was the son of Otto Grotewohl, GDR Prime Minister 1949-1964. The 
delegation’s head Gerhard Kosel had been one of the leading figures in the GDR’s drive for industrialized 
construction, but was demoted from his post as President of the German Academy of Construction in 1965. He 
continued to serve as deputy-minister (until 1972); at the time of construction in Vinh he was responsible for 
international cooperation and foreign trade in the Ministry of Construction (Müller, 2000; Kosel, 1989). 
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even ruins. A burned out moonscape with countless bomb craters like so 
many pockmarks stretched before the eye.”81 (Kosel, 1989, pp.324-325)  
The Vietnamese report on the delegation’s journey describes visits to Vinh and Hanoi, during 
which the delegation was informed of the DRV’s plans for Vinh’s reconstruction and the state 
of the country’s construction sector. While most meetings took place with central agencies, 
both sides agreed that planning was to take place in Vinh, not in Hanoi or Berlin. 
Responsibility for planning and construction would lie with provincial authorities. Planning 
would follow an innovative approach that would see planning for the initial phase of 
reconstruction in parallel with the preparation of a General Development Plan82 for the city. 
Cooperation would not only include planning and construction efforts but also re-organisation 
of administrative structures. Provincial authorities would also be supported by strengthening 
the provincial construction industry through rationalisation of existing workshops and the 
creation of construction material factories and construction enterprises (Bộ Xây dựng, 
18.7.1973). These measures reflect a pessimistic assessment by the GDR delegation. It 
reported that planning by central agencies was not based on actually available materials and 
resources. Additionally, existing designs for apartment blocks required technical equipment 
and machinery beyond the existing conditions and were seen by the GDR delegation as 
contrary to the preferred lifestyle of the Vietnamese. Vietnamese planners, on the other 
hand, rejected traditional building materials like bamboo in favour of modern materials such 
as concrete, despite the low development level of the construction industry. In a similar vein, 
urban planning in the DRV was influenced by concepts and experiences of economically far 
more advanced socialist countries, while Vietnamese planners themselves had no 
experience in their application. Existing command structures were not able to coordinate 
construction and planning activities, or to efficiently use available resources and machinery 
(Ministerium für Bauwesen, 27.8.1973; Kosel, 1.8.1973).  
Nevertheless, the Vietnamese side proposed GDR assistance in the following projects (Bộ 
Xây dựng, 18.7.1973): 
- To assist in the preparation of the General Development Plan and technical structures. 
- To equip a planning office, a training enterprise, and a construction material laboratory. 
- To train cadres and workers, and equip a training school. 
                                                          
81 “Von der Höhe eines Hügels am Blauen Fluß hatte man einen Überblick über das Stadtgebiet bis hin zur 
Küste. Der Ausdruck „Stadtgebiet“ ist nicht zufällig gewählt, denn von der Stadt selbst war nichts 
übriggeblieben. Es gibt schreckliche Bilder von dem zerstörten Minsk und Stalingrad, den Ruinenfeldern von 
Coventry und Dresden, hier in Vinh gab es nicht einmal Ruinen. Vor dem Auge dehnte sich eine mit zahllosen 
Bombentrichtern wie mit Blattern übersäte und ausgebrannte Mondlandschaft.“ 
82 “Generalbebauungsplan” 
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- To construct and/or equip a brick factory (capacity 30,000,000 bricks per year), a cement 
factory (capacity 15,000 t per year), an enterprise for the production of sand and gravel, a 
carpentry for the production of doors and windows, a combine for the construction of 1,000 
apartments per year, as well as a provincial construction enterprise and a central 
construction enterprise. 
- To supply construction materials to ensure that construction would soon begin. 
The German delegation had no decision making power; its proposals to Minister of 
Construction Wolfgang Junker largely followed the Vietnamese requests. However, the 
delegation advised the Vietnamese that the GDR would not be able to supply a whole brick 
factory as it did not produce equipment for such factories (Kosel, 1.8.1973). Additionally, the 
earliest possibility for the delivery of a concrete factory would be in 1980, thus not part of 
cooperation in Vinh that was envisaged by the GDR to last for five years (see below) (Büro 
des Ministerrates der DDR, 3.9.1973c). More importantly, the construction of a concrete 
panel factory in Vinh was rejected. The GDR experts saw this construction technology as not 
suitable to the local context as it would require industrial production and assembly 
techniques, as well as the respective machinery, all of which were beyond the economic 
realities of Vinh. They therefore preferred brick building complemented with concrete 
elements, proposing tunnel forms for a second phase when the technical requirements would 
be fulfilled (Ministerium für Bauwesen, 27.8.1973). Tunnel form building was also proposed 
by DRV Ministry of Construction (MoC, successor of the Ministry of Architecture) officials, but 
in contrast to the GDR experts, they saw this as a transition technique while they envisaged 
pre-fabricated concrete panels as the ideal solution (Vũ Đức Thận, 10.10.1973). Both the 
concrete factory and the panel factory were not part of the protocol signed by both sides on 
the conclusion of the delegation’s visit to the DRV (Kosel, Vũ Đức Thận, 20.7.1973).83 The 
first delegation’s visit to Vietnam had not altered the vision of Vinh’s reconstruction as a 
Socialist City. It had, however, clearly shown that disagreements existed between the two 
sides on the application of modern construction techniques, as well as on the suitability of 
concrete panel apartment blocks for Vietnam in general and Vinh specifically. Furthermore, 
GDR documents make clear that GDR experts saw the need to restructure planning and 
buildings activities, as well as to train cadres and workers in all aspects of the planning and 
construction process.  
                                                          
83 However, the Vietnamese request for a concrete panel factory in Vinh would continue to trouble 
cooperation. See for example (Wolters, 20.9.1973), reporting that the DRV ambassador to the GDR repeated 
the request for a concrete panel factory.  
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The Committee for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation84  (CESTC) meeting of 
1973 was the first to take place after the Paris Peace Agreement; it was thus also the first 
after mutual projects had been put on a hold in late 1972 due to bombing by the US. By 
incorporating the reconstruction of Vinh into the CESTC framework, the GDR aimed at 
centralizing all of its activities in the field of urban construction on Vinh, with the exception of 
the concrete panel factory in Đạo Tú (Büro des Ministerrates der DDR, 3.9.1973c). Based on 
the findings and proposals of the Kosel delegation to Vietnam in July 1973, the GDR’s 
Council of Ministers had decided that assistance in Vinh would last for five years, 1974 to 
1978; total costs were calculated at about 120 Mio GDR-Mark. This would include payment 
and accommodation for GDR experts in Vinh, equipment for a planning office, machinery for 
construction enterprises and construction material production, construction material not 
available in the DRV, training of cadres and workers, as well as transport costs (Büro des 
Ministerrates der DDR, 3.9.1973a). Of the 24 Mio Mark designated for 1974, 5.2 Mio Mark 
would be non-repayable solidarity funds contributed by the GDR population spent for experts’ 
salaries, training of Vietnamese, as well as for planning office equipment.85 Repayable funds 
would have to be repaid in kind (“traditional Vietnamese products”) over a period of ten 
years, starting in 1980 (Büro des Ministerrates der DDR, 3.9.1973b).  
Concluding negotiations on the reconstruction of Vinh were carried out on an even higher 
level than the CESTC. In October 1973, DRV Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng visited the 
GDR to discuss opportunities for cooperation between the two countries (no author, October 
1973). The agreement was signed by Phạm Văn Đồng and Willi Stoph on 22 October 1973 
without changes to the GDR draft. It stipulated that the GDR would assist in 
- preparing the General Development Plan as well as in planning housing areas, including 
individual buildings by sending GDR experts to Vinh 
- equipping a planning office and construction enterprises 
- training of cadres   
                                                          
84 Due to the importance and wide range of assistance in the reconstruction of Vinh, the GDR proposed a 
separate treaty between GDR and DRV on that subject, and that further negotiations would take place in the 
framework of the CESTC (Wolters, 20.9.1973). To this effect, the GDR prepared a draft agreement to be signed 
during the CESTC negotiations 1973 (Büro des Ministerrates der DDR, 3.9.1973b). Thereby, the project was 
both elevated in formal importance, as well as incorporated in the institutionalized channels for economic 
relations between the two countries. 
85 The use of these funds and the authority of state agencies over them represent a clear example of the 
entanglement between official cooperation and “solidarity” funded by people’s contributions.  
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- rationalizing production of building materials86, by sending experts, machinery, and 
equipment (Government of the GDR, Government of the DRV, 22.10.1973). 
While the GDR rejected requests for administrative buildings, several public buildings serving 
the population were part of the cooperation, such as a cinema and an event centre. 
According to the agreement, responsibility for planning and construction would lie with the 
DRV government. A Task Force would be established at the respective Ministry of 
Construction for overall coordination, while in Vinh a Vietnamese Reconstruction Supervisor 
(Aufbauleiter) and the leader of the German expert group would cooperate and be 
responsible for every day management activities. Further details were to be discussed and 
fixed in a protocol until the end of the year. As the GDR had proposed, delivery of material 
and machinery would be agreed on in CESTC negotiations (Government of the GDR, 
Government of the DRV, 22.10.1973). Thus, in October 1973, structures as well as 
responsibilities had been agreed on in general terms.  
At the same time, first steps for implementation were taken. A Task Force Vietnam had been 
established under the GDR Ministry of Construction on 1 October 1973, with Hans Grotewohl 
as its chairman (Nguyen Sy Thuy et al., 2011: p.25).87 In October 1973, a Vietnamese 
delegation travelled the GDR to study its advances in construction techniques, focusing on 
the examples of Dessau and Halle (Nguyễn Đình Châu, 13.11.1973). Among those GDR 
officials in charge of the delegation’s visits was Karlheinz Schlesier, who held important 
positions as chief architect in Dessau and Halle-Neustadt (Weber, 2000). After 
accompanying the Vietnamese delegation on its visit to East Germany, Schlesier was 
appointed deputy head of the expert group in Vinh and head of its division for urban 
construction and planning.  
Schlesier and Grotewohl, two prominent figures of GDR planning and architecture, would 
thus form part of the leadership of the first GDR expert group in Vinh, reflecting the 
importance attributed to the project by the GDR. In late November 1973, they travelled to 
Vietnam as members of a preparation group that was to take first steps in the implementation 
of the agreement (Phủ Thủ tướng, 22.11.1973). Like the Kosel delegation before, they met 
with officials at the provincial and national level. Meetings with high-ranking officials indicate 
the increased attention of the DRV leadership to the reconstruction of Vinh and its 
appreciation of the GDR’s efforts (Knauer, 20.12.1973). However, consultations with officials 
                                                          
86 This included production of bricks, concrete elements, cement, sand and gravel, calcium oxide, as well as a 
lime stone quarry (Büro des Ministerrates der DDR, 3.9.1973b, appendix 2). 
87 However, according to (Bộ Xây dựng, 18.7.1973), Grotewohl had already been head of the Task Force when 
he visited Vietnam as member of the Kosel delegation. As the Ministry of Construction had already established 
a Task Force as part of the Đạo Tú project that was turned into the Task Force Vietnam, it is likely that the 
establishment of the Task Force on 1 October was merely a formal act.  
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also pointed at conflicts within the Vietnamese administration. Deputy chairman of the State 
Planning Committee Nguyễn Văn Khá as well as Politburo member and Deputy Prime 
Minister Đỗ Mười advised the delegation to reject exaggerated requests from lower 
authorities and to only supply those machines that could be efficiently used under local 
conditions. Also the Ministry of Construction was criticized by Nguyễn Văn Khá as it had not 
yet established the Vinh Task Force and neglected its responsibility for preparations (Knauer, 
20.12.1973).88 In a letter to Phạm Văn Đồng, Lê Thanh Nghị and Đỗ Mười, Nguyễn Văn Khá 
repeated his criticism, stating that by the time the delegation had left Vietnam in December 
1973, the DRV had not taken the agreed steps to establish necessary bodies and structures. 
He called on the MoC to immediately establish a Vinh Task Force, to delegate necessary 
personnel to Vinh, to supply necessary documents to the German partners, and to establish 
centralized authority over the reconstruction process (Nguyễn Văn Khá, 21.12.1973). 
Additionally, Deputy Chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers Gerhard Weiss withheld from 
the delegation important information that he reported to deputy Minister of Construction 
Poser (Weiss, 21.11.1973).89 Withheld information concerned a number of problems in the 
planning and reconstruction of Vinh. According to Weiss, responsibility for the construction of 
Vinh had been turned over to provincial authorities who lacked capacity and experience. 
Provincial authorities claimed that they were informed that the GDR would supply a concrete 
factory as well as two training facilities for construction workers and cadres. Different 
agencies proposed different reconstruction strategies. The Ministry of Construction had only 
recently been established but lacked resources, authority, and efficient structures to fulfil its 
tasks. Therefore, support from the MoC was not forthcoming. Plans for the reconstruction of 
Vinh were unrealistic and not covered by available materials and supplies due to 
uncoordinated planning. Thus, the report again painted an alarming picture of the state of 
construction and planning in the DRV at the beginning of the reconstruction of Vinh. 
Coordination, one of the most important aspects of centralized planning and industrialized 
construction, was seen as critically lacking (Weiss, 21.11.1973). 
                                                          
88 During this meeting Nguyễn Văn Khá also pointed to the unrealistic plan of the former Minister of 
Construction for New Hanoi, a project that by then had been abandoned. This meant that the panel factory in 
Đạo Tú would, according to the plans of that time, be located far away from any meaningful construction site 
and without necessary infrastructure.  
89 The document gives no explanation as to why this information had to be kept private and was withheld from 
the expert group.  
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When the second delegation travelled to Vietnam in November 1973 to prepare first steps in 
Vinh’s reconstruction, the kind of destruction in Vinh was different from experiences in the 
GDR, where bombing had left cities in ruins. In Vinh, the high number of wooden buildings 
and the scale of bombing meant that only a small number of ruins was left in 1973. 
Nevertheless, Nguyễn Sỹ Hòa, Vice-Chairman of the PAC, and expert group leader Otto 
Knauer agreed on first practical steps including agreements on personnel, financial 
regulations, and milestones for the first year of reconstruction, 1974 (Knauer, 20.12.1973, 
appendix). The delegation proposed first measures for efficient reconstruction of the city. 
Zoning was to be applied to steer increasing individual housing construction by returnees to 
designated areas and to ensure that zones for permanent construction would stay free of 
provisory buildings. The first housing complex of the city would be erected close to the 
former city centre on both sides of Quang Trung Street, starting on May 1, International 
Workers’ Day (see Figure 5). This meant that construction of the complex would take place 
before its design was completed. In a similar fashion, reconstruction of the city would begin 
before a General Development Plan was completed. Placing the housing complex along 
Quang Trung Street also followed a political rational: this location was intended to ensure 
that people, especially those heading to the war-zone in the south, would pass by this 
symbol of international solidarity and of a believe in victory in the on-going war (Mönnig 
1989:13). 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
Map of Vinh’s built-up area 
in 1975 showing the 
envisaged location of the 
first housing complex 
(green) along National 
Highway 1 (violet) (adapted 
from Knauer, 27.2.1976) 
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Before cooperation in the reconstruction of Vinh officially began in February 1974, important 
decisions had been agreed on for the reconstruction of Vinh as a Socialist City. A revised 
planning document (see below) would serve as the formal basis of cooperation. The first 
housing complex in Vinh would be located on Quang Trung Street.90 The first permanent 
buildings to be erected in Vinh would be housing blocks, not administrative or representative 
buildings. While initial reconstruction would rely on construction material supplied by the 
GDR, reconstruction of the city was seen by GDR planners as a “complex” undertaking.  The 
goal was to improve existing plans and to enable their implementation. Therefore, planning 
was to consist of regional planning of Nghệ An province, urban planning of Vinh, as well as 
the planning of an exemplary housing complex. This was to ensure that as much 
construction material as possible would be produced locally, replacing prevalent manual 
labour with rationalised production. In addition to creating a local construction material 
industry, construction enterprises would be supplied with necessary machinery. Training of 
cadres and workers would be one of the most important tasks to allow for increasingly self-
reliant urban development. This would take the form of on-the-job and class-room training in 
Vinh and the GDR, as well as the equipment of a vocational school (Mönnig, 1989). It was 
agreed during this delegation’s visit that planning for Vinh would be revised according to 
discussions between the delegation and Vietnamese authorities. A revised planning 
document would then serve as the formal basis of cooperation (Knauer, 20.12.1973). 
 
3.3.2.5 Vietnamese-German Planning of a Socialist City 
While preparations for GDR-DRV cooperation in the reconstruction of Vinh were carried out, 
people, institutions and enterprises started to return to Vinh from early 1973 on. After initial 
repairs to war damaged structures in 1973 only 117,522m² were usable, mostly in bamboo 
buildings. By August 1973, five km of roads had been repaired provisionally and electricity 
was provided by six generators. While DRV and GDR central authorities prepared for 
cooperation from early 1973 on, urban planning in Vinh continued without reference to 
possible GDR assistance, upholding the guidelines of former plans. Planning by the central 
Institute for Urban Planning focused on the first two years of reconstruction (1974 to 1975), 
during which pre-war levels of services, infrastructure and production should be achieved, 
with a focus on industrial zones and the housing areas for respective workers. Vinh’s 
population for 1974 to 1975 was calculated at about 60,000 people, mainly industrial and 
construction workers, administration cadres, as well as their families. Three to four m² per 
person of housing would be provided, 2/3 of which were to be situated in one-storey 
buildings and 1/3 in four to five-storey buildings (Bô Xây dưng, Viện Thiết kế Quy hoạch 
thành phố và nông thôn, August 1973). While this plan focused on production and the 
                                                          
90 Thus its subsequent name Quang Trung Housing Complex. 
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provision of housing, other agencies argued for reconstruction to begin with the construction 
of the city centre as an assembly of administrative buildings, leaving the provision of housing 
to private initiative (Weiss, 21.11.1973). When the first members of the GDR expert group 
Vinh arrived in 1974, no plan had been approved by the Party leadership or the DRV 
government.  
After the second GDR delegation’s visit in November/December 1973, planning for 
reconstruction had been revised, importantly from 1974 on it was under the responsibility of 
Nghệ An’s Party Committee and Administrative Committee (UBHC Nghệ An, 17.1.1974). The 
city’s population was estimated to reach 80,000 in 1975, calculated from the workforce 
necessary for the operation of the city and its industries, plus the number of dependents. 
However, in contrast to previous plans, permanent housing would only be supplied by the 
state to those who had to be relocated from designated construction sites, amounting to 
12,000 people who would be housed in five-storey communal housing blocks (60%) and 
family-apartment buildings (40%). The types of buildings were chosen from Vietnamese 
catalogues, allowing for detailed planning of the required materials and funds. Public 
buildings to be built in the first two years were to provide services and entertainment; plans 
for the construction of the city centre were abandoned. With reference to cooperation with 
the GDR, the Quang Trung Housing Complex was designated as the most important 
construction project for the years 1974 to 1975, laying out mechanisms to ensure 
implementation. The influence of the GDR delegation’s visit to Vinh is visible in this 
document (UBHC Nghệ An, 17.1.1974). The delegation had proposed to start construction in 
Quang Trung with Vietnamese building designs to ensure an early start of construction and 
to raise the confidence of the Vietnamese partners, and the delegation itself had participated 
in choosing the building types. The delegation had also played a role in choosing Quang 
Trung as the first housing complex to be constructed. Critique of GDR officials towards 
former plans is addressed in the document:  it pays much more attention to detail, as well as 
to materials needed. For the first time material needs are put into relation to locally available 
resources and production capacities, laying out a plan for the development of construction 
material industries. Furthermore, the plan requests reliable decisions and information of 
central agencies (UBHC Nghệ An, 17.1.1974).   
When the first GDR experts arrived in Vinh in February 1974, documents that were to serve 
as a basis for mutual planning of Vinh and the Quang Trung Housing Complex had been 
prepared. During the next 20 years, the city’s population would rise to 120,000-150,000 
inhabitants, the housing stock would mainly (85%) consist of four to five-storey buildings, 
with a much lower percentage of one and two-storey buildings (10%) and high-rises above 
five stories (5%). Contrary to former plans, Bến Thủy industrial area would be reduced in size 
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and a more important industrial area focusing on construction materials be located south of 
Quyết Mountain. For the year 1974, reconstruction would focus on housing, public services, 
and transport infrastructure. While total investments by the DRV were calculated at 
7,500,000 Đồng, funds for 1974 had not yet been allocated by the State Planning 
Committee. The Provincial Administrative Committee called on central agencies to twin Nghệ 
An with a home province of Karl Marx in the GDR91 (UBHC Nghệ An, February 1974a). 
During 1974 to 1975, 40,000m² of housing were to be constructed in Quang Trung Housing 
Complex, with 10,000m² in 1974. Planning for housing complexes until that point remained 
abstract, presenting calculations on costs and materials, but no elaboration on designs and 
planning principles (UBHC Nghệ An, February 1974b). Both documents were approved by 
the DRV Council of Ministers on 5 February 1974, thus forming the basis on which mutual 
planning could build (Schlesier, 25.3.1974). While the documents generally followed previous 
planning, the emphasis on housing is reflective of GDR priorities.  
Mutual planning began in February 1974. Contrary to Vietnamese expectations, GDR 
experts did not immediately assist in the design of completely new housing blocks. To ensure 
that construction of Quang Trung would soon begin and the targeted 10,000m² of housing 
space would be completed in 1974 the GDR expert group convinced the Vietnamese 
partners to construct the first four housing blocks according to existing Vietnamese designs 
(Schlesier, 25.3.1974). The jointly developed building concept was planned to be applied 
beginning with the fifth housing block and to be continuously modified according to 
experiences gathered during application (Schlesier, 4.9.1974). The expert group estimated 
the housing complex on both sides of Quang Trung Street to be completed by 1976 or 1977 
(Knauer, 25.5.1974). Vietnamese-German cooperation in the planning of a Socialist City 
focused on two projects: the General Development Plan and the Quang Trung Housing 
Complex.  
The General Development Plan  
Not only the Quang Trung Housing Complex was intended as a model, the reconstruction of 
Vinh as a whole, including construction, planning, organisation, training, and leadership, was 
intended by the DRV leadership to provide an example for the whole country (Leiter der 
DDR-Arbeitsgruppe Vinh, 13.6.1974: p.1). Construction activities began in 1974 based on 
preliminary guidelines while the General Development Plan was prepared. In May 1975, the 
Administrative Committee of Nghệ An presented the result of cooperation on the General 
Development Plan to the MoC for approval. It is the most comprehensive summary of the 
transnational modern project to create a Socialist City in Vinh. Socio-political principles of the 
                                                          
91 Maybe unaware that Karl Marx had been borne in West Germany. 
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plan followed political guidelines laid out by central agencies of the DRV 
(Verwaltungskomitee Nghe An, 30.5.1975). These principles92 emphasised the city’s 
-  regional and national importance  
- the function of the General Development Plan to develop Vinh as a “beautiful, well-
functioning, city worthy its revolutionary traditions”93 
- economical use of land, with the mixture of urban and rural land-use in the city representing 
the “immediate cooperation between workers and peasants”94  
- future economic structure 
- role as a provincial and local centre for administration and education, as well as the 
symbolic importance of the city centre 
- population size and area 
- separation into industrial, residential, educational, and recreational zones 
- development according to the housing complex model 
- development phased according to economic planning 
- “’healthy urban structure’”95 
- need for development of construction material industries 
- service to improvements in the living and working conditions of its citizens 
- reconstruction ten times more beautiful than before (Verwaltungskomitee Nghe An, 
30.5.1975: pp.6-8).  
The city would also continue to follow its role as an administrative centre and a transport hub. 
Reconstruction at Vinh’s old location followed ideological concerns:  
“Reconstruction of Vinh’s central part will take place at the city’s old location. 
Thereby existing objects, roads, and installations will be used, above all the 
traditional location of the ‘Red City Vinh’, the ‘Iron City Vinh’ will be preserved 
                                                          
92 See appendix for a full translation of the socio-political principles.  
93 “ schönen, gut funktionierenden, modern ausgestatteten und ihren revolutionären Traditionen würdigen 
Stadt ” 
94 “ unmittelbare Zusammenwirken von Arbeitern und Bauern” 
95 “’gesunde Stadtstruktur’” 
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and developed for all future and coming generations.”96 (Verwaltungskomitee 
Nghe An, 30.5.1975: p.19) 
Vinh’s economic structure was to follow those directions that had already been laid out in 
previous plans: transport, harbour and sea economies, light industries, repair industries, and 
construction industries. These would be located in the Northern Industrial area, as well as a 
Southern Industrial area encompassing the Bến Thủy area, the northern river bank and 
Quyết Mountain. While the northern zone would include small scale and transport/repair 
industries, the southern zone would serve construction material industries as well as those 
industries relying on water ways. In addition to these two areas, a textile combine would be 
located close to the city centre in the former Trường Thi area. Cửa Lò would serve as a sea 
harbour, Cửa Hội as a base for fishery and related industries.  
The rationale behind urban planning and design of Vinh was to create a beautiful city:  
“Year by year the image of the city has to be designed, one section, one object 
has to fit harmoniously and according to plans with the next one. Each building 
is a stone in the mosaic of the city, experiences teach that the construction of 
a beautifully designed city, a cultural city with a pleasant environment for its 
citizens and for the joy of its visitors can not be improvised; neither can it be 
postponed to a later date – because each building project creates realities. 
The mission assigned by Hồ Chí Minh’s legacy to also reconstruct Vinh ten 
times more beautiful is understood as the task to design the houses, streets, 
squares, complexes, and ensembles of the city worthy and harmoniously, to 
realize them in such a way that its citizens feel comfortable and at home, in 
such a way that gradual improvements in the life of the people are expressed 
in the construction of the city. It [the mission] is understood as the task to 
effectively apply the means and possibilities of socialist planning and 
construction arts.”97 (Verwaltungskomitee Nghe An, 30.5.1975: p.26) 
                                                          
96 “Der Aufbau des zentralen Teils der Stadt Vinh erfolgt am früheren Standort der Stadt. Damit werden die 
vorhandenen Objekte, Trassen, Anlagen genutzt, vor allem aber wird der traditionsreiche Standort der ‘Roten 
Stadt Vinh’, der ‘Eisernen Stadt Vinh’ bis in alle Zukunft für künftige Generationen erhalten und entwickelt.“  
97 “Jahr für Jahr muß zielstrebig das Bild der Stadt gestaltet werden, ein Abschnitt, ein Objekt muß sich mit dem 
nächsten harmonisch und planvoll ergänzen. Jedes Bauwerk ist ein Stein im Mosaik der Stadt, die Erfahrungen 
lehren, daß der Aufbau einer schön gestalteten Stadt, kulturvollen Stadt mit angenehmen Milieu für ihre 
Bürger und zur Freude ihrer Gäste nicht improvisiert werden kann, er kann auch nicht auf irgend einen 
späteren Zeitpunkt hinausgeschoben werden – weil jede Baumaßnahme Realitäten schafft. Erst die 
sozialistische Gesellschaft bietet überhaupt die Möglichkeit, eine so anspruchsvolle Aufgabe in Angriff zu 
nehmen. 
Der Auftrag des Vermächtnisses Ho chi Minhs auch Vinh zehnmal schöner wiederaufzubauen, wird als Aufgabe 
verstanden, die Häuser, Straßen, Plätze, Komplexe und Ensembles der Stadt würdig und harmonisch zu 
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Thus, planners would harmoniously incorporate the different functions of the city with each 
other and the city’s environment. The structuring principle would be the southern axis (now 
Trần Phú Street), from which axis’ would spread north, north-east and along the Lam River. 
While National Highway 1 would be relocated outside the city, old important streets would 
highlight historic places and create axial vistas towards the city centre.  
The central area is described as the “highlight of urban design”. It was to be located along 
the southern west-east axis, forming a series of three functionally differentiated zones. The 
first (arriving from the west) would serve as a service and trade centre, including the market 
that would be reconstructed at its former location. The second zone would be located in the 
area of the Trần Phú, Trung Tâm (today Trường Thi Street) and Phan Bội Châu (today Lê 
Duẩn Street) streets intersection. As the city centre, this area would incorporate political, 
administrative, and cultural institutions for leading and planning of society. “This composition 
has to consider the leading social institutions (including military authorities), the Central 
Square, meaningful artistic design, the most important cultural buildings of the city, parks, 
and water bodies”98 (Verwaltungskomitee Nghe An, 30.5.1975: p.31). In a third zone, 
stretching along Phan Bội Châu street south towards the banks of Lam River, educational 
institutions would be located.99 
In combination with the street layout, these three zones would form three axes (see Figures 
8 and 9). The first, stretching along Phan Đình Phùng and Trần Phú streets from west to 
east, would highlight entry to the city close to the citadel by a group of high-rise buildings; its 
northern side would be lined by representative housing buildings. The second axis would 
connect the “places of the heroic fight against the US-aggressors” in the Bến Thủy-Quyết 
Mountain area with the Central Square (Verwaltungskomitee Nghe An, 30.5.1975: p.32). The 
southern entry to the city would be marked by Quyết Mountain and a recreational park in Bến 
Thủy; the street leading into the city would create vistas over the city centre and Quang 
Trung Street towards high-rise buildings marking the northern city entry. The third axis would 
follow Trung Tâm Street and connect the city to Cửa Lò and Cửa Hội.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
gestalten, so zu realisieren, daß sich ihre Bürger wohl und heimisch fühlen, daß sich die schrittweise 
Verbesserung des Lebens des Volkes im Aufbau der Stadt widerspiegelt. Er wird als Aufgabe verstanden, die 
Mittel und Möglichkeiten sozialistischer Stadtbaukunst wirkungsvoll einzusetzen.”  
98 “Die Komposition dieses Ensembles hat die führenden gesellschaftlichen Einrichtungen (darunter auch die 
militärischen Leitungen), den Zentralen Platz, eine bedeutungsvolle bildkünstlerische Gestaltung, die 
wichtigsten kulturellen Objekte der Stadt, Parkanlagen und Wasserflächen zu berücksichtigen.“ 
99 These three functionally distinct and hierarchically ordered centres roughly mirrored Vinh’s historic 
development as three distinct settlements: The economic centre would be located at the core zone of imperial 
and colonial Vinh around the former citadel, the new city centre at the location of former Trường Thi (later 
reflected in the re-naming of Trung Tâm Street as Trường Thi Street) where the railroad atelier had been 
located in colonial times, and the educational area close to Bến Thủy. 
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Figure 6  
This drawing of Vinh’s city centre is part of the General Development Plan’s design concept for the city’s 
construction and architecture (Bundesarchiv Koblenz BArch DH 1 Bild-28569-07-02).  
 
 
Figure 7  
The General Development Plan with the first (green), the second (violet), and the third axis (orange) converging 
at the Square of Victors (brown) (adapted from Brambach, February 1979). 
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In the city centre, a central park would be located to the west of Trung Tâm Street. The 
layout of this axis would allow views towards the Trường Sơn mountain range bordering on 
Laos. All three axes would converge on a central monumental square, with the Square of 
Victors at its centre. Designs for the Square of Victors proposed a monumental Hồ Chí Minh 
statue to be placed in its centre (see Figure 8). The city silhouette would be highlighted by 
high-rise buildings marking its entries, while an even higher group of buildings would mark 
the city centre. In addition to industrial and residential areas as well as the above described 
three central zones, three large recreational parks where planned: one in the former citadel 
(see Figure 9), a central park, and a park in the Bến Thủy area (Verwaltungskomitee Nghe 
An, 30.5.1975).  
 
Figure 8 
Study of Vinh’s administrative centre (Bundesarchiv Berlin BArch DH1/28550). In the centre is visible the 
Square of Victors, with a monumental Hồ Chí Minh statue. Quyết Mountain is located on the right.  
 
Figure 9  
Study of the area around Vinh’s citadel, the city’s historic centre (Bundesarchiv Berlin BArch DH1/28550). To 
the left are visible Vinh’s market and the west-east axis lined with housing blocks. In the centre can be seen a 
high-rise building marking entry to the city from the west. The citadel area was to serve as a park for culture 
and recreation. 
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Implementation of this plan was envisioned to take about 20 years. While the first phase of 
reconstruction had lasted for two years (1974 to 1975), the second phase would last for a 
five year period from 1976 to 1980. More detailed planning for this period was part of the 
General Development Plan of 1975 and was carried out in cooperation with the GDR group. 
This early phase was seen as particularly important, as it would crucially influence later 
development of the city. Thus, it focused on projects and measures that would ensure later 
implementation of the General Development Plan. Steering construction activities was 
regarded as the most important measure, the whole city area had by then been put to use by 
returning inhabitants, enterprises, and institutions. The plan differentiated between areas in 
which construction would be forbidden, those which had to be cleared for construction 
activities, and areas for provisory bamboo buildings. Industries were to be located in the 
designated industrial areas. Of the three parks, only the citadel park received attention during 
GDR-DRV cooperation. While construction of the city centre had been relegated to a later 
period, focus during the years 1975-1980 would be on the construction of housing, with the 
Quang Trung Housing Complex regarded as a model and experimental project. 
The focus on housing construction during the first phase and the postponement of the city 
centre to a later period reflect GDR construction policies that focused on housing 
construction on urban fringes.100 This strategy proved controversial. As has been described 
above, other agencies had previously called for construction activities to focus on the city 
centre, while housing would be left to private initiative.101 Lê Duẩn, General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), proved to be the highest 
ranking critique of this strategy. Visiting Vinh in April 1979, he underlined the role of Vinh as 
the country’s third most important city. According to him, the city centre would have to clearly 
reflect Vinh’s political and economic importance symbolized by public buildings, on the 
expense of housing construction (Brambach, 6.7.1979). Differing views on the strategy for 
Vinh’s reconstruction within the DRV/SRV also surfaced when Deputy Chairman of the State 
Planning Committee Phạm Hào called for a reduction of housing construction in talks with 
Bruno Lietz102 in Berlin, without the agreement of Nghệ Tĩnh’s authorities or the SRV 
government (Roller, 3.1.1977: p.9).   
The General Development Plan expresses the planning and design ideals serving as 
guidelines for the reconstruction of Vinh as a Socialist City. However, it was not approved by 
the DRV or later the SRV government because it provided only outlines and no detailed 
                                                          
100 According to Werner, unconvincing theorizing on the forms genuine to a Socialist City was one of the main 
reasons for the long absence of construction activities in inner city areas in the GDR (Werner 1998: 33-38). 
Additionally, industrial construction was difficult in city centres where the existing urban fabric complicated 
usage of large machinery. 
101 However, the relevant GDR document does not indicate which actor/s propagated this course.  
102 Lietz was responsible for agriculture and food supply in the State Planning Committee.  
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planning of infrastructure (Roller, 3.1.1977). Furthermore, work on the General Development 
Plan was complicated by a central decision to unite Nghệ An Province with its southern 
neighbour Hà Tĩnh, forming Nghệ Tĩnh Province in 1976. Thereby Vinh became the centre of 
a much larger area, and planning would now have to incorporate the southern bank of the 
Lam River, the former provincial border (Mönnig, 1989; Knauer, 27.2.1976).103  In 1977, a 
revised General Development Plan had been presented to the Ministry of Construction and 
submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval (Kohl, 12.8.1977; Liebe, 10.2.1977: p.6). It 
complemented the 1975-plan with planning for a larger area south of the Lam River and 
detailed infrastructure projects, leaving intact the above described aspects (Volkskomitee 
Provinz Nghe An, 8.11.1977). However, by 1979 the Council of Ministers had still not 
occupied itself with the General Development Plan, prompting the then head of the GDR 
expert group in Vinh to complain: “obviously the partner, especially the Ministry of 
Construction, still underestimates the importance of a General Development Plan for the 
overall development of a city”104 (Brambach, February 1979: p.3). In the end, no General 
Development Plan for Vinh would be approved during the GDR cooperation period.105 
The Quang Trung Housing Complex  
The Quang Trung Housing Complex was a core element of the modern project to construct a 
Socialist City with assistance of the GDR by providing an example of socialist housing, 
planning and construction techniques, as well as the institutions and structures necessary for 
its administration. The basic design of the complex was presented to the Vietnamese 
Ministry of Construction in May 1974 (Knauer, 25.5.1974). As a result of the MoC review, the 
housing blocks were turned 23 degrees so as to reduce the impact of the dry hot Lao wind 
(Mönnig, 1987: p.128; Bộ Xây dựng, 28.6.1974). The original design had paid insufficient 
attention to this detail (see Figure 10), and the turning of the buildings would later be 
celebrated as proving the willingness to adapt generic designs of a housing complex to local 
conditions (Schwenkel, 2012: pp.468-469; Mönnig, 1989, 1987).106 This and other 
recommendations by the MoC were incorporated into the plan and design of the complex, 
which was approved by the MoC in November 1974 (Bộ Xây dựng, 13.11.1974).  
                                                          
103 Nghệ An and Hà Tĩnh were re-established as separate provinces in September 1991. Vinh remained the 
provincial capital of Nghệ An. 
104 “offensichtlich [hat] der Partner, insbesondere das Ministerium für Bauwesen, die Bedeutung eines 
Generalbebauungsplanes als Dokument für die Gesamtentwicklung einer Stadt noch unterschätzt” 
105 The first development plan for Vinh would be approved in 1993 (UBND Nghệ An 9.1.1993; Lương Bá Quảng 
n.d.).  
106 However, due to urban design, some of the buildings located along major streets were oriented towards 
these and not to the wind direction.  
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Figure 10 
Design of the Quang Trung Housing Complex by the provincial Institute of Planning and Design, signed by 
Hoàng Văn Liêu and Dr. K. Schlesier on 14.5.1974 (Bundesarchiv Berlin BArch DH1/28550). Note that in contrast 
to the above model of Quang Trung most buildings are not yet turned to cushion wind impact.  
The MoC approval stipulated that the Quang Trung Housing Complex would provide housing 
for 15,600 inhabitants in 2,480 apartments with a total floor space of 65,800m² (ca. four m² 
per person). 30% of the inhabitants would occupy collective accommodation (dormitories), 
while the remaining 70% would be provided with family apartments (Bộ Xây dựng, 
13.11.1974). In contrast, previous planning by provincial authorities had envisaged a much 
larger percentage of the population to be housed in collective housing blocks (60%) (UBHC 
Nghệ An, 17.1.1974, see above). Participation of GDR experts in the design of the socialist 
housing complex thus put more emphasis on family based apartments.107 The layout and the 
facilities of the Quang Trung Housing Complex followed the typical ideals of a socialist 
housing complex (see Figures 11 and 13). According to its plan, it was divided into five 
groups (A-E), each inhabited by 2,180 to 4,410 people in six to nine blocks (see Figure 12). 
Public buildings would include crèches, kindergartens, schools, a hotel, and a cinema, as 
well as a neighbourhood centre including facilities for shopping, services, cultural activities, 
as well as communications (Nguyen Sy Thuy et al., 2011; no author, 19.9.1977). While 
                                                          
107 Schwenkel attributes the insistence of GDR experts on family apartments to a genuine GDR-version of 
socialist living that might have evoked ideological opposition from DRV officials (Schwenkel, 2012). The GDR’s 
ideological view of the socialist two-generation family as the smallest unit of socialist society was indeed 
expressed in apartment designs; however, it remains unclear why DRV authorities might have rejected this 
style of housing (Hannemann, 1996: pp.103-106; see also Footnote 75). As I have described above, communal 
living had been abandoned as the desired form of housing in the USSR from early on, and was applied in the 
DRV mainly out of economic rather than ideological concerns. Similarly, many apartments in Quang Trung 
would later be inhabited by several families each occupying one room while sharing sanitary and cooking 
facilities.  Furthermore, in Quang Trung as in other projects in the DRV, collective housing was intended for 
singles, not families (DDR-Arbeitsgruppe Vinh, 3.5.1974). 
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completion of Quang Trung had initially been intended for 1976 or 1977 (Knauer, 25.5.1974), 
the General Development Plan postponed the complex’ completion to 1978.  
 
Figure 11 
A model of Quang Trung Housing Complex (Bundesarchiv Koblenz BArch DH 1 Bild-28569-07-01). To the left are 
recognizable remains of the citadel. 
 
Figure 12  
The different housing groups in the Quang Trung 
Housing Complex (adapted from Brambach, 
February 1979). Blue: Group A, Orange: Group B, 
Violet: Group C, Red: Group D, Green: Group E. 
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Intended as a prototype that would fully express the advantages of a housing complex in 
bringing about a socialist lifestyle, its function as a model for the development of Vinh went 
beyond its physical structures and layout. It was to provide an example for Vietnamese 
planners on how to supply the city’s inhabitants with housing and public facilities in one all-
encompassing project. Its buildings were intended to serve as model designs suitable to the 
conditions of their time but adaptable to future developments (Brambach, February 1979: 
p.6). The designs provided those living in family apartments with electricity, private sanitary 
and cooking facilities, as well as running water piped into the apartments by a centralized 
water supply. Balconies provided private open space, while the first floor, half underground, 
provided storage space (for floor plans see Purtak, 1982: appendix 2). Living conditions were 
intended to be on the same level or above that in the most modern housing complexes in the 
DRV (Engemann, 20.4.1970). The housing complex was to be administered by one central 
agency under the city’s Administrative Committee. Apartments were to be allocated to 
workers of the nearby Northern Industrial Zone, as well as workers and employees of 
construction and electricity enterprises, again underlining the socialist principle of access to 
high quality housing for the working class (Dietl, 1.12.1975; UBHC Nghệ An, 24.10.1975).  
 
Figure 13 
Study of Quang Trung Street with housing blocks on both sides of the street (Bundesarchiv Berlin BArch 
DH1/28550). 
Designing new projects for public facilities and housing blocks was promoted as adding to 
the catalogues108 available in Vinh and Vietnam. The MoC recommended the mutually 
designed housing series “Quang Trung” for further use in Vietnam (Liebe, 3.10.1977). 
                                                          
108 “Catalogues” here refers to actual catalogues of buildings and projects that could be reused and adapted in 
the future. 
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Furthermore, Quang Trung would serve as a testing field for management instruments such 
as the allocation of apartments, collection of rents, legal status of apartments and buildings, 
as well as the administration of the complex. Mutual planning and construction activities were 
seen as providing a practical training ground for Vietnamese cadres and workers, who would 
later on apply the experiences of Quang Trung in other housing complexes 
(Verwaltungskomitee Nghe An, 30.5.1975: p.40). As such, Quang Trung was supposed to be 
the first step in a large scale housing program. The General Development Plan envisioned 
the construction of 6 additional housing complexes. For the first phase of reconstruction, 
public facilities (especially the neighbourhood centre) of Quang Trung would serve the whole 
city. The construction of a permanent centre would require a higher development level of 
technical and planning skills, as well as more resources than currently available 
(Verwaltungskomitee Nghe An, 30.5.1975: p.30).  
During the construction of the first four blocks following Vietnamese designs, work on the 
design of the mutual series “Quang Trung” started in 1974. While GDR experts had intended 
to construct blocks A5 and A6 according to a revised design of the Vietnamese types to allow 
more time for the design of a completely new, mutual design, the MoC stipulated that the 
“Vietnamese” designs be totally abandoned and construction after the first four blocks be 
carried out according to the mutual design (Leiter der DDR-Arbeitsgruppe Vinh, 13.6.1974: 
p.2; DDR-Arbeitsgruppe Vinh, 3.5.1974). Thus, starting with blocks A5 and A6, this design 
was applied in Quang Trung and was continuously modified according to experiences gained 
during the construction process and by inhabitants. The Quang Trung series allowed for 
considerable diversity in the combination of different building sections (see plans in Purtak, 
1982: appendix 2; Knauer, 27.2.1976). 
Significant changes to the design of housing blocks were carried out in preparation of 
construction on the western side of Quang Trung Street. There, the ground floor of buildings 
located along the street would provide space for shops and services. Plans for the 
construction of housing on that side of the complex had to be reworked in light of changes in 
central housing regulations, abandoning designs for dormitories and small apartments in 
favour of two and three-room apartments. Thus, only 1,650 of the inhabitants of Quang 
Trung were to live in dormitories, representing only about 10% of the planned residents
(Purtak, 31.12.1980: pp.51-52). Open cooking facilities and chimneys would be replaced by a 
closed system to avoid pollution and health hazards (Brambach, February 1979: p.5).  
As described above, conflicts had existed about the construction techniques to be applied in 
Quang Trung. While central DRV agencies had repeatedly asked for the construction of a 
panel factory, GDR experts rejected this request on the ground of technological and 
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economic realities in Vinh, instead proposing tunnel forms to be applied at a later stage 
(DDR-Arbeitsgruppe Vinh, 3.5.1974). The General Development Plan, however, made no 
mention of construction methods other than traditional brick building, rationalized by the 
increasing use of prefabricated concrete elements but not concrete panels. Still, planners of 
the MoC continued to insist that prefabricated concrete panels should be used in the 
construction of the second housing complex in Vinh. While this was rejected by both 
provincial authorities as well as GDR experts, they cooperated in the experimental design of 
an apartment block constructed in this way (Liebe, 23.7.1976, 12.6.1976; Hansen, 
18.6.1976). The Vietnam Task Force in the GDR Ministry of Construction vehemently 
opposed this approach, as Vinh’s construction industries were equipped neither with 
necessary construction equipment nor with respective production facilities (Hansen, 
23.9.1976). 
 
3.3.2.6 Implementation  
After the plans for the reconstruction of Vinh were presented, this part turns to the 
implementation of these plans and the creation of a Socialist City. It is divided into three 
different phases. Phase one refers to the first months of reconstruction in 1974, in which the 
most important steps were taken for the construction of five-storey housing blocks (Knauer, 
9.5.1974). The second phase lasted from mid-1974 to 1978, the original period of the 
agreement on Vinh’s reconstruction. However, as a multitude of problems and difficulties 
made necessary an extension of the agreement for two years, a third phase lasted from 1979 
until the end of cooperation between GDR and SRV in the reconstruction of Vinh.   
First Phase: Early to Mid-1974 
The first phase was characterized by organisational decisions, the arrival of the first German 
experts and German equipment, as well as the beginning of cooperation in the different 
areas the agreement had set out (Schlesier, 25.3.1974). The landmark event during this 
phase was the beginning of construction of the first Quang Trung building on 1 May 1974, 
International Workers’ Day, attended by Minister of Construction and Vice-Prime Minister Đỗ 
Mười.  
Organisational activities included the mobilisation of construction workers from Vinh’s 
surrounding areas. This proved problematic, as most districts had not fulfilled their quotas 
and others had violated guidelines by sending children or pregnant women. By mid-February, 
only 2,300 of 5,000 workers had arrived in Vinh (UBHC Nghệ An, 20.2.1974). As described 
above, the Ministry of Construction had so far been slow to establish the agreed on bodies to 
coordinate Vinh’s reconstruction. Only by February 1974, a committee had been established 
in the Ministry of Construction, headed by Đàm Trung Phường, director of the Institute for 
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Urban Planning (Phủ Thủ tướng, 21.2.1974). On the local level, Nguyễn Đình Châu, Vice-
chairman of the PAC was appointed leader of the provincial working group while Nguyễn 
Dương Điềm served as the city’s head of reconstruction (Nguyen Sy Thuy et al. 2011: p.25;  
DDR-Arbeitsgruppe Vinh, 3.5.1974). 
The GDR was slow to provide experts in Vinh. The first group of three GDR experts had 
arrived in Vinh in February, followed by members of the group’s leadership in March. Former 
head of the Vietnam Task Force Hans Grotewohl was appointed head of the architecture 
division, being replaced by Eddy Hansen as head of the Task Force in Berlin. By April, only 8 
experts were scheduled to arrive, representing only 50% of the agreed on number, 
“unacceptable” in light of DRV efforts (Schlesier, 25.3.1974: p.5). Due to these delays and 
the character of work during the first phase, the experts were largely concerned with 
immediate problems rather than systematic and conceptual tasks (DDR-Arbeitsgruppe Vinh, 
3.5.1974; Schlesier, 25.3.1974). In addition to the reconstruction expert group, German 
experts assisted in the reconstruction of a carpentry that had been constructed in the 
framework of GDR aid in equipping workshops during the 1960s, and that was to provide 
doors and windows for the housing complex (Knauer, 9.5.1974: p.2; Solidaritätskomitee der 
DDR, Vietnam-Ausschuß, n.d.).  
Delivery of GDR machinery and goods was also slow (Knauer, 25.5.1974: p.2; 9.5.1974: 
p.11; Schlesier, 25.3.1974: p.6). While materials for the planning office were supplied by air 
transport, shipped goods arrived late (Knauer, 9.5.1974: pp.8-9). Both sides had agreed that 
second-hand equipment could be supplied by the GDR. Thus, German enterprises were 
requested to provide stocks of their unused machinery and equipment. This proved a lengthy 
process. Additionally, some of the equipment provided was not operational or had been 
damaged during transport due to improper packaging (Ruprecht, 30.11.1974; Knauer, 
9.5.1974: p.9).  Thus, early construction efforts and the ground-breaking ceremony relied on 
locally available machinery and heavy manual labour (Knauer, 22.1.1975: pp.41, 47; Leiter 
der DDR-Arbeitsgruppe Vinh, 13.6.1974: p.3).  
Despite these shortcoming, cooperation between the Vietnamese and GDR experts on the 
local level quickly produced results. While differing views existed between the two groups on 
details of urban planning and Quang Trung design, the Vietnamese were willing to adjust 
their ideas to recommendations by the expert group (Schlesier, 25.3.1974: pp.2-3).  
However, disagreements on the political level surfaced in March, when Otto Knauer, expert 
group leader, was advised by Berlin to discontinue negotiations on the protocol 
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supplementing the agreement on Vinh’s reconstruction (Knauer, 9.5.1974: pp.12-13; 
4.4.1974: pp.1-2).109   
Despite these issues, optimism seems to have been high during the first phase. GDR experts 
were met with high expectations which even grew in light of the early construction start, their 
presence had a positive effect on efficiency and morale (Knauer, 9.5.1974: p.7; Schlesier, 
25.3.1974). Construction activities started in April with preparations for ground-breaking in 
Quang Trung, including the filling of bomb craters in construction areas (Knauer, 9.5.1974: 
pp.9-10; 4.4.1974: pp.2-3). Work regarding construction material industries during this phase 
focused on conceptual planning and analysis’ for the production of sand and gravel, 
limestone, and concrete (DDR-Arbeitsgruppe Vinh, 3.5.1974). Additionally, preparations 
were carried out to use pre-fabricated barracks as planning and management offices as well 
as a tent as cultural centre once those arrived from the GDR (Knauer, 9.5.1974).   
On 1 May 1974, the ground-breaking ceremony took place at block A1 in Quang Trung, 
attended by Đỗ Mười and GDR ambassador to the DRV Doering (Knauer, 9.5.1974: pp.9-
10). This event symbolically marked the beginning of construction aimed at creating a 
Socialist City assisted by the GDR.  
Second Phase: Mid-1974 to 1978 
Lightening of the first ship delivering materials and machinery to Vinh in early May 1974 
marks the beginning of the second phase (Knauer, 25.5.1974: p.2). This phase was 
characterized by continuous work on the agreed on projects, substantially increasing the 
output of construction material industries. However, it was also marked by growing 
disillusionment because of slow progress and by conflicts between different actors. Political 
decisions as well as national and international politics heavily influenced progress.  
Different circumstances and events impacted the availability of resources. Slow delivery of 
equipment and material from the GDR continued throughout the second phase, especially 
since German enterprises had no economic incentive to provide materials to Vinh (Hansen, 
April 1975: pp.10-15). To prevent delivery of broken or incomplete equipment, the Vietnam 
Task Force in the GDR started to examine material that was to be sent to Vinh in mid-1975 
(Arbeitsstab Vietnam, 11.7.1975). Still, delivery of broken or low quality equipment burdened 
GDR-DRV relations (Außenhandelsbetrieb Limex, Arbeitsstab Vietnam, 9.9.1975; Liebe, 
27.4.1977). 
                                                          
109 While documents available to me do not indicate reasons for disagreements, the event highlights central 
level conflicts that would continue to influence cooperation in the following years (Knauer, 25.5.1974, 
appendix). The protocol would be signed only in February 1977 (Kohl, Vu Quy, 8.2.1977). 
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Sea transport remained slow because of long storage time in Rostock and Hải Phòng. 
Responsibility for shipment lay with Vietnamese authorities after goods had been delivered to 
Rostock, although transport was usually on German ships (Hansen, 7.12.1978; Knauer, 
15.8.1975: p.5). Hải Phòng’s port facilities were heavily overburdened by the influx of aid and 
goods after the war had ended in 1975, causing storage times of up to eight months (Knauer,  
22.10.1975: pp.4-5). Open air storage, improper packaging and handling, as well as poor 
road conditions at times caused heavy damage to and losses of equipment delivered to Vinh 
(no author, 13.7.1976; Knauer, 15.8.1975: p.5; Schlesier, 15.3.1975: p.3; Eckhardt, 
9.12.1974). By 1977, over 400 colli (trading units) had not arrived in Vinh (Liebe, 26.1.1977). 
To speed up transport, some ships were lightened near the coast off Vinh. From 1976 on, 
ships were also lightened off Hải Phòng and materials transported to Vinh by a German 
coastal motor ship (Liebe, 10.2.1977: p.15). Due to siltation of the Lam River, this proved to 
be a short-term solution and from 1978 on the motor ship had in turn to be lightened again off 
Cửa Lò (Liebe, 8.3.1978: p.7).110 However, construction activities in Vinh were more severely 
impacted by shortages of resources supplied by the DRV (Kaumann, 14.10.1975: p.2; 
Bernecker, 24.6.1975). Machines delivered to Vinh were often stored in open weather for 
long times before being installed, resulting in damage and theft (Hansen, 7.12.1978, 
appendix; Liebe, 10.2.1977: p.23). Additionally, because of untrained personnel and the 
harsh climate, many machines quickly fell into disrepair while no spare parts were locally 
available and delivery from the GDR was slow or impossible due to shortages there (Peters, 
28.11.1977: p.10; Liebe, 3.10.1977: pp.7-8).   
Conflict ensued over these problems during the second phase of the cooperation. 
Accounting for cooperation activities and deliveries was carried out by GDR’s Limex and 
Vietnam’s Technoimport foreign trade firms. During negotiations in September 1975, 
Technoimport requested that unused non-repayable solidarity funds would be applied to 
physical goods, while Limex and the expert group insisted that according to government 
agreements such funds could only be used for expenses connected to the experts (such as 
salaries, food etc.). Technoimport further demanded that all tools be financed by solidarity 
funds, while according to agreements, only tools provided for the vocational school would 
thus be financed. The Germans prevailed in these issues, as former agreements had already 
stipulated regulations on them (Außenhandelsbetrieb Limex, Arbeitsstab Vietnam, 9.9.1975). 
As a result, non-repayable funds were from then on transacted through the GDR’s Solidarity 
Committee (Hansen, April 1976). More severe disagreements persisted on the value of 
deliveries and responsibilities for loss, damages, and slow transport. In a surprise meeting in 
January 1977, Technoimport insisted that these issues resulted from faulty packaging and 
wrong information provided by the GDR. Its deputy director blamed the GDR for causing 
                                                          
110 Note that this problem had already impacted the development of Vinh’s harbour in colonial times. 
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production losses by delivering late or not at all. The expert group on the other hand rejected 
these accusations, blaming slow construction entirely on the Vietnamese and claiming that 
broken machinery resulted largely from faulty use and lacking maintenance (Liebe, 
26.1.1977). In the following, at most 50% of the original price could be charged for second-
hand deliveries from 1976 on. In November 1977, it was further agreed by the GDR that this 
rule would also apply to goods delivered in 1974/1975, and that goods unsuitable for local 
conditions delivered in 1974 would be charged only at 50% of their price. Solidarity funds 
were used to compensate for the gap in the GDR’s accounts (Hansen, 23.11.1977: pp.3-4). 
These episodes show how during the second phase, good relations between partners were 
at times overshadowed by economic interests, and how mistakes and slow progress were 
blamed on each other.111  
In April 1975, the war ended when DRV troops seized Saigon (Turley, 1986: p.183). Instead 
of increasing efforts for the reconstruction of Vinh, the DRV’s victory in South Vietnam and 
the subsequent unification of the country diverted resources from Vinh to priority projects in 
the South.112 Thus, from 1975 on, cement, electricity and fuel were in increasingly short 
supply (Liebe, 23.7.1976; Hoffmann, 3.7.1975: p.4). To continue construction even on a low 
level, cement had again to be imported from the GDR (Kohl, 12.8.1977: p.2; Liebe, 
3.10.1977: p.6). This situation was compounded by tensions between the SRV on one side 
and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Democratic Kampuchea on the other that 
escalated into open conflict towards the end of the second phase (Goscha, 2006; Quinn-
Judge, 2006). China’s closing of the border increased the overreliance on Vietnam’s 
underdeveloped ports, further prolonging shipping duration (Zentrum für Information und 
Dokumentation der Außenwirtschaft, 1979: p.8). Projects carried out with assistance of the 
PRC were abandoned or continued relying on other resources. Most importantly, mobilisation 
diverted workers and resources to the armed forces (Brambach, February 1979: pp.2, 18; 
Liebe, 5.1.1978: p.4). In addition to mobilisation, shortages were due to economic difficulties 
(Roller, 18.6.1977). These were so severe that already in 1975 additional workers could not 
have been supplied with food (Hansen, March 1977: p.17). GDR experts had to rely almost 
exclusively on imported food from 1977 on (Liebe, January 1978: p.30). According to the 
expert group’s 1978 report, the productivity of available construction workers was low due to 
the overall emergency situation, poor provisions as well as inadequate diet and resulting 
worries of workers for their families (Brambach, February 1979: pp.18-20). Adding to existing 
difficulties, heavy floods and storms affected Vinh and Nghệ Tĩnh in November 1978, 
                                                          
111 Furthermore, it shows the necessity for further research to balance the reliance of this study on GDR 
sources and views expressed in them.  
112 The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) was subsequently founded on 2 July 1976. 
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causing severe structural damage as well as destruction of material, equipment and 
machines (Kohl, 30.10.1978: pp.4-5; 16.10.1978).   
The GDR had deliberately refused to provide already completed projects and construction 
brigades to enable Vietnamese workers and planners to improve their skills through on the 
job training, as well as to emphasise Vietnamese responsibility (Schäfer, 2011: p.15; 
Gottschalk, 30.8.1978: p.2; Solidaritätskomitee der DDR, Vietnam-Ausschuß, n.d.: pp.34-36). 
However, due to the low number of experienced and trained workers as well as qualified 
planners, GDR experts had to carry out numerous planning and manual tasks by themselves 
(Brambach, February 1979: pp.24-26; Jahn, 20.3.1979; Ruprecht, 30.11.1974).113 While 
many experts were loyal to their local Vietnamese partners and willing to extend their 
contributions to tasks beyond official agreements, they were reminded by their superiors in 
Berlin that their tasks were not those of a working brigade but of advisors (Hansen, 
16.6.1976). Though the work quality of the Vietnamese planners and architects improved 
over time, it was still heavily criticized by experts at the end of the second phase (Brambach, 
February 1979: pp.4-6, 19).114  
Coordination between central authorities and the construction efforts in Vinh weakened 
during the second phase, especially after victory in 1975. While the DRV leadership 
repeatedly emphasised the importance of Vinh’s reconstruction, the Vietnamese MoC had 
from the beginning been slow to implement commitments and had only limited resources at 
its command. While its leadership had been fully aware of the difficulties encountered in 
Vinh, German Deputy Minister of Construction Kohl judged that the Vietnamese MoC’s 
assistance was not only insufficient, but that it did not assist at all in solving problems (Kohl, 
12.8.1977, appendix 2: p.2; Doering, 9.6.1977). According to the expert group leader, the 
Vietnamese MoC’s Vinh Task Force had no resources to devote to Vinh, as it did only 
consist of the director of the Institute for Urban Planning and one employee. He remarked: 
“We have the impression that Vinh City and Nghệ Tĩnh in fact receive less support from the 
MoC than other provinces, because, well, comrades in Vinh have the possibilities of GDR 
assistance”115 (Liebe, 3.10.1977: p.6). Furthermore, when cooperation with the MoC took 
place, it was often uncoordinated with local developments (for example Liebe, January 1978: 
p.5). In June 1978, conflicts over poor coordination in the construction of the vocational 
school reached the GDR’s Council of Ministers, providing an interesting example of 
negotiations and alliances between involved actors (Weiss, 20.7.1978). The school had been 
                                                          
113 This led to conflicts with at least one expert who was not willing to carry out such tasks (Liebe, 29.5.1976). 
114 However, Brambach reports that also the expert group lacked qualified planners for some projects 
(Brambach, February 1979: p.4). 
115 “Wir haben den Eindruck, daß die Stadt Vinh und die Provinz Nghệ Tĩnh faktisch weniger Unterstützung 
durch das MfB [Ministerium für Bauwesen] erhält als andere Provinzen, da ja die Genossen in Vinh die 
Möglichkeiten der DDR-Unterstützung haben“  
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designed by the MoC according to a Cuban project. Construction, however, had been carried 
out poorly by a central construction enterprise. Provincial construction officials agreed with 
the expert group that the structure would collapse once GDR machinery had been installed 
and operated. Thus, as provincial authorities saw no possibility to influence work carried out 
by the MoC, they asked Liebe to intervene directly with the Minister of Construction (Liebe, 
28.7.1978). Liebe’s letter to the minister following this request represented a severe breach 
of protocol, for which he was harshly reprimanded by Kohl (Kohl, 21.7.1978; Liebe, 
13.7.1978). The GDR Ministry of Education (as the formal partner in equipping the school) 
demanded clarification; Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Weiss requested the 
embassy to withdraw the “presumptuous” letter (Weiss, 20.7.1978; Oppermann, 19.7.1978). 
The SRV Ministry of Construction, however, sent a delegation to Vinh to discuss the issue 
and to ask for the experts’ suggestions. Liebe was thanked, for providing important 
information and was asked to participate in solving the problem at the school (Jahn, Liebe, 
28.7.1978; Liebe, 28.7.1978).  
Quang Trung Housing Complex  
Construction of the Quang Trung Housing Complex had started as scheduled in April 1974. 
However, this was to be one of few fulfilled targets in the construction process. After 
preparations for the ground-breaking ceremony had to be carried out using local materials 
and equipment, subsequent construction relied heavily on materials provided by the GDR 
(Poser, 16.9.1974: p.3). Building activities had started well in mid-1974, but quickly fell 
behind schedule despite increasing replacement of manual labour by machinery delivered 
from the GDR (Knauer, 22.1.1975: p.7; Schlesier, 4.9.1974). By September 1974, structural 
works were delayed by 6 weeks, due to poor planning and coordination, as well as inefficient 
construction techniques (Poser, 16.9.1974: p.6). None of the 10,000 m² housing space to be 
erected in 1974 was completed, blocks A1 and A4 were the first ones to be handed over to 
provincial authorities in August 1975. Delays were also due to a lack of interior materials and 
harsh weather conditions like high temperatures and heavy rainfall) (Knauer, 15.8.1975: p.1). 
Two years after the agreement had been signed in October 1973, the Quang Trung Housing 
Complex was six months behind schedule. For the first time it was acknowledged that targets 
for the following years would not be met without affecting other projects and double the 
number of actually available construction workers would be required (Knauer, 22.10.1975).  
The re-unification of the country in 1975 had further diverted resources. However, according 
to a report by the expert group leader from February 1976, housing construction had never 
been a priority for Vietnamese decision makers (Knauer, 16.2.1976: p.2). From mid-1976 on, 
SRV officials called for cooperation to shift to public buildings on the expense of housing 
construction. However, the GDR insisted on focusing on the construction of Quang Trung to 
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create a completed and functioning example of a socialist housing complex as an expression 
of GDR solidarity (Poser, 18.11.1976: p.2).  
Shortages in workers, electricity, and materials continued to plague construction in Quang 
Trung. Rationalized construction techniques could not be applied because necessary rails for 
the operation of a new crane were not provided by the Vietnamese (Liebe, 23.7.1976: p.8). 
Due to lacking concrete, in addition to the above described reasons, construction came to a 
near standstill in September/October 1976 and mid-1977 (Kohl, 12.8.1977, appendix 2: p.2; 
Liebe, 16.10.1976). By late 1976, GDR experts had concluded that the Quang Trung 
Housing Complex would not be completed in the agreement’s timeframe and internally 
discussed options for continued cooperation (Poser, 18.11.1976: p.2). In March 1977, they 
estimated that until the end of 1978 (end of agreement) in the eastern part all housing blocks, 
two kindergartens, two nurseries, and one school would be completed. In the western part, 
structural works of area D housing blocks would be completed (Liebe, 21.3.1977). Until the 
end of the second phase, this estimate was repeatedly lowered (Kohl, 30.10.1978: pp.1-2; 
Liebe, 8.3.1978).  
By the end of the second phase in 1978, all housing blocks in groups A and B (planned for 
4,490 inhabitants), as well as two blocks in group C had been handed over. Structural works 
of 3 three additional group C blocks were completed, as well as foundations of one block in 
group D. Only one kindergarten in group A had been handed over, structural works of one 
nursery were nearly finished. Works on the school had not yet begun (Brambach, February 
1979: pp.6-10; UBND Nghệ Tĩnh, 26.2.1979: pp.3-4). In total, far less than 50% of Quang 
Trung had been completed during the original agreement’s duration. 
While those buildings that were occupied were of relatively low quality, during a meeting of 
the local SED organisation in Vinh results were described as impressive for Vietnamese 
observers, and as an improvement to the current situation in the SRV (Gottschalk, 
30.8.1978: p.3). The expert group leader graphically compares the new apartments to former 
housing conditions in Vinh and the GDR: 
“Visitors from the GDR should not forget how the situation was at home, when 
one was speaking of ‘usable’ housing. At the moment the ruin next to housing 
area A is vacated. 50 people were ‘housed’ there. A comparison is therefore 
very dangerous, in my opinion not possible.”116 (Knauer, 16.2.1976: p.2) 
                                                          
116 “Betrachter aus der DDR sollten allerdings nicht vergessen, wie es vor 29 Jahren bei uns aussah, wenn von 
‘nutzungsfähigen’ Wohnräumen gesprochen wurde. Z. Z. wird die Ruine beim Wohngebiet A geräumt. 50 
Menschen haben darin ‚gewohnt‘. Ein Vergleich ist also sehr gefährlich, nach meiner Meinung nicht möglich.“ 
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The expert group reported in January 1978 that the apartments were so popular that conflicts 
ensued during their allocation to residents, despite the prohibition to raise chicken, dogs, 
pigeons, and pigs or to grow food on public land in the housing complex (Liebe, January 
1978: p.21). Schwenkel reports that some regarded it as the best housing available in 
Vietnam at the time of its construction (Schwenkel, 2012: p.449). 
Nevertheless, GDR experts were highly critical of the results in Quang Trung, attributing 
shortcomings mainly to poor oversight and management (Gottschalk, 30.8.1978; Geiseler, 
14.4.1975). While the quality of work by Vietnamese construction workers improved over the 
years, diligence and precision remained below the experts’ expectations (Jahn, 20.3.1979; 
Geiseler, 9.10.1975). Initially, concrete produced in Vinh was of poor quality, affecting the 
buildings’ quality (Liebe, 10.2.1977: p.10; Mann, 14.8.1976). Many installations and 
appliances did not fit or were not working well (Liebe, 30.7.1976; Knauer, 16.2.1976). In 
addition, once the blocks were handed over to be inhabited, their state deteriorated quickly 
as repairs and maintenance works were not carried out, even after a respective enterprise 
had been established in 1977 (Brambach, February 1979: p.10; Liebe, 3.10.1977; Thomas, 
26.8.1977: pp.2-3).  
The state of Quang Trung remained a constant issue for GDR experts during the second 
phase especially since this was the most visible and prominent example of their assistance in 
the reconstruction of Vinh (Brambach, February 1979: pp.6-7; Gottschalk, 30.8.1978). In the 
interest of the GDR’s reputation, the housing complex’ visual quality and inhabitability was 
declared to be of highest importance (Thomas, 26.8.1977: p.2; Liebe, 30.7.1976: p.2). 
Measures proposed by the expert group included technical improvements, such as new 
plaster material, as well as evoking responsibility of the inhabitants for their environment 
(Gottschalk, 30.8.1978: p.4).  
However, aesthetic considerations were surpassed by concerns for residents’ health. While 
water was supposed to be supplied by a centralized pressure system, Vietnamese data on 
existing pressure had been exaggerated (Poser, 16.9.1974: p.6). By the time a functioning 
system was completed, many water taps had been stolen from apartments (Liebe, 
23.7.1976: p.6). As the system relied on electricity for operation, it did not become functional 
during the second phase (Brambach, February 1979: p.9; Liebe, 3.10.1977: p.2). 
Wastewater proved to be an even larger problem. Already existing designs were judged 
unsuitable by GDR experts as they relied on electricity for operation (Rudolph, 4.7.1975). A 
new jointly developed design was dismissed in favour of the application of an older 
Vietnamese design that soon suffered siltation as it required too large quantities of water for 
operation (Rudolph, 24.11.1975). By March 1978, the expert group leader judged that 
untreated wastewater in Quang Trung had created danger of an epidemic (Liebe, 8.3.1978: 
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p.2). While the construction of a wastewater treatment plant and a new boost water pipe 
designed and financed117 by the GDR had been completed by the end of the second phase, 
they did not become operational by the end of 1978 (Brambach, February 1979: p.8). 
Additionally, as described above, nearly no public services were available in Quang Trung by 
the end of 1978. Because of these reasons, it was concluded that Quang Trung did not fulfil 
its role as an exemplary socialist housing complex by the end of the second phase 
(Brambach, February 1979: p.6).  
Construction material industries and other projects 
Other parts of the cooperation were also impacted by general causes such as the end of war 
in 1975 (Knauer, 27.2.1976: p.5), natural calamities in 1978 (Kohl, 16.10.1978), conflicts with 
the PRC and Democratic Kampuchea (Liebe, 1.6.1978: p.2), lacking skills of workers and 
cadres, as well as poor organisation and coordination (Brambach, February 1979). However, 
construction material industries saw more progress than housing in the second phase. 
During 1974, preparations were carried out for most construction material projects (Knauer, 
22.1.1975: pp.9-11). Practical work started in September with the construction of new 
production facilities at Rú Mượu quarry, this enterprise was also the first to be completed in 
1976 (Liebe, 10.2.1977: p.14; Siegmund, 26.11.1974; Schlesier, 4.9.1974: p.4). Also in 1974 
barges and towboats were delivered from the GDR to replace heavy manual labour in the 
extraction of sand and gravel from rivers (Knauer, 22.1.1975: p.9). Although progress 
remained much slower than planned for during the second phase, the use of GDR machinery 
increasingly replaced manual labour and allowed for raising output (Liebe, 3.10.1977: pp.3-4; 
Betenstedt, 22.7.1976; Knauer, 15.8.1975: pp.2-3; 22.1.1975: pp.9-11; Bernecker, 
24.6.1975). However, from early 1977 on, reports by the Vietnam Task Force and the expert 
group in Vinh regarded completion of most projects by the end of 1978 as impossible (Liebe, 
January 1978: pp.7-12; Hansen, March 1977: pp.6, 31-32;). By the end of the second phase 
in 1978 the following successes had been achieved (Brambach, February 1979: pp.10-14; 
UBND Nghệ Tĩnh, 26.2.1979; Arbeitsgruppe der DDR - Spezialisten Vinh/SR Vietnam, 
25.1.1979): 
- The cement factory had been completed and produced according to plan when supplied 
with energy. 
- Production in the Rú Mượu quarry continued according to plan when supplied with energy. 
- Rationalizing of the brick factory was completed. Production at times exceeded 
expectations.  
                                                          
117 The water pipe had not been part of the original agreement.  
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- Rationalizing of the stoneware tube factory was completed and production expected to start 
in early 1979.  
- Construction of two out of four production halls of the concrete element factory had been 
finished. Production of concrete elements had begun in 1978. 
- All repair workshops were equipped and operating. Output remained unsatisfactory 
because of shortcomings in organisation and leadership.  
- Sand and gravel extraction with the use of barges and towboats continued according to 
plan, while unloading facilities were not finished. 
- Facilities at the marble quarry in Quỳ Hợp were nearly completed.118 
-  Equipment for a lime production facility had been delivered, but planning not yet begun.119  
- Assembly of Vinh’s new market hall had begun.120 
- An ice factory was completed and operational.121  
- A second brick factory had been reconstructed with GDR equipment after destruction by 
floods in late 1978. 
- The old cinema in Quang Trung had been repaired and equipped with solidarity equipment 
in 1975.  
- A tent served as temporary building for cultural and political events since 2 September 1974 
(Schlesier, 4.9.1974: pp.3-4).122  
- Two pre-fabricated barracks from the GDR served as planning offices (Knauer, 22.1.1975: 
p.13). 
As part of the governmental agreement on economic cooperation in 1975, the GDR had 
additionally agreed to equip a vocational school for the training of construction workers 
(Knauer, 27.2.1976: p.12; Zecher, Phạm Nguyên Lương, 5.2.1976; Phủ Thủ tướng, 
17.12.1974). Construction began in late 1976, GDR ambassador Doering and deputy 
Minister of Construction Bùi Van Các attended the ground-breaking ceremony (Roller, 
                                                          
118 The quarry had been proposed by the PAC in June 1975 (Hansen, 1.7.1975, appendix 1: p.3). The GDR 
agreed to assist in the construction of the marble quarry in 1976. It was expected that marble from this quarry 
would to a large part be exported to the GDR (Poser, 18.11.1976).  
119 This facility had been proposed by the PAC in June 1975 (Hansen, 1.7.1975, appendix 1: p.2). 
120 The market hall had been added to the cooperation projects in late 1977 or early 1978 as a highly visible 
project of GDR assistance (Liebe, 8.3.1978: p.6). 
121 Documents available to me do not indicate when the ice factory was added to the projects. It was 
completed in early 1977 (Liebe, 10.2.1977: pp.13-14).  
122 Vietnamese National Day, celebrating Hồ Chí Minh’s declaration of independence in 1945.  
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3.1.1977: p.2). By the end of 1978, the school was partly finished. It was expected that those 
parts to which the GDR contributed, the school buildings and workshops, would be 
completed and handed over in mid-1979 (Arbeitsgruppe der DDR - Spezialisten Vinh/SR 
Vietnam, 25.1.1979: pp.7-8).123   
 
The GDR placed highest importance on the cooperation projects. However, priorities 
between different Vietnamese authorities apparently differed considerably from each other 
and from those of the GDR. As described above, focusing on housing had been 
controversial. Furthermore, diversion of resources indicates that priorities moved away from 
Vinh to other projects. In addition to practical reasons, the GDR’s insistence on the 
importance of mutual projects was driven by political considerations over national reputation. 
To reconcile interests, the GDR considered extending cooperation. In September 1976 the 
head of the Vietnam Task Force proposed reduction of the goals in Quang Trung to the 
eastern part of the complex including infrastructure and public services to complete a visible 
and functioning example of GDR aid. He argued that because rationalizing of construction 
material industries would also not be completed by the original end of the cooperation in 
1978, the Vietnamese should be encouraged to request an extension of cooperation that 
would allow for slower construction activities more adapted to the economic situation in the 
SRV, without pledging additional GDR funds (Hansen, 23.9.1976: pp.2-3). In October that 
year, the expert group informed the Vietnamese MoC of a possible extension (Liebe, 
16.10.1976: p.2). In November, the GDR MoC proposed extension of cooperation to the 
German section of the CESTC (Poser, 18.11.1976, appendix 2: p.2). Negotiations carried on 
throughout 1977, with the SRV aiming at extending the agreement for five to ten years and at 
including new projects, while the GDR cautiously proposed extension for three years during 
which the already begun projects would be completed and no material support for new 
projects be added (Hansen, 23.11.1977; Bộ Xây dưng, Ban công tác Vinh, 11.10.1977; 
Liebe, 3.10.1977: p.5; 26.1.1977: p.5; Roller, 18.6.1977: p.5). By 1978, the GDR’s Vietnam 
Task Force had become increasingly dissatisfied with negotiations. At a high level bi-lateral 
party and government meeting in December 1977, the SRV had made no mention of a 
possible extension. Experts insisted that the GDR should not work towards extension itself, 
as assistance in Vinh had already been considerable, arguing that “Also between socialist 
countries, economic relations are for mutual benefits!”124 (Liebe, 5.1.1978: p.2). While Nghệ 
                                                          
123 Buildings to which the GDR did not contribute were dormitories, the kitchen, and the canteen. Those would 
not be finished by mid-1979.   
124“Wirtschaftliche Beziehungen auch zwischen sozialistischen Ländern sind Beziehungen zum gegenseitigen 
Vorteil!” 
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Tĩnh’s authorities and the SRV MoC had already presented a wide ranging proposal125  for 
extension to the SRV State Planning Committee and the Council of Ministers in September, 
this had not been acted upon during the state visit in December (no author, 30.10.1977, part 
2). A formal request was finally submitted to the GDR in March 1978126, calling for a 2-3 year 
extension but making no mention of additional projects (Le Thanh Nghi, 23.3.1978). The 
GDR informally agreed to a two year extension and planning for the coming years started 
around May (UBND Nghệ Tĩnh, 16.6.1978a; Liebe, 1.6.1978: p.1; Gradl, 5.4.1978: p.2). The 
document adjusting the agreement on reconstruction of Vinh was formally signed by both 
governments in July 1978 (Weiss, Lê Thanh Nghị, 4.7.1978). Reduced Vietnamese requests 
for additional projects in Vinh during 1979-80 included design and construction of (UBND 
Nghệ Tĩnh, 22.1.1979; 16.6.1978b): 
- a water supply system 
- an electricity system 
- Vinh’s main roads 
- a second wastewater treatment plant in Bến Thủy 
- a glass factory. 
Requests also included additional equipment for the vocational school and the production of 
cemented carbide, as well as delivery of further construction materials, equipment, and 
machinery. However, the GDR rejected most of these request, instead focusing on 
completing existing projects, supplemented by a water supply system to ensure hygiene in 
Quang Trung (Brambach, February 1979: pp.33-36).  
The end of the second phase was thus marked by the extension of cooperation for two years 
until 1980. However, Khmer Rouge attacks on Vietnamese villages and escalating tensions 
with Democratic Kampuchea and led to a major attack on that country by the SRV on 25 
December 1978. In retaliation the PRC attacked the SRV along the countries’ mutual border 
in February 1979 (Quinn-Judge, 2006). The beginning of the third phase took thus place in a 
war situation. 
 
Third phase 1979-1980  
The third phase was characterized by continuing difficulties due to war and conflicts with 
Cambodia and China. Nevertheless, most of the projects could be finished by the end of 
                                                          
125 This proposal included many additional projects and more funds to be supplied by the GDR than the original 
5 year agreement. 
126 The late date of the request complicated planning for 1979 considerably. 
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1980 or early 1981. Construction materials were to a large extent delivered from the GDR, as 
shortages did not allow reliance on local resources. Furthermore, the GDR focused its efforts 
on “bevölkerungswirksame”127 projects.  
 
 
Figure 14  
The fountain at the northern tip of Quang Trung Housing Complex in 1983 (Thông tấn xã Việt Nam, Xây dựng 
dânh dung T2, 1983-1996 986/83, T1, T7-83:2955). It was one of several projects later added to create highly 
visible landmarks of GDR aid. Note that construction of block D2, the only block constructed on the western 
side of Quang Trung Street is on-going on the right-hand side.  
 “Bevölkerungswirksame” works were highly visible projects in Vinh that benefited large 
numbers of people and were agreed on during the last years of cooperation (Hansen, 
February 1981: p.8; Arbeitsgruppe der DDR - Spezialisten Vinh/SR Vietnam, 26.6.1980: 
pp.5, 8-11; see Figure 14). These included Vinh’s new market hall, a pioneer club building128 
including a cinema and recreational facilities, floodlights for Vinh’s stadium, increased 
assistance in the construction and equipment of the vocational school, as well as a park on 
the northern tip of the housing complex including water fountains (Purtak, 31.12.1980: pp.54-
58, 60). Equipment and construction materials for these projects were to a large extent 
imported from the GDR (Hansen, February 1981: pp.9-10; Brambach, 6.7.1979; 
Arbeitsgruppe der DDR - Spezialisten Vinh/SR Vietnam, 5.5.1979). Especially the market 
hall was judged to serve as a successful and prominent example of GDR aid to Vinh 
contributing to that country’s prestige (Bùi Thiết, 1984: pp.67-76; Hansen, February 1981: 
                                                          
127 “population effective” 
128 The Ernst Thälmann Pioneer Club, named after Ernst Thälmann, chairman of the German Communist Party 
1925-1933. The Ernst Thälmann Pioneer Organisation was a GDR youth organisation for children aged 6-14, 
which also contributed funds the club’s construction (Hansen, February 1981: p.16; Purtak, 31.12.1980: pp.56-
57). 
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p.16; 8.11.1979: p.3; Purtak, 31.12.1980: pp.55-56). To complete important works and 
ensure operation of delivered machinery the expert group’s composition placed higher 
importance on practical works, with members increasingly taking over manual labour 
(Hansen, February 1981: pp.9-10; Kohl, 31.5.1979: p.1). After a visit by CPV general 
secretary Lê Duẩn, planning and design attention shifted away from housing to public 
buildings and especially to the future city centre (see above, Arbeitsgruppe der DDR -
 Spezialisten Vinh/SR Vietnam, 26.6.1980: p.3; Brambach, 6.7.1979). This reflected a 
general trend in the SRV, which from 1979 on considerably reduced its housing program, 
especially with regards to pre-fabricated concrete panels (Purtak, 29.06.1979).  
Quang Trung Housing Complex 
During the third phase, Quang Trung Housing Complex‘ eastern side was nearly completed. 
Contrary to their Vietnamese partners’ wishes, GDR experts prevailed with their focus on the 
eastern part (Jahn, 20.3.1979). While in late 1978 construction activities had seen fast 
progress and large numbers of workers, many of those left Quang Trung to join other 
projects or the military during 1979 (Jahn, 20.3.1979; Arbeitsgruppe der DDR - Spezialisten 
Vinh/SR Vietnam, 25.1.1979). Other workers stayed away from construction sites because of 
unpaid wages and food shortages (Hansen, February 1981: p.15; Arbeitsgruppe der DDR -
Spezialisten Vinh/SR Vietnam, 24.9.1979: p.2). In mid-1979, 2,200 Vietnamese workers had 
been sent to construct housing in the Lao People's Democratic Republic, where the SRV 
assisted in planning and construction of a new capital; the SRV had also send construction 
workers to Mongolia, and to Cambodia after Vietnamese forces had overthrown the Khmer 
Rouge government (Purtak, 4.7.1979: pp.2-3). During 1979 and 1980, the number of workers 
in the complex continued to fall, while construction material shortages were even more 
severe (Arbeitsgruppe der DDR - Spezialisten Vinh/SR Vietnam, 26.6.1980: pp.6-7; 
5.5.1979; Brambach, February 1980: pp.1, 9-14; Hansen, 8.11.1979: pp.2-3). By late 1979, 
German experts judged that the Vietnamese would not be able to fulfil obligations they had 
agreed to at the time of the agreement’s extension (Hansen, 8.11.1979: p.5; Kohl, 
12.10.1979: pp.1-2).  
Relying on materials and equipment sent from the GDR129, a new water supply system and 
Quang Trung Street could be completed (Arbeitsgruppe der DDR - Spezialisten Vinh/SR 
Vietnam, 5.5.1979: pp.3-5,11; 24.9.1979: pp.5-8, 15-16; UBND Nghệ Tĩnh, 28.3.1979). 
Progress was particularly slow at the housing complex centre, which was intended to serve 
the whole city until a city centre had been constructed in a later development stage 
(Arbeitsgruppe der DDR - Spezialisten Vinh/SR Vietnam, 5.5.1979: p.4). Planning of the 
centre had from the beginning been slow, as contradictory demands were put forward by 
                                                          
129 For example, of the 7,246.4 tonnes of cement supplied by the GDR, 5,455 tonnes were shipped to Vinh in 
the years 1979-1980 alone (Purtak, 31.12.1980: p.67). 
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different agencies (Liebe, January 1978: p.5). By late 1979 it was clear that the centre could 
not be completed until 1981 and its design was reduced to one (formerly four) element 
(Purtak, 31.12.1980: p.54; Hansen, 8.11.1979: p.5). Problems of poor construction quality 
and lacking maintenance persisted throughout the third phase (Wauer, 22.8.1979: p.4; Jahn. 
20.3.1979; Arbeitsgruppe der DDR - Spezialisten Vinh/SR Vietnam. 25.1.1979: p.3). 
Additionally, electricity shortages heavily impacted housing conditions and water supply 
(Purtak, 31.12.1980: pp.52-54; Arbeitsgruppe der DDR – Spezialisten Vinh/SR Vietnam, 
25.1.1979: p.3). In this light, the housing complex did not become operational and could not 
demonstrate the advantages of socialist housing during Vietnamese-German cooperation 
(see previous assessment of GDR experts above, p.109).  
Over the seven years of 1974 to 1980, 21 blocks providing 35,533 m² of housing in 1712 
units were completed in the eastern part of Quang Trung, according to norms intended for 
8,360 inhabitants (1,650 in dormitories). Two kindergartens, two nurseries, one school, and 
one element of the centre were completed (see Figures 15 to 22; UBND Nghệ Tĩnh, 
26.5.1981: p.3; Purtak, 31.12.1980: pp.51-55).  
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Figure 15 
Plan of Quang Trung Housing Complex, indicating realised and not realised buildings (Kaiser, 2012: p.20; 
map prepared by Pacific News Cartography: © Claus Cartens 2011). 
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Figure 16 
Inside one of the housing complex’ 
apartments (Bundesarchiv Koblenz 
BArch DH 1 Bild-28565-06-03). 
 
Figure 17 
Due to power outages, residents of 
Quang Trung had to rely on outside 
wells (Bundesarchiv Koblenz BArch 
DH 1 Bild-28565-06-02). 
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Construction Industries and Other Projects 
Construction material industries in Vinh faced similar difficulties as the Quang Trung Housing 
Complex. Those factories that had been completed by 1978 continued to produce but in 
industries relying on high amounts of resource inputs such as electricity or fuel, production 
fell. Others, like sand extraction or gravel production in Rú Mượu, were able to increase 
output (Brambach, February 1980: pp.15-22). Construction of lime production facilities had 
not started due to lacking funds and workers. The concrete element factory had also not 
been completed (UBND Nghệ Tĩnh, 26.5.1981: pp.3-5; Purtak, 31.12.1980: pp.16-49; 
Hansen, 8.11.1979: pp.2-7). In many cases, output of the factories and workshops was of 
poor quality, especially maintenance of machinery was insufficient (Katzenellenbogen, 
13.12.1980; Purtak, 31.12.1980). Nevertheless, by the end of 1980, the following industrial 
projects had been completed, but productivity and production quality varied considerably 
(Purtak, 31.12.1980: pp.16-49; Hansen, February 1981: pp.13-39; UBND Nghệ Tĩnh, 
26.5.1981: pp.3-5): 
- cement factory with a capacity of 12,000 t per year 
-  sand and gravel extraction 
- quarry Rú Mượu 
- marble quarry Quỳ Hợp 
- brick factories with capacities of 30,000 bricks and 2,000 tiles per yea, 
- stoneware production facilities 
- carpentry workshop 
- vehicle, machinery, and equipment repair workshops 
- transport enterprise to serve construction industries 
- warehouse enterprise for construction material, machinery and equipment 
- equipment of construction enterprises  
- air separation unit for the production of oxygen  
- ice production facility with a capacity of 3,650 t per year. 
The last experts returned to the GDR in January 1981 (Hansen, February 1981: p.39). GDR 
officials saw the need to further extend cooperation in Vinh to finish last works in 1981 and to 
advise on operation and maintenance of the mutual projects over the coming years (Hansen, 
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8.11.1979: p.5; Hansen, February 1981: pp.39-40). In contrast, Nghệ Tĩnh provincial 
authorities proposed a new agreement that would continue GDR assistance in the city’s 
development, focusing on the city centre and further development of construction material 
industries (Purtak, 29.06.1979). While housing had been relegated to a low rank among the 
SRV’s priorities, assistance of the GDR in the construction of the housing complex’ western 
part was also envisaged by provincial authorities (UBND Nghệ Tĩnh, 26.5.1981: pp.6-7), as 
was a twinning arrangement with Karl-Marx-Stadt (Kohl, 10.12.1980: p.4). 
As part of general scientific-technical cooperation, it was agreed that six experts would assist 
in operation and maintenance of production sites erected with GDR assistance, especially of 
machinery delivered by the GDR. Additionally, two experts advised on the construction of a 
spinning mill that was erected in Vinh as an investment project from 1981 on (Ministerium für 
Bauwesen DDR, Ministerium für Bauwesen SRV, 5.12.1980; Knöfel, 2011: p.24). No further 
measures were agreed on; urban construction and planning played no important role in 
further cooperation between the two countries (Knöfel, 2011; Schäfer, 2011; Politbüro des 
ZK der SED, 24.3.1987). 
 
3.3.2.7 Results 
While no numbers are available on the funds provided by the SRV, the GDR MoC reported in 
detail on its accounts. Over seven years, the GDR had spent 113.4 Mio Mark, less than the 
128 Mio initially budgeted for the five year-agreement. Of these, 16.5 Mio Mark were non-
repayable solidarity funds, the rest would have to be repaid interest free after ten years. In 
addition, material, machinery, and equipment worth 20 Mio Mark had been delivered to Vinh 
as part of bilateral trade agreements. In total, 41,500 tons had been shipped to Vinh by 62 
sea journeys (Hansen, February 1981: pp.28-31, appendixes).  
In light of the described difficulties, the results of cooperation were regarded as important 
achievements by both sides (UBND Nghệ Tĩnh, 26.5.1981; Hansen, February 1981; Purtak, 
31.12.1980). The protocol on the fulfilment of the agreement called the reconstruction of Vinh 
a visible expression of friendship and solidary between the German Democratic Republic and 
the Socialist Republic Vietnam. Both sides agreed that the agreement had been fully 
implemented (Kohl, Vu Quy, 5.12.1980).130 Especially the creation of modern and effective 
construction industries was regarded as providing an important basis for future development 
of Vinh and Nghệ Tĩnh Province (UBND Nghệ Tĩnh, 26.5.1981: p.2; Kohl, 10.12.1980: p.2). 
In addition to physical projects, provincial authorities highly valued the experience of cadres, 
                                                          
130 While some of the projects had not been completed, this statement remains true as the original agreement 
had made no mention of specific projects. For example, it mentioned only the construction of a housing 
complex, not its size. Thus, the completion of eastern Quang Trung could formally be regarded as a full 
accomplishment. 
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planners, and workers to work with GDR experts. This was seen as having considerably 
improved their abilities and working styles, preparing them for future challenges (UBND Nghệ 
Tĩnh, 26.5.1981: p.2). GDR assistance in Nghệ Tĩnh and Vinh was described as exemplary 
urban development by Trương Huy Chinh131, as well as an example for international 
cooperation and regional planning by Mönnig132 (Mönnig, 1989, 1987; Trương Huy Chinh, 
1985). 
GDR experts and officials were more pessimistic in their assessment, as reflected in their 
agreement to provide further assistance in operation and maintenance of cooperation 
projects. Furthermore, they had judged that important shortcoming in planning, designing, 
and implementing projects had not been overcome, doubting that provincial capacities were 
sufficient to carry out urban development autonomously (Brambach, February 1980: p.27; 
February 1979: p.24; Jahn, 20.3.1979). The leader of the expert group judged in early 1980: 
“However, it has to be critically assessed that even considering all the 
occurring difficulties construction progress is still too slow. Main reasons for 
this are subjective. The provincial leadership, the provincial construction 
authority, and the construction enterprise administrations are over-challenged 
by planning and administrative decision making. Increasingly comprehensive 
tasks are not mastered yet by the few qualified administrators. Complicated 
and inadequate financial regulations for construction and trade as well as 
lacking cooperation between enterprises especially impact construction 
progress.”133 (Brambach, February 1980: p.34; repeated in Purtak, 
31.12.1980: pp.65-66) 
The final report by the expert group also regarded the abilities of their Vietnamese partners 
as insufficient for the design, planning, and building of complicated facilities or high-rise 
buildings. Additionally, work organisation and processes were judged to still be 
uncoordinated and inefficient (Purtak, 31.12.1980: pp.8-9).  
                                                          
131 Trương Huy Chinh had worked in the provincial planning institute together with German experts and later 
became its director (Nguyen Sy Thuy et al., 2011: p.37)   
132 Hans-Ulrich Mönnig worked as a planner in Vinh in 1974/75. He later became head of the Department of 
Building in Tropical and Foreign Countries of the Institute for Further Studies in Urban Design and Architecture 
at the College of Architecture and Building in Weimar.   
133 “Es muß jedoch kritisch eingeschätzt werden, daß auch bei Beachtung aller eingetretenen Schwierigkeiten 
das Bautempo noch zu niedrig ist. Die Hauptursachen dafür sind subjektiver Art. Die zentralen Leitungsorgane 
der Provinz, das Provinzbauamt und die Leitungen der Betriebe sind hinsichtlich der zu treffenden Planungs- 
und Leitungsentscheidungen überfordert. Der immer umfangreicher werdende Aufgabenkatalog wird von den 
wenigen qualifizierten Leitkräften noch nicht beherrscht. Besonders negativ wirken sich die komplizierten und 
unzulänglichen Regelungen zur Finanzierung der Bau- und Lieferleistungen sowie die fehlenden 
Kooperationsbeziehungen zwischen den Betrieben auf das Bautempo aus.“  
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Nevertheless, compared to assistance by other socialist countries in the reconstruction of 
Vietnam’s cities, GDR efforts were regarded as exemplary by both the GDR and the SRV 
(Brambach, February 1980: p.33; Hansen, March 1977: p.5). As described above, North 
Vietnamese cities had been twinned with socialist countries. According to a GDR MoC 
report, only the USSR had assisted on a comparable scale in the development of Hanoi. 
Cuba had contributed to reconstruction by planning and supplying material for a number of 
projects. Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, and North Korea had assisted in 
planning and designing, but not provided material aid for respective projects (no author, 
December 1977: p.4). The expert group judged that due to GDR assistance Nghệ Tĩnh’s 
construction industry was most advanced compared to other provinces of the SRV 
(Brambach, February 1979: p.23). Acknowledging the comprehensive aid program and its 
progress, Minister of Construction Đỗ Mười relocated a national conference on housing and 
urban planning from Hanoi to Vinh and promoted application of Quang Trung housing 
designs in other provinces (Liebe, January 1978: pp.4-5). 
 The political dimension of Vinh’s reconstruction was not only highlighted by the siting of 
Quang Trung and the fact that its construction began during the war. Construction works 
were closely aligned with important dates, such as national holidays, important celebrations 
of the international workers movement, or political events such as the founding day of the 
CPV or the SED, by setting them as milestones for projects or conducting competitions  
(Arbeitsgruppe der DDR - Spezialisten Vinh/SR Vietnam, 26.6.1980: p.11; Brambach, 
February 1979: p.21; Liebe, 23.7.1976: p.23; Schlesier, 4.9.1974: p.2).134 Reliefs, flags, and 
banners on Quang Trung buildings marked them as results of GDR-SRV cooperation. As the 
most visible cooperation project, GDR officials were very conscious of Quang Trung’s 
symbolism. Especially the local SED organisation was concerned over the visible quality of 
the housing complex and the effect on GDR reputation (Thomas, 26.8.1977). It reported that 
many Vietnamese saw the housing complex as being constructed by Germans, irrespective 
of the SRV’s responsibility negative aspects were often attributed to the GDR. This was 
troubling for the SED especially considering possible future comparison with other buildings 
(Gottschalk, 30.8.1978). These concerns were not unfounded. Hermann Schwiesau, GDR 
ambassador to Vietnam 1982 to 1986, recounts a visit to Vinh:  
“But when I looked at the badly battered facades of the buildings [in Quang 
Trung] and remarked that they would have to be maintained a little, the 
Vietnamese representatives immediately agreed and said that the GDR should 
consider what it would have to do in ‘its’ housing complex to fix the situation. 
                                                          
134 In addition to examples like the ground-breaking ceremony described above, important national holidays, 
such as the GDR’s Tag der Republik (Day of the Republic) on 7 October, were collectively celebrated by 
Vietnamese and Germans (Purtak, 31.12.1980: p.76; Liebe, 16.10.1976). 
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After all, this would be a question of GDR prestige.”135 (Schwiesau, 2011: 
p.18) 
Concerns of the SED were also driven by the conflict with West Germany: “Vietnamese 
sometimes presented the following problem: The eastern side of Quang Trung should be 
built by the GDR, the state in the east of Germany, the western side should be built by the 
Federal Republic of Germany – the state located in the West.”136 (Gottschalk, 30.8.1978: 
p.1). The Quang Trung Housing Complex was thus an ambiguous result of cooperation 
regarding its political symbolism, which might also have influenced the decision to focus on 
“population effective” projects during the third phase of cooperation. 
 
3.4 The Failure of a Modern Project 
Socialist urban development had been embraced by DRV authorities and was introduced to 
Vietnam through Soviet advisors as well as architects and planners who had been trained in 
socialist countries. Thus, the concepts and ideals that became influential in Vietnam reflected 
political developments and their expressions in urban design in the Soviet Union. The 
modern project to create a Socialist City informed urban development in Vinh from the early 
1960s to the 1980s. Two attempts to implement this project were abruptly ended by US-
bombing that destroyed the city in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Reconstruction from 1973 on was carried out with assistance of the German Democratic 
Republic, building on experiences of GDR assistance in Vietnam. The decision to turn to the 
GDR for assistance in the reconstruction of Vinh was most likely informed by the economic 
strength of that country and its advanced construction industries, deemed appropriate to the 
role of Vinh as the most important urban centre in the south of the DRV and its revolutionary 
history. The GDR’s commitment to Vinh was informed by Cold War rivalry and the country’s 
zeal to contribute to the victory of the socialist camp. Even prior to cooperation in Vinh, the 
GDR had been eager to export its achievements and expertise in the field of urban 
construction and planning to the DRV. 
The version of a Socialist City promoted in both countries was reflective of changing visions 
of such a city that originated from the USSR. At the time of Vinh’s reconstruction, the ornate 
                                                          
135  “Als ich aber etwas kritisch auf die arg ramponierten Fassaden der Häuser [des Wohnkomplexes] sah und 
bemerkte, dass man das ein wenig pflegen müsse, stimmten die vietnamesischen Vertreter sofort zu und 
meinten, die DDR solle sich doch nun überlegen, was sie in ‚ihrem‘ Wohngebiet tun müsse, um dies wieder 
herzurichten. Das sei ja auch eine Frage des Ansehens der DDR.“ 
136 “Von Vietnamesen wurde gelegentlich etwa folgendes Problem gestellt: Die Ostseite der Quang Trung sollte 
die DDR, der Staat im Osten Deutschlands bauen, die Westseite sollte die BRD – der Staat, der im Westen liegt, 
bauen”   
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style of the Stalin-era had been abandoned. The housing complex had become the most 
prominent and widely applied element of the Socialist City, thereby aligning the form of the 
Socialist City to a large extent with internationally prevalent ideals of modern urban planning 
of the time. Both countries shared the same view of the city as an object that could be 
planned as an ideal environment, at the same time expressing and furthering socialist living 
and development. In this view, such an environment is created through the careful design by 
experts who balance different politically derived goals by employing scientific means.    
While both countries shared the same vision of creating a Socialist City, the GDR left 
discernible marks on the planning and construction of Vinh. However, contrary to Shannon 
and Loeckx’ assessment that “the East Germans transplanted their mass construction of 
concrete five-storey walk-up tenements to the extreme heat of Vinh’s summers and ravages 
of autumn’s typhoons”, the GDR’s influence was rather an adjustment of already existing 
plans (Shannon, Loeckx, 2004: p.129). Because of its experiences with failed or troubled aid-
projects in the DRV, the GDR insisted on the participation of Vietnamese cadres in the 
planning process and overall responsibility of Vietnamese authorities for all cooperation 
projects. This was part of GDR experts’ decision to carry out “complex planning”, including 
regional, urban, and housing planning that was aimed at creating a situation in which local 
authorities and planners could autonomously replicate and further develop the experience 
gained by cooperating with German experts on the basis of local materials, enterprises, and 
factories. This was in stark contrast to DRV plans that called for the application of most 
advanced techniques such as industrialized construction using concrete panels and other 
international standards applied in developed countries. 
In the design of Quang Trung Housing Complex, GDR cooperation promoted family based 
apartments as opposed to dormitories. While the DRV did not endorse dormitories because 
of ideological reasons, its housing policies differed from that of the GDR with regards to the 
large scale provision with self-contained family-apartments. A compromise is expressed in 
the composition of Quang Trung. While several buildings are designed as dormitories137, 
their number is considerably reduced compared to planning prior to GDR involvement. 
Contrary to many apartments constructed in Hanoi in the 1970s, nearly all apartments in 
Quang Trung are self-contained. 
While GDR participation in the reconstruction of Vinh contributed large material and human 
resources, it also restricted subsequent political and economic decisions. As Vietnamese 
priorities were revised, especially after the country’s re-unification and in light of conflicts with 
Democratic Kampuchea and the PRC, GDR insistence on focusing on mutual projects was in 
                                                          
137 Many of these were, however, used as offices or, in the case of A4, a hotel. 
  
 
126 3.4 The Socialist City: The Failure of a Modern Project 
contrast to Vietnamese policies which put more emphasis on projects in the South, as well as 
agricultural and industrial development. From the point of view of respective actors, both 
strategies are rational: the GDR was concerned about the impact of poorly executed or 
unfinished projects on its reputation, while many among the Vietnamese regarded housing 
as a problem that could be solved without large state investments that would be more useful 
in the productive sector. Shifting priorities, often expressed by re-allocation of resources, do 
not only highlight differences between GDR and DRV/SRV, but also indicate conflicts and 
diverging priorities between Vietnamese authorities.  
Both the Vietnamese and the GDR had invested large sums in this modern project, thereby 
creating housing for many and capacities for the production of construction materials. 
However, with regards to the creation of a Socialist City, it failed. As GDR experts had 
assessed, the Quang Trung Housing Complex did not become functional during cooperation 
and could thus not express the advantages of socialist living. This was due to planning that 
was not adapted to local administrative, economic, and political conditions. A project such as 
Quang Trung, and for that matter the whole reconstruction of Vinh as a Socialist City, would 
require strong coordinative and administrative capacities that did not exist in the field of 
construction in Vietnam. At the same time, the centralized economy relied on a planning 
process that was not able to provide reliable figures based on which realistic planning could 
be carried out. These problems did exist in most socialist countries, but were exacerbated in 
Vietnam by the war situation as well as the lack in experienced and qualified cadres. 
While Quang Trung exemplified the best available housing for some (see page 108), it 
proved ill adapted to the lifestyle of others. For many who returned to Vinh after years of war 
it was the first instance of living in a concrete home, let alone in an apartment in a multistorey 
building (Schwenkel, 2013: p.264). This resulted in improper behaviour in the eyes of 
planners and authorities.138 The additions and modifications of the apartments, buildings, and 
layout of the housing complex, like extensions to balconies or vegetable gardens in open 
areas, are indicative of the shortcomings that were overcome by private initiative 
(Vandenpoel, 2011; UBND Nghệ Tĩnh, 13.11.1985; see Figure 23). The assumptions 
underlying the planning of Quang Trung had not been realized, such as water and electricity 
provision or, more importantly in this regard, equal access to apartments. This led to misuse 
of power in the allocation, administration, and use of apartments (for example UBND Nghệ 
Tĩnh, 21.4.1986, 28.8.1985). Furthermore, contrary to its intended function as a model 
housing complex Quang Trung remained the only of its kind in Vinh. The SRV shifted its 
housing policies in the 1980s, giving up the ideal of providing equal living conditions through 
state supplied housing to all its citizens (see below).  
                                                          
138 Interview 9.10.2010 
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Today, the general spatial zoning of the draft development plan prepared with participation of 
the GDR is upheld. The city can roughly be divided into an economic (around the former 
citadel), an administrative (in the Trường Thi area) and an educational centre (around the 
university in Bến Thủy). Industries are clustered in the north-west and close to Bến Thủy 
harbour. However, the envisaged separation of residential and recreational areas from work 
places has not been achieved (Mönnig, 1986: p.127). Additionally, the basic spatial division 
into three centres is as much reflective of pre-colonial and colonial urban development as of 
the planning of a Socialist City. The ambitions of the modern project to create a Socialist City 
did rely on the socio-economic and political setting the relevant city was embedded in. 
However, this setting has been altered in Vietnam from the 1980s on, giving up the cultural 
program of socialism that informed the modern project of the Socialist City. In the official 
vision promoted today for Vinh’s development, the most prominent reminder of the Socialist 
City, the Quang Trung Housing Complex, is now rather regarded as a problem inhibiting the 
creation of a “Modern and Civilised City”.139 
 
Figure 23 
Inhabitants of the Quang Trung Housing Complex have modified the buildings for example by adding 
extensions to the structures. Large parts of public space in the complex are used for agriculture (picture taken 
by author, 12.8.2011). 
                                                          
139 Another reminder of GDR assistance in Vinh, the Thälmann Club, is now renamed the Vietnamese – German 
Cultural House. 
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4. Multiple Modern Projects in Vinh 
 
From the late 1970s on Vietnam faced increasing international isolation and failure of its 
economic policies. Additionally, with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries 
increasingly facing economic difficulties in the 1980s, cooperation with and aid from these 
countries began to dry up. These developments resulted in Vietnam’s economic and political 
reorientation, highlighted by the Đổi Mới-reforms of 1986, which aimed at establishing a 
“market economy with socialist characteristics” (Nguyen Tien Dung, 22.4.2013; Masina, 
2006: pp.39, 53-64; Beresford, 1998; Fforde, de Vylder, 1996). Accompanying them was a 
shift in foreign policy that turned away from the reliance on COMECON (Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance) countries and intended to improve relations with Western countries. 
An important step that paved the way to international integration was taken with the peace 
progress in Cambodia that began in 1989 and culminated in the Paris peace agreement on 
Cambodia in October 1991. In July 1995 diplomatic relations between the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam and the United States of America were formally normalized. Already in 1993, the 
US had announced that they would no longer veto lending to Vietnam in multinational 
agencies and a number of the major international donors resumed their official cooperation in 
that year (Elliot, 2012; Forsberg, Kokko, 2007). Thus, since the 1990s, large numbers of 
multilateral and bilateral donors, NGOs, foundations, and development agencies enter the 
country. Many of these actors bring with them social visions that they wanted to further 
through the implementation of modern projects. At the same time, the officially promoted 
vision of cities in the SRV reflected changes in the political and economic spheres. In Vinh 
this meant that a multiplicity of different modern projects became to be promoted by local, 
national, and international actors. The following parts will introduce a number of these 
projects and the involved actors, as well as analyse their strategies and change resulting 
from the interaction of different modern projects. This includes presentations of the Modern 
and Civilised City promoted by Vietnamese authorities and of projects by international actors 
aimed at a Participatory City.     
 
4.1 The Modern and Civilised City 
According to Trinh Duy Luan et al., socioeconomic impacts of Đổi Mới are most visibly 
expressed in Vietnam’s cities (Trinh Duy Luan et al., 2000: p.56). Đổi Mới-reforms and 
subsequent legislation opened up possibilities for private initiative in construction and the 
economy. However, the planning and management framework was ill adapted at directing 
urban growth. Despite attempts to make planning more responsive to actual conditions, this 
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led to a situation in which centralized formal planning is largely detached from informal 
processes  (Albrecht et al., 2010: pp.51-52; Coulthart et al., 2006; Nguyen, Kammeier, 2002). 
Plans often express an ideal state of a Modern and Civilised City emphasizing orderliness 
and modern styles, rather than building on actually available resources and realistic solutions 
(Schwenkel, 2012; Coulthart et al., 2006: p.ix; Nguyen, Kammeier, 2002: p.377; Shannon, 
2002; Drummond, 2000). According to Pedelahore de Loddis such planning results in the 
design of “new districts made up of high-rises and lines strongly influenced by trivialized 
international models” of urban development and architecture (Pedelahore de Loddis, 2010: 
p.21).  
“Ideologically, self-sufficient housing estates have yielded to business parks 
and condominiums of the nouveaux riches, community houses to banks, 
meagerly rationed grocery shops to glitzy shopping malls, and impoverished 
fishing villages to deep-sea-port. Spatially, this has translated to erasure, and 
more commonly, bizarre juxtapositions. Modern office buildings, high-rise 
apartments and hotels dwarf pre-colonial buildings and neighborhoods. New 
industrial zones emerge from paddy fields. Local urban fabrics near transport 
corridors of airports are overrun with global advertising and ‘big-box’ 
architecture. ‘Gated communities’ for the rapidly rising middle- and upper-
classes of the local societies are appearing as compounds of exclusion and 
privilege.” (Shannon, 2002: p.4) 
The opening up to foreign investment is highly visible, new landmarks of economic growth 
and international integration are created in Vietnam’s large cities. Most visible are the high-
rise hotel and office complexes of foreign investors, like the Hanoi Towers, proposed by a 
Vietnamese-Singaporean joint-venture and erected on parts of the former Hỏa Lò prison. 
Some of these structures have continued the trend of former periods, that is, they were built 
without much reference to their setting and to local architectural styles. Others, however, 
have been integrated into the cityscape more carefully, like the Hilton Hotel next to the Opera 
House, reflecting the architectural style of that building.  One new “landmark” of the attention 
foreign investors pay to Hanoi is the Keangnam Hanoi Landmark Tower.  
New buildings with direct involvement by the authorities nowadays symbolize Vietnam’s 
regional and global integration. Noteworthy projects of this category are the National Stadium 
in Mỹ Đình, which had been built to host the Southeast Asia Games in 2003.140 Another 
example is the National Convention Centre, also located near the National Stadium. The 
Convention Centre was designed by the German company gmp Architekten and is host to 
                                                          
140 It also hosted the Asian Games in 2007 and is the site of most of Vietnam’s international competitions. 
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major national events, as well as the venue of Vietnam’s important international conferences 
like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in 2006 or the 9th Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) Foreign Ministers Meeting in 2009. Other buildings symbolize the economic 
power of major state-owned enterprises like the Electricity of Vietnam Twin Towers. German 
gmp Architekten also designed the new Ministry of Public Security, a monumental reminder 
of state power.141 
Apart from creating landmark buildings representing economic growth, political stability and 
national identity, Đổi Mới reforms have considerably impacted the housing sector. On one 
hand, the state has retreated from the housing sector. Central Party and government 
decisions allowed for the sale of public housing to current residents since 1985. Because 
provinces and localities often implemented the policy arbitrarily (for example selling housing 
units without proof of state ownership, selling at prices too low or too high), central guidelines 
were stipulated in 1989. The main reasons given for this policy are the poor state of the 
housing units and the inability of the state to maintain them (Trinh Duy Luan, Nguyen Quang 
Vinh, 2001: p.123). It was perceived that private ownership would result in private 
investments and improvements (Hoang Huu Phe, 2001; Nguyen Xuan Mai, 2001; Hoang 
Huu Phe, Nishimura, 2000: pp. 38-40). A legal framework for the sale of publicly owned 
housing was stipulated with decree NĐ 61-CP in 1994 (Chính phủ, 5.7.1994). In general, this 
policy faced considerable problems due to uncertainties regarding the legal situation of 
ownership. This was partly due to the initial idea that the collective housing areas would have 
to be redesigned and rebuilt before people could acquire land-use rights. By 2006 only 45% 
of those housing units designated for sale had been sold, and the government called on 
provincial and municipal authorities to speed up sales (Chính phủ, 7.9.2006; see also Bộ Xây 
Dựng, 16.1.2009, 17.01.2008; Chính phủ, 30.8.2007).  
On the other hand, reforms have legalized private construction activities that had been 
responsible for the production of a large percentage of urban housing even before these 
reforms (Trinh Duy Luan et al., 2000: pp.65-66). Different modes of housing introduced since 
the late 1980s took the form of state and people partnership, self-built housing by state 
organisation, self-built housing on subdivided land, and comprehensive housing projects142 
                                                          
141 See http://www.gmp-architekten.de/projekte.html. 
142 “Under the first model, the household contributes funding while the state provides the basic infrastructure 
and organizes for construction arrangements. In the second model, the government allocates land to state 
institutions and then these have responsibilities to mobilize funding for the construction of their employee’s 
houses. In the third model, the construction companies develop the infrastructure and subdivide the 
developed land for sale; after that, buyers are responsible for building the houses by themselves. Despite 
contributing to easing the housing shortage, these models have created a number of urban problems, such as 
inconsistent designs, lack of infrastructure and inefficiency of land use. Free handling of land and housing 
development by the public organisations and individuals led to chaotic situations of urban development with 
inefficient provision of infrastructure and property speculation. Since 1996, a new housing model in the form of 
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(Nguyen, Kammeier, 2002: p.382; Hoang Huu Phe, 2001). However, the private sector was 
responsible for most housing production (Sun Sheng Han, Kim Trang Vu, 2008: pp.1103-
1104). Until the late 1990s, the private sector in housing construction consisted mainly of 
households that relied on their own funds and private loans (Trinh Duy Luan, 2001; Trinh 
Duy Luan et al., 2000: p.75; Evertsz, 2000: p.49; Japan Bank for International Cooperation, 
1999: pp.iv, 104). Construction activities are largely unregulated and enforcement of existing 
regulations remains arbitrary (Koh, 2006; Trinh Duy Luan, Nguyen Quang Vinh, 2001).  
Since the late 1990s, high-rise apartment blocks and multistorey town houses are built in 
Vietnam’s largest cities by large construction companies (Labbé, 2010; Gough, Tran, 2009: 
p.175). Many of these projects take the form of New Urban Areas, “large-scale integrated 
developments displaying standardized urban forms and consumer-oriented architecture”, 
often constructed by state-owned enterprises and increasingly by foreign investors (Labbé, 
2010: p.25; see also Albrecht et al., 2010: p.46).143 Some of these developments, like “The 
Crescent” or the “Royal City” can be regarded as prestige objects symbolizing economic 
growth and resulting affluence. Sun Sheng Han and Kim Tran Vu argue that a pro-growth 
coalition between developers and the state has emerged that carries out large-scale projects 
on the expense of former residents, creating rent-seeking possibilities for corrupt officials 
(Sun Sheng Han, Kim Trang Vu, 2008; see also VietnamNet, 26.1.2011). 
While the amount of housing space has grown considerably since the introduction of reforms 
in the 1980s, housing space and quality are now among the most visible indicators of 
economic and social differentiation (Gough, Tran, 2009).  
“The current boom is geared largely to middle and upper income earners e.g. 
Ciputra development in Tay Ho, Hanoi and Phu My Hung in South Saigon. It is 
fueled by increased disposable income, increased savings, changes in lifestyle 
such as a decline in the role of the extended family, and rapid inflation of 
housing and land prices. However, the provision of appropriate housing for 
low-income people, including students and those requiring resettlement arising 
from development projects, remains a major challenge for Government.” 
(Coulthart et al., 2006: p.21) 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
comprehensive projects with the coordinated development of housing, technical and social infrastructure has 
been introduced. This housing model is reported to be suitable for the development of residential areas, with 
improved facilities as well as better landscaping” (Nguyen, Kammeier, 2002: pp.382-383). 
143 This approach is favoured by the World Bank (Coulthart et al., 2006: p.x). 
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A number of authors have argued that no consistent policies exist to address the problems of 
poor people to access adequate housing (for example Nguyen Xuan Mai, 2001; Trinh Duy 
Luan, Nguyen Quang Vinh, 2001; Evertsz, 2000). Existing policies mainly apply to deserving 
social groups, such as veterans, “heroic mothers”, families of fallen soldiers, or state 
employees (Albrecht et al., 2010: p.99; Trinh Duy Luan, Nguyen Quang Vinh, 2001: pp.139-
141; Trinh Duy Luan et al., 2000: pp.79-80). Despite large-scale construction activities, 
demand still by far exceeds supply; housing prices have also been driven by speculation. 
Thus, apartments in big cities are still out of reach not only for the very poor, but also for 
middle-income earners (Quang Duan, 28.1.2011; Albrecht et al., 2010: p.108). National and 
local housing policies targeting these income groups have thus far not had the desired 
effects, partly due to their arbitrary implementation or a lack of incentives for their application 
by local authorities (Labbé, 2010: pp.25-27; Albrecht et al., 2010: pp.102-103). In 2001 there 
existed no widely applied mechanisms for financing housing for the poor (Trinh Duy Luan, 
Nguyen Quang Vinh, 2001: p.216). Some such instruments (like saving groups, micro-credits 
etc.) have been introduced by international NGOs, aid agencies, and donors, and are applied 
in some areas with participation of the Vietnamese Women’s Union (VWU), a Mass 
Organisation (Albrecht et al., 2010: pp.104, 106-107; Coulthart et al., 2006: pp.21-24; Tran 
Minh Chau et al., 2003). The need for a comprehensive nationwide framework has been 
recognized by the Government in its “National Housing Development Strategy until 2020, 
with a view towards 2030”. It emphasises the role of the market, complemented by policies to 
help deserving groups as well as urban poor and workers in industrial zones by setting up 
social housing funds and respective construction companies (Thủ tướng Chính phủ, 
30.11.2011). To work out such policies in detail, the Vietnamese government turns to 
international examples, notably from Republic of Korea and Germany (DongA.com, 
22.1.2011).144 
  
The goal of equal housing conditions provided by the state had been given up in Vinh by the 
late 1980s, planning did not refer to a Socialist City anymore and the socialist housing 
complex had lost its role as a physical planning unit as well as politically and socially 
desirable living space.145 In fact, the eastern part of Quang Trung remained the only such 
complex in Vinh. Housing supplied by the state accounted for only 10 to 20% of the city’s 
housing stock in 1991, of which 75% were one-storey buildings146 (UBND Nghệ Tĩnh, 
13.6.1991). When the first General Development Plan for the Construction of Vinh was finally 
                                                          
144 Personal conversation 16.7.2013 
145 Extensive research in provincial archives did not reveal any larger housing construction by the state or its 
agencies after GDR cooperation had ended. 
146 15% four to five-storey buildings, 10% two to three-stories. 
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approved by the government, the ideals of the Socialist City and the Socialist Housing 
Complex had been abandoned (UBND Nghệ An, 9.1.1993; Lương Bá Quảng, n.d.). 
Regarding housing, provincial and municipal construction authorities were mainly occupied 
with managing private construction activities and distributing construction materials 
throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s.147 From 1988 on, housing owned by state 
agencies and companies in Vinh was sold to inhabitants (UBND Nghệ An, 26.8.1993; UBND 
Nghệ Tĩnh, 16.10.1990, 15.10.1990, 15.9.1990, 12.7.1990; the earliest document referring to 
this process permits the sale of apartments in Quang Trung blocks (UBND Nghệ Tĩnh, 
30.4.1988)). Public construction centred on activities (such as the construction of a hotel or 
street repairs) to commemorate Hồ Chí Minh’s 100th birthday in 1990 (UBND Nghệ Tĩnh, 
25.2.1989, 15.9.1988).148  
 
Although the effects of Đổi Mới became visible in Vinh’s urban landscape later than in larger 
urban centres of Vietnam, the goal to create a Civilised and Modern City is thoroughly 
entrenched in official planning documents and public statements by officials, lately 
“sustainability” has been added as a goal (Schwenkel, 2012; Thu Huyền, 18.3.2011; Đình 
Sẩm, 9.7.2010; Hoàng Đăng Hảo, 13.5.2010; Phạm Anh Tuấn, 8.10.2008; Shannon, Loeckx, 
2004; Shannon, 2000). Every major planning document of the last years refers to this goal, 
complemented by an emphasis on the historic and revolutionary role of the city.149 The Plan 
for Urban Development until 2020 calls for preservation and restoration of the historic and 
cultural heritage while modernizing the city centre and constructing New Urban Areas 
“modern, civilised, sustainable, carrying ethnic identity”150 (Thủ tướng Chính phủ, 21.4.2000). 
However, the meaning of these terms and how they can be translated into physical layouts 
and urban design remains unclear. Instead, plans focus on the city’s functions in Vietnam’s 
urban network and in regional development. For example, the Prime Minister’s decision to 
elevate Vinh to the centre of North-Central Vietnam stipulates that the city’s development 
would serve industrialisation and urbanisation of that area, while making the city its economic 
and cultural centre (Thủ tướng Chính phủ, 30.9.2005: Điều 1). Vinh’s role in the urban 
                                                          
147 Interview 11.5.2011. 
148 Because of shortages, a lottery was organized to raise funds for the completion of these works and 
provincial authorities repeatedly had to highlight the national importance of the event when calling on other 
provinces or central agencies for assistance (UBND Nghệ Tĩnh, 26.10.1989, 8.4.1989, 10.5.1988). 
149 See for example (UBND Vinh,  July 2010; UBND Nghệ An, 11.12.2009; Thủ tướng Chính Phủ, 9.3.2009, 
30.9.2005; Bộ Xây Dựng, Viện Kiến trúc-Quy hoạch đô thị nông thôn, August 2008; UBND Nghệ An, 5.5.2008; 
Viện Quy hoạch Kiến trúc Xây dựng Nghệ An, October 2007) 
150 “hiện đại, văn minh, bền vững, mang bản sắc dân tộc” 
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network is further defined by its status as a Class 1151 city under provincial administration (Bộ 
Xây Dựng, Viện Kiến trúc-Quy hoạch đô thị nông thôn, August 2008). 
 
Figure 24 
Vinh’s commercial centre is dominated by high-rise buildings that dwarf the buildings of the Quang Trung 
Housing Complex (picture taken by author, 14.6.2011). The grey building to the right has for a short time been 
the highest building in Vinh. Now, a 135m high 5-star hotel is located next to it. 
According to Shannon and Loeckx, such official plans for Vinh’s development see the city as 
a “mini-Singapore”, taking little account of local characteristics while resulting in “a series of 
unbuilt projects and underdeveloped areas of expensive infrastructure – unrealizable 
dreams” (Shannon, Loeckx, 2004: p.133). A more balanced view is provided by Schwenkel:   
“Urban renewal has meant not only the construction of a new entrepreneurial 
city but also the (re)construction of socialist monuments, museums, and 
martyr cemeteries. […] For example, adjacent to the city’s central park, east of 
Quang Trung, an eighteen- meter- high granite statue of Hồ Chí Minh was 
erected in 2003, while the Xô Viết Nghệ Tĩnh Museum of the Revolution, on 
the grounds of the former French colonial prison, has recently undergone 
substantial renovation […].”(Schwenkel, 2012: p.457, see Figures 24 and 25) 
                                                          
151 Vietnam’s cities are classified into 6 groups: Class one to five and special cities. Classification is according to 
national or regional importance, percentage of employment outside agriculture, provision of infrastructure, 
population size, and population density. The higher a city is classified, the more responsibilities its 
administration has (Coulthart et al., 2006: pp. 56-58). As a Class 1 city Vinh is in the second highest class. 
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Figure 25  
The Hồ Chí Minh statue located at Vinh’s central square (pictures taken by author, 29.11.2010). Banners on 
tribunes located next to the statue read the slogans “The Socialist Republic Vietnam Forever!” and “The Great 
President Hồ Chí Minh Lives Forever In Our Deeds!”152 Especially in the evening the square is a favourite 
location for recreation and socializing.  
The power of a “market economy with socialist characteristics” is represented by high-rise 
buildings combining retail, housing, and office space as well as hotel rooms, constructed by 
state-owned enterprises and private investors (Thu Huyền, 18.3.2011; Thanh Loan, 
23.11.2010).153 These buildings and New Urban Areas on the outskirts are depicted by 
advertisement and brochures as “new residential communities that show the middle classes 
enjoying prosperous, orderly, and moral lives. […] images depict a disciplined, largely 
unpeopled world free from the disorder of haphazard construction, informal markets, and 
swarming motorbikes, with expensive new cars, law-abiding pedestrians, and well-cared-for 
homes” (Schwenkel, 2012: p.460; see also Nghệ An Online, 29.12.2010 and Figure 27).  
                                                          
152 “Nước Cộng Hóa Xã Hội Chủ Nghĩ Việt Nam Muôn Năm!” “Chủ tịch Hồ Chí Minh Vĩ Đại Sống Mãi Trọng Sự 
Nghiệp Của Chúng Ta!” 
153 Especially TCT Xây lắp Dầu Khí Nghệ An (Petrovietnam Nghe An Construction JSC), Handico 30, TECCO, and 
the Mường Thanh Hotel Group.  
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With growing numbers of middle-class consumers, international and national corporations 
start to eye the market in Vinh. This is most visibly expressed in the presence of car-
showrooms, shopping centres, and high-rise apartment buildings. Among the first to arrive 
were French Casino Group and German Metro Group. These showcases of consumer 
culture do not only provide shopping opportunities but also stages for new choices in lifestyle 
and consumption. They attract customers from as far away as Laos, while at the same time 
many of the people living next door only participate as non-buying spectators. This creation 
of “internationalised” economic centres follows the provincial authorities’ strategy to generate 
tax-income and job-opportunities by attracting investment, while at the same time setting 
these areas spatially apart from administrative zones where the revolutionary role of the city 
as Hồ Chí Minh’s homeland is celebrated (Sở Kế Hoạch Và Đầu Tư Nghệ An, October 
2010).  
As in other cities this modernizing vision is pursued by a coalition between officials and 
developers (Trang thông tin điện tử tp Vinh, 24.3.2008). As the market is driven by political 
considerations and speculation, numerous projects remain on billboards or quickly fall into 
disrepair upon their completion (Nguyễn Đình Cát, 25.7.2013; Đôthị.net, 13.3.2011; Nguyễn 
Hải, 4.1.2011; Thành Nam, 20.12.2010; Huy Minh, 6.11.2010). From relatively modest 
beginnings in the early 2000s, the market for apartments and real estate developments has 
quickly attracted numerous investors (Schwenkel, 2012; Trung Kiên, 11.11.2010, 5.3.2009, 
20.3.2008; Đôthị.net, 18.8.2009). Construction companies have focused on apartments for 
middle- and high-income earners, creating an oversupply in this market that, in combination 
with economic difficulties, makes it difficult to carry out registered projects and sell completed 
apartments. TECCO Construction Company for example has reacted to this by expanding 
into the social housing market (Châu Lan, 29.8.2011). The provincial People’s Committee 
has encouraged activities in this field since mid-2010. Policies are targeted at the supply side 
of the market, by cutting fees and allowing developers to reserve 20% of the respective area 
for commercial activities (Thiên Thảo, 7.11.2010). While apartments in TECCO’s social 
housing developments were quickly sold, bitter conflicts ensued as buyers perceived prices 
as unreasonably high for their incomes and the quality of housing provided (K. Hoan, Đức 
Kỳ, 4.4.2012; TECCO, 19.4.2011).154  
                                                          
154 TECCO’s project in Hưng Lộc ward was the first housing project for people with low incomes in Vinh, 
completed in late 2011. Only families with a per capita income up to 1.7 Mio Đồng per month were eligible to 
receive apartments in the building. Before prices per m² were approved by the provincial People’s Committee 
(PPC), TECCO demanded payment of up to 70% of apartment prices, which were set at about 8 Mio Đồng per 
m² by TECCO, and later reduced to 7.7 Mio Đồng/m² by provincial authorities. Complaints of resident compared 
these prices to much lower m² prices in other cities like Đà Nẵng. Additionally TECCO had allegedly introduced 
unfavourable credit schemes to buyers. TECCO on the other hand blamed the provincial People’s Committee 
for attracting the company’s investment with promises to apply favourable policies, but later reneging on that 
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Figure 26 
One of Vinh’s first new apartment complexes constructed by Handico, located on Nguyễn Thái Học Street 
(picture taken by author, 14.4.2011).  
Apart from leaving housing development to the market, authorities in Vinh have followed the 
policy to sell state owned housing to residents. Due to its complete destruction during the 
American War, Vinh’s housing stock consists of a considerable number of collective housing 
areas constructed in the 1970s. When residents bought units in these areas from the late 
1980s on, they often acquired only the housing structures, not land use rights. This created 
legal uncertainties preventing many from carrying out costly repairs and investments.155 As a 
step towards the development of a civilised and modern city, demolishing these housing 
areas until 2015 became official policy in September 2007, as will be describe in detail below 
(UBND Nghệ An, 21.9.2007; HĐND Nghệ An, 25.7.2007). Another form of housing that is 
regarded as being in the way of modern and civilised development is the Quang Trung 
Housing Complex. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
promise prompting prices to rise. According to the company, contrary to promises by the PPC, taxes were not 
reduced, favourable credit rates were not available to the company, and buyers were denied access to low-
interest credit and special pay-back schemes (Thanh Uyên, 16.7.2013; K. Hoan, Đức Kỳ, 4.4.2012; Nguyễn Phê, 
4.4.2012). The provincial People’s Committee, in turn, claimed that it had no funds to assist in low-income 
housing construction and that, while it encouraged such projects, it could not assist in all points. Thus, the 
prices of housing in the project were close to market prices and were a problem to be solved between the 
investor and buyers (Nguyễn Phê, 4.4.2012). No solution seems to be in sight as both buyers and developer 
turn to authorities for help (Thanh Uyên, 16.7.2013; Nguyễn Phê, 4.4.2012). Whether policies applied in new 
projects avoid such problems as described above remains to be seen (Toàn Thắng, 8.6.2013). 
155 Interview 29.6.2011 
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As described above, the Quang Trung Housing Complex did not become fully functional 
during the period of assistance by the GDR and long thereafter. In 1984, open air wells had 
to be constructed as provisory water supply (UBND Nghệ Tĩnh, 13.08.1984). Already by 
1986, only five years after cooperation ended, the deteriorating quality of many buildings, 
especially of block C1, created unsafe living conditions for residents (UBND Nghệ Tĩnh, 
22.3.1986). However, due to a lack of funds resulting from economic difficulties and low 
rents, maintenance continued to be kept to a minimum over the next decades and repairs 
were carried out in piecemeal fashion (UBND Nghệ An, 16.10.1997, 29.6.1996). A central 
water supply and a wastewater system became finally operational due to official 
development assistance from the Federal German Republic in the 1990s (Nguyen Sy Thuy 
et al., 2011: pp.120-125). However, unsafe conditions persist, during Vinh’s frequent storms 
and heavy rain many of Quang Trung’s inhabitants have to be evacuated (Thân Cương, 
2.8.2011; see also Lê Thanh, 24.08.2012).  
From 1988 on, first attempts were undertaken to sell a number of apartments to inhabitants 
(UBND Nghệ Tĩnh, 30.4.1988). From 1992 provincial authorities unsuccessfully tried to sell 
all of Quang Trung’s apartments.156 Finally, in 2001 the Ministry of Construction proposed a 
plan to rehabilitate the housing complex according to market mechanisms as a national 
example for the conversion of housing estates. Inhabitants would be given first-buyer priority, 
but market value-prices and the absence of special consideration other than law-required 
compensation would put the new apartments out of reach of many (Shannon, Loeckx, 2004: 
p.145).  
“The MOC project, presented in Hanoi in March 2001, featured an extravagant 
‘façade of the twenty-first century’ (animated by a number of new staircases 
serving only two apartments per floor), a site plan of decreased density and 
larger open spaces, and apartments enlarged by six meters along the northern 
front façades. Examples were drawn from Japan and Finland. […] The local 
and provincial plans for the rehabilitation of Quang Trung have been 
superseded. The MOC project takes precedence and it appears only too 
typical of urbanism in the hands of some central administrators and their docile 
‘surface designers.’ ‘Imagineered’ (to borrow terminology from Disney) cities 
                                                          
156 Provincial authorities planned to sell all housing units in Quang Trung to residents, while the complex would 
stay under public management. As in the overall policy to sell state-owned housing to inhabitants, this would 
lessen ideological and financial burdens on state agencies, while encouraging private investment. Funds raised 
by the sale would be used for other housing projects (UBND Nghệ An, 10.11.1992). However, this plan was not 
carried out and in 1997, a new attempt was undertaken to sell apartments in the framework of NĐ 61/CP-
policies in 1997 (UBND Nghệ An, 17.4.1997). Again, this plan was not implemented, as were plans to carry out 
the most needed repairs in 1997 (UBND Nghệ An, 23.6.1999, 16.10.1997). 
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and the theme-parking of urban areas driven by grandiose dreams are still in 
vogue in some powerful offices. In Hanoi, a considerable number of politicians 
and planners back their visions with piles of overly optimistic statistics, heavily 
overestimating the power of their decrees. The fantastical thinking that Vinh 
can transform itself overnight into an orderly, individualistic-driven market 
system is irresponsible and results in irrelevant urban visions. Seductive 
imagery is not the solution for one of the city’s most important urban sites.” 
(Shannon, Loeckx, 2004: p.145) 
The project would involve demolition of a number of Quang Trung’s buildings and the 
relocation of inhabitants to resettlement apartments in the northern part of the city (UBND 
Nghệ An, 9.11.2001, 22.10.2001). In 2002, the provincial People’s Committee agreed to a 
proposition by TECCO157 from Hồ Chí Minh City to plan the redevelopment of the first block 
to be demolished (C1) as a complex including housing, office, and retail space (see Figure 
27; UBND Nghệ An, 22.7.2002). Schwenkel calls the construction of this project, including 
two high-rise towers, “the most striking visual changes to the cityscape” (Schwenkel, 2012: 
p.457).  
However, as with previous attempts at repair or rehabilitation of the housing complex, the 
2001 MoC plan was not implemented. Instead, it was decided that the whole complex would 
be redeveloped according to guidelines set out in 34/2007/NQ-CP, including the demolition 
of all buildings (HĐND Nghệ An, 25.7.2007). This resolution prescribes the improvement and 
reconstruction of housing complexes as integrated projects including housing as well as 
technical and social infrastructure, similar to New Housing Areas. Again, the goal is to 
contribute to the development of a civilised and modern city (Chính phủ, 3.7.2007). The 
planned redevelopment of Quang Trung signifies a shift in ideological emphasis from a 
socialist egalitarian society towards a market-liberal vision of the city as a creator of revenue 
and a “modern and civilised” space of middle-class consumer culture (Schwenkel, 2013; 
2012).158 
                                                          
157 Công ty Cổ phần Đàu tư Xây dựng & Ứng dụng Cộng nghệ mới (New Technology application & construction 
investment corporation) 
158 Schwenkel describes this as a typical case of replacing socialist ruins with lucrative development schemes. 
This process, according to her, includes complex issues of identity, community, and ideology (Schwenkel 2010, 
2012, 2013). While I agree that it signifies a shift in ideological emphasis, I take issue with other parts of her 
analysis. She overly emphasises the role of international agencies, particularly a Local Agenda 21 program (LA 
21) that will be described in detail below, in the promotion of market-liberal policies for the redevelopment of 
Vinh (there is especially no hint given at why and how “Vinh ironically became a Cold War battleground 
between the former Germanys” (Schwenkel, 2013: p.268). As will be described below, a market driven 
approach that would most likely see many of Quang Trung’s inhabitants relocating to other places was most 
strongly advanced by the Ministry of Construction, while the LA 21 proposal was much more considerate of the 
needs and wishes of inhabitants. Additionally, the logic of market-driven development and an individualistic, 
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As a first step that was supposed to be completed by the end of 2010, all housing units in 
Quang Trung were to be sold to inhabitants to enable calculation of compensation by 
developers (Đình Sẩm, 8.6.2010, 7.6.2010). In mid-2011, Vinh’s People’s Committee 
released an article on its website stating that nearly all of Quang Trung’s residents had 
registered to buy their housing units (Hải Yến, 14.6.2011). First land use certificates were 
handed over to buyers in September 2011 (Hương Giang, 27.9.2011).  
The three zones of Quang Trung have been assigned to three developers for this project, as 
no investor willing to redevelop the whole area could be found.159 However, so far only one 
new apartment block has been constructed by Handico at the north-western corner of the 
complex, where a sports-field had been located, and no buildings apart from C1 have been 
demolished. Delays are due to prolonged negotiations between inhabitants and developers 
over compensation, as well as the process of selling apartments to inhabitants as a 
precondition for calculating the amount of compensation. Only in March 2013 did 
Petrovietnam Nghe An Construction JSC receive an investment license for its Zone A project 
(Tổng công ty xây lắp dầu khí Nghệ An – PVNC, 18.3.2013). 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
orderly vision of Vinh’s future have been vehemently criticized by LA 21, as expressed in the citation of 
Shannon and Loeckx above, who were members of the international LA 21 team. The current redevelopment 
project (demolition and reconstruction) had been proposed after the involvement of LA 21 in Vinh. 
Furthermore, the view of Quang Trung, as she describes herself, had shifted from that of an ideal living quarter 
to a “socialist ruin” even before the LA 21 program started in Vinh (Schwenkel, 2013: p.267). The role of 
Vietnamese actors has been more important in the re-evalution of Quang Trung than attributed to them by 
Schwenkel. In fact, as described above, plans for rehabilitation including the sale of apartments had been 
formulated before Vinh was chosen for the LA 21 program in late 1996 (UBND Nghệ An, 08.09.1994). 
Documents of the LA 21 program suggest that Vinh’s authorities had even approached the program with the 
need to rehabilitate Quang Trung during the process of choosing a Vietnamese city (email 11.3.1997; LA 21, 
25.2.1997).   
159 Interview 18.5.2011. The three companies are: Petrovietnam Nghe An Construction JSC (Zone A; Tổng công 
ty xây lắp dầu khí Nghệ An – PVNC, 14.04.2011), CT CP Địa ốc vườn xanh Nghệ An (Khu B; Công Ty cổ phần Địa 
ốc vườn xanh Nghệ An, 13.6.2011), and Handico 30 (Khu C; Hải Hưng, Lê Xuân Thủy, 14.4.2011). 
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Figure 27 
New high-rise apartment buildings stand next to blocks of the Quang Trung Housing Complex (picture taken by 
author, 14.6.2011). The building on the left side is part of TECCO’s development that replaced block C1. The 
larger building on its right is the first of Handico’s high-rises. 
  
In the above described vision a city’s civilised and modern character stems from the outcome 
of centralized planning by experts, as well as from the promotion of civilised behaviour of its 
inhabitants. In contrast, international cooperation has shifted to a view of the city in which its 
modern character results from the ways and institutions that create and govern the city. In 
this view, modernity is expressed by democratic and participatory processes, not physical 
outcomes. Made possible by Vietnam’s policies of international integration, modern projects 
promoting a Participatory City have challenged the vision of a Modern and Civilised Vinh 
since the mid-1990s. The following part introduces perceptions of development, participation, 
and civil society informing these projects. 
 
  
  
 
142 4.2 Multiple Modern Projects in Vinh: The Participatory City 
4.2 The Participatory City  
According to Hall, the view of a city as created by its inhabitants can be traced to the 
anarchist movement in urban planning and is most prominently expressed in the work Patrick 
Geddes (Hall, 2002: p.263). Geddes advocated close engagement of architects and planners 
with the working classes and urban population to find out about their aspirations, as well as 
setting an example of how individuals could make a change to their living environment. Living 
himself in a simple flat in Edinburgh, he used techniques of social sciences (so called “civic 
surveys”) in activities that would today be referred to as slum upgrading already in the late 
19th century (Hall, 2002: p.264). Travelling to India in 1914, he applied his ideas in a colonial 
setting and “developed his concept of ‘conservative surgery’ – or, in latter-day jargon, urban 
rehabilitation” (Hall, 2002: p.265). Geddes’ visionary concepts were met with suspicion, and 
at times open hostility, by the established bureaucracy. While he claimed that they produced 
better results at lower costs than top-down planning, his methods required careful on-site 
research and engagement with local populations, which experts were not enthusiastic to 
undertake. He stressed that planning required “real and active participation”, warning of 
“Dangers of Municipal Government from above”, resulting in “detachment from public and 
popular feeling, and consequently, before long, from public and popular needs and 
usefulness” (Hall, 2002: pp.266-269; citing Geddes, 1918: p.104).  
However, Geddes’ views did for long not become influential. International housing policies 
promoted by governments and international agencies focused on public housing produced by 
the state and rented by residents, in the early years after World War 2. However, such 
policies proved to be costly and often ill-adapted to local climates and cultural settings 
(Harris, Giles, 2003: pp.174-175). Policies relying on self-help and market forces in contrast 
to top-down state intervention had at times been promoted in colonial urban development 
from the 1920s on, and were employed by Latin American countries from the 1950s on. 
Harris and Giles show that “aided self-help was consistently endorsed by the leading 
international housing agencies” (including the HHFA160, the IADB161, the ILO162 and UN 
organisations) from the 1950s on (Harris, Giles, 2003: p.176; see also Harris, 2003a). Many 
writers attribute the spread of such policies to the work of John Turner163 (Harris, 2003: 
                                                          
160 US-based Housing and Home Finance Agency 
161 US-based Inter-American Development Bank 
162 International Labour Organization 
163 A British architect, Turner was influenced by anarchist architects such as Kropotkin and Geddes. Due to the 
rigidly institutionalized United Kingdom of his time, Turner applied Geddes’ ideas in Peru from the late 1950s to 
the early 1960s in an environment in which self-aid was already being vigorously discussed as a solution to low-
income housing (Harris, 2003a: pp.248-249; Bromley, 2003; Hall, 2002: p.271). Contrary to prevalent views of 
slums in developing countries that saw them as breeding grounds of vice, requiring outside intervention (often 
slum clearance), he maintained that dwellers in informal settlements did at times rationally choose to stay 
there, and that if required they knew how to build themselves new homes. Thus, he saw the role of the 
  
 
143 4.2 Multiple Modern Projects in Vinh: The Participatory City 
p.164; see for example Hall, 2002: p.271). Harris, however, shows Turner’s role as mainly 
that of “a channel for the diffusion of ideas about squatter settlements that probably 
originated in Latin America and that he helped bring to the attention of housing and urban 
experts around the world” (Harris, 2003a: p.263). From the mid-1960s on, Turner’s views 
were widely accepted, by the 1970s “Turnerite policies had received the ultimate accolade of 
respectability: they had been embraced by the World Bank” (Hall, 2002: p.277), although, as 
Harris shows, in a very different fashion than advocated by Turner himself164 (Harris, 2003a). 
Concepts of participatory development were, however, not confined to the development 
sector, but largely replaced modernist top-down planning in the West in the 1960s and 70s165 
(Hall, 2002: pp.279-293).  
According to Evertsz (2000), while participation in urban planning and housing construction 
has marked development policies (as advocated by the World Bank) since the 1970s, 
emphasis on the role of different actors has shifted considerably over time. In Site-and-
Service projects of the 1970s influenced by Turner’s views saw the state as supplying 
infrastructure and land. However, in line with general changes in the development discourse 
which moved to the Washington Consensus, the state became regarded as unable to 
efficiently fulfil this function and housing production by NGOs and the formal market was 
promoted in the 1980s. In the Post-Washington Consensus of the 1990s, the state plays the 
role of an “enabler” of housing construction, while projects rely on participation of NGOs, 
community organisations, or civil society actors for implementation (Evertsz, 2000: pp.25-28).  
While following a state-led, top-down approach influenced by Keynesian economics until the 
1970s, development actors shifted their focus and approaches in the 1980s. What became 
known as the Washington Consensus in the 1980s was a promotion of the idea that the 
market should function unrestricted by outside powers and would thus lead to development. 
In its more radical versions, this approach promoted market forces as an end in themselves 
and posited the market against the state, which was seen as being invested with particular 
interests, captured by elites and generally not able to deliver the goods (Harriss, 2002: p.77). 
As it became increasingly clear that the market was also not able to achieve the goals of 
development, the debate about the right approaches to development continued, shifting to 
the Post-Washington Consensus around 1990. In this consensus the state came back in as a 
player in development. It was assigned an enabling role; its task was to provide rules and a 
framework in which the market would operate. Hewison and Jayasuriya argue that this shift 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
government and planners as setting a framework in which self-help would be possible, as well as supporting 
this process by the provision of materials, services, and especially land.  
164 Turner’s writing of that time includes for example (Turner, 1976) and (Turner, Fichter, 1972). 
165 As is described in the chapter on the construction of the Socialist City in Vinh, planning was an integral part 
of socialist economics and politics; therefore centralized planning remained entrenched in socialist countries.   
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in development politics is not a complete turn-around from the Washington Consensus but 
rather “should be viewed as an attempt to develop a political and institutional framework to 
embed the structural adjustment policies of the Washington consensus. […] the PWC [Post-
Washington Consensus] complements, rather than replaces, the policies associated with the 
Washington consensus” (Hewison, Jayasuriya, 2004: p.5). To achieve development a 
country would thus have to reform its institutional setup to create an environment in which 
the market would be able to operate in the right way. These “good” institutional structures 
resembled those of developed countries with a market-liberal system (Ufer, 2008: pp.28-29). 
Central concepts of the Post-Washington Consensus and the discourse surrounding it are 
participation and civil society.166  
Since the 1970s, “participation” has become one of the buzz-words in the development 
discourse:  
“People’s participation as a concept was formulated – or rediscovered – in the 
1970s, in response to the growing awareness that the various approaches 
then employed for rural development, such as community development, 
integrated rural development or basic needs did not often lead to significant 
rural development and especially poverty reduction, largely, as was then 
thought, because there was little involvement in development projects of those 
undergoing ‘development’, and particularly the poor.” (de Campo Guimarães, 
2009: p.5) 
According to Mohan, participation in various forms is accepted as an integral part of 
development projects and policies by nearly all actors in development (Mohan, 2001). 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the interest in civil society regained in 
prominence, as civil society actors were seen as the major power that had driven the 
peaceful revolutions in the Eastern European countries167 (Mitlin, 2001: p.152). According to 
Lewis, out of the numerous conceptualisations of civil society, two are commonly embraced 
                                                          
166 “Today, international development is characterized by the aid system’s urgent embrace of the concept of 
civil society” (Fowler, 2000: p.3). Similarly, participation is referred to as an “emerging new orthodoxy in the 
world of development” (Henkel, Stirrat, 2001: p.168). 
167 Mitlin identifies three major reasons for the emphasis on the possible role of civil society in development. 
The first is the role played by civil society actors in the push for democratic changes mainly in Eastern Europe. 
Secondly, it was recognized that institutions and institutional change do play a role for a country’s 
development, that the market would not solve all the problems. A third reason is a disillusioned view of NGOs, 
which were criticized as not being able to live up to their previously promoted abilities to provide efficiency and 
legitimacy to development projects (Mitlin, 2001: p.152). An added reason is that with the end of the cold war, 
western donors, especially the United States became bolder in their spending to promote democracy through 
development aid (Encarnación, 2011; Fowler, 2011: p.49). 
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nowadays.168 The first one is heavily influenced by de Tocqueville’s depiction of nineteenth 
century associations in the United States as ensuring freedom and providing protection 
against the state as well as curtailing its powers (Lewis, 2002: p.571). According to 
Ehrenberg it was Tocqueville’s worry about the reach of the state in other societies that led to 
his claim that voluntary activity connected individuals to the common good (Ehrenberg, 2011: 
p.24). The second contemporarily influential approach to civil society builds on the works of 
Antonio Gramsci. He argued “that civil society is the arena, separate from state and market, 
in which ideological hegemony is contested, implying that civil society contains a wide range 
of different organisations and ideologies which both challenge and uphold the existing order” 
(Lewis, 2002: p.572; see also Gray, 1999).  
The different conceptualisations of civil society create much confusion for those who seek to 
apply the concept in their work. As Edwards notes, “civil society is one of the most enduring 
and confusing concepts in social science. […] civil society is also a […] contested concept 
because so many definitions and understandings exist” (Edwards, 2011: p.3). However, in 
the field of development some general views persist on the nature of civil society. According 
to Edwards, these general views are expressed in Walzer’s definition: “civil society is the 
sphere of uncoerced human association between the individual and the state, in which 
people undertake collective action for normative and substantive purposes, relatively 
independent of government and the market” (Edwards, 2011: pp.3-4; citing Walzer, 1998: 
pp.123-124).   
According to Jenkins “The community of scholars, consultants, activists, and policy analysts 
that influence policymaking in national governments, international agencies, and non-
governmental organisations have constructed an elaborate discourse around the role played 
by civil society in the process of social, economic and political change in post-colonial 
societies” (Jenkins, 2001: p.1). In this discourse, civil society as made up of associations, 
plays a major role in the structures of a state that employs good governance169. A large 
number of expectations are connected to the participation of civil society actors in 
development. Not only is their participation promoted as contributing to efficient project 
implementation, it is also regarded as a political force that furthers equitable development as 
well as democratic institutions (Fowler, 2000: pp.7-8). In the promotion of democracy, civil 
society is supposed to serve a dual role: firstly it is to be a political force that drives forward 
                                                          
168 For an overview of the history of a concept in philosophy and the social sciences see (Ehrenberg, 2011). 
169 According to UNDP, “Good governance is, among other things, participatory, transparent and accountable. It 
is also effective and equitable. And it promotes the rule of law. Good governance ensures that political, social 
and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that the voices of the poorest and the 
most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation of development resources” 
(http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/policy/chapter1.htm, accessed 24.9.2013). 
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the development into a liberal democracy; secondly it enables the implementation of “good 
government” and is a part of it. Jenkins describes these two roles as mutually related:  
“The logic runs roughly as follows. Development requires sound policies and 
impartial implementation. These can only be delivered by governments that 
are held accountable for their actions. Accountability, in turn, depends upon 
the existence of ‘autonomous centers of social and economic power’ that can 
act as watchdogs over the activities of politicians and government officials. 
Civil society consists of both the associations that make up these ‘centers’ and 
the ‘enabling environment’ that permits them to operate freely. It is an arena of 
public space as well as a set of private actors. Therefore, aid to the 
‘democracy and governance sector’, as it has increasingly come to be known 
within the profession, must be earmarked to support both individual 
associations as well as the political milieu in which they carry out their 
functions.” (Jenkins, 2001: p.3) 
In the discourse of the Post-Washington Consensus, a similar dual role is attributed to 
participation. It is seen on the one hand as enabling more effective and efficient project 
implementation, and on the other as furthering empowerment of those who participate and as 
reducing structural inequalities as well as social exclusion, thereby ultimately altering power 
relations (Osmani, 2008; Hickey, Mohan, 2004: pp.11-13; Craig, Mayo, 1995: p.2). Projects 
promoting participation and civil society qualify as modern projects because they are 
intended to bring about political and social change beyond immediate actions. 
 
When in the 1990s donors explicitly looked for NGOs to implement their projects in Vietnam, 
one of their goals was to contribute to political transformation through the promotion of 
participation and the strengthening of civil society actors. However, the situation they faced in 
Vietnam had been different to many other countries. Having only recently been embraced by 
the larger donor community as eligible for aid, Vietnam had no experience with the concepts 
that were the buzz-words of development at that time (Hannah, 2007; Salemink, 2006; Gray, 
1999).170  The next part will turn to two modern projects involving international cooperation in 
which actors advocate the development of Vinh as a Participatory City. It will present the 
                                                          
170 Hannah describes how the term civil society in its two translations of xã hội công dân (translated as citizen 
society) or xã hội dân sự (translated as civilian society) is not used in the media and when used in conversations 
“elicited blank looks and wild guesses” (Hannah, 2007: p.99). He argues that the use of these terms was a 
response to the introduction of civil society by donors and that until today they are used extremely rarely in 
official documents. This is due to its perceived “sensitivity” in the Vietnamese context and the unclear stance of 
the Communist Party towards it. Today, the term xã hội dân sự is the used more often, while not being exactly 
defined (Hannah, 2007:  pp.108-109).  
  
 
147 4.2.1 The Participatory City: The Localising Agenda 21 Programme (1997 to 2002) 
different actors involved, their strategies to cope with the changing institutional environment 
and the officially promoted vision of a Modern and Civilised City, as well as the projects’ 
results. 
 
4.2.1 The Localising Agenda 21 Programme (1997 to 2002) 
Vinh had been influenced by international politics since its founding as a city by the French. 
After it had been repeatedly destroyed in the wars following the declaration of independence 
by Hồ Chí Minh, it was reconstructed with the help of the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) in the 1970s. After that, however, it was not until the mid-1990s when new projects of 
urban development with the participation of foreign organisations and donors were 
implemented. By that time the international development discourse had already shifted to the 
Post-Washington Consensus described above. This shift was marked by the “Earth Summit” 
in Rio de Janeiro which had called for sustainable development and the promotion of Local 
Agenda 21 (United Nations Conference on Environment, 1992). Civil society and 
participation were part of the institutionalized discourse of development in the early to mid-
1990s, as expressed by Article 4 of the Habitat Agenda, adopted at the Habitat II 
Conference: “Democracy, respect for human rights, transparent, representative and 
accountable government and administration in all sectors of society, as well as effective 
participation by civil society, are indispensable foundations for the realisation of sustainable 
development” (UNCHS, 1996). It was in this context that Vinh was chosen to be one city in 
the Localizing Agenda 21 Programme.171  
The program Localising Agenda 21: Action planning for Sustainable Urban Development (LA 
21) describes itself as being embedded in the discourse of sustainable development, 
participation, and civil society as outlined above (Verschure, Tuts, 2004: p.15). It was jointly 
designed by the Post Graduate Centre for Human Settlements (PGCHS) in the Department 
of Architecture, Urban Design and Planning of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium 
as well as the Training and Capacity Building Unit of the United Nations Centre for Human 
Settlements (UNCHS, later UN-HABITAT); both institutions had been working together since 
the late 1970s. Funding for the project was provided by the Belgian Development 
Cooperation. The partners in the program were thus as follows (Verschure, Tuts, 2004: 
p.17): 
- UNCHS172  
                                                          
171 The project program was carried out in three cities. Apart from Vinh, these were Nakuru in Kenya and 
Essaouira in Morocco. 
172 Now UN-HABITAT 
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- Belgian Development Cooperation (under the Belgian government)  
- PGCHS coordinated a Belgian consortium of universities, NGOs and cooperating 
municipalities  
- Partner cities in selected countries 
- National ministries and capacity-building institutions.  
 
4.2.1.1 Approach 
Tuts and Verschure cite the general objective of the program as “to contribute to sustainable 
urban development by improving the efficiency and effectiveness of providing basic urban 
housing and services through local government and community partnerships in three priority 
towns and to disseminate the results and lessons learned to other towns and countries” 
(Verschure, Tuts, 2004: p.17; citing PGCHS, UNCHS, 1995: p.16). Specific goals were 
improved access by the poor to shelter, infrastructure and services; reducing the burden of 
poverty of communities through the delivery of infrastructure and the implementation of 
municipal planning and management actions plans; to integrate these action plans with 
strategic urban development plans so as to promote urban development policies and 
strategies for more sustainable urban development. The program thus aimed at both the 
implementation of action plans and capacity building. In the approach of “Strategic Structure 
Planning” these both go together. 
Strategic Structure Planning (SSP) starts with a critique of traditional approaches of “master 
planning”. Van den Broeck describes SSP as taking “space” as the integrative factor for 
social, cultural, economic, and ecological activities. SSP activities are divided into three 
“working tracks” namely working towards a long term vision for the city, daily policy as well as 
actions, and engaging different actors and citizens in the planning and decision process (van 
den Broeck, 2004: p.177). Capacity building actions promoting this approach were to be 
combined with practical implementation of so called strategic projects. Actors to be involved 
in these processes in the selected cities were to include local government, civil society 
groups, and the private sector because they “can creatively engage in discussions, in 
proposing actions and in being partners in execution of projects, as well as in resolving 
conflicts or removing obstacles towards more sustainable urban development” (Verschure, 
Tuts, 2004: p.23). The project aimed at “the encouragement and promotion of citizen 
initiatives with the intention of bringing about direct and concrete change in people’s living 
conditions and to empower them” (van den Broeck et al., 2004: p.205).  Additionally, the 
program was meant to contribute to decentralisation policies. Good urban governance was 
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later added as a principle in the program (Verschure, Tuts, 2004: pp.19-24). The approach of 
the program is a typical example of the mainstream policies promoted by donors in the 
framework of the “Post-Washington Consensus”. It thus constitutes a modern project in 
which concrete actions are intended to bring about political and social change aimed at more 
participatory development, including participation of civil society, sustainability, and good 
governance. 
 
4.2.1.2 Implementation 
While work in Nakuru in Kenya and Essaouira in Morocco had started in 1995, the selection 
process in Vietnam took until 1996 (de Meulder, Loeckx, 2004; Loeckx et al., 2004). Cities 
considered for the project were medium-sized provincial capitals facing explicitly difficult 
situations such as a lack of resources, environmental conflicts, or social tensions (Verschure, 
Tuts, 2004: p.19). Vinh had been chosen on the basis of its positive response to the program 
and its clear statement of needs and priorities and was in general seen as suitable to the 
program’s approach. However, from the beginning it was clear to the project partners outside 
Vietnam that due to budgetary constraints the intensive preparatory work conducted in the 
other cities could not be replicated and that they would have to rely more on inputs from the 
local and national partners (LA 21, 25.2.1997).  
During a mission of international experts to Vinh and Hanoi in April 1997 a Local Team for 
the implementation of the program was setup under Vinh’s People’s Committee.173 This five-
member team was headed by the director of the International Relations Office of the 
People’s Committee of Vinh. In addition, the composition of an Advisory Board was agreed 
on: local and provincial government representatives, the Women’s Union, representatives of 
the business community, representatives of selected urban districts and co-operatives. 
Those partners contacted during the mission in Vinh were all part of the city’s and the 
provincial administration. Other actors involved at that time were the Institute of Geography 
and the Architectural University in Hanoi as well as employees of the Ministry of 
Construction. Cooperating international organisations were UNCHS in Vietnam and the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Association of Provincial Cities of 
Vietnam, which was to serve as an advisor and play a role in disseminating the project’s 
results to other cities in Vietnam, was also involved from early on174 (Tuts, 6.5.1997). This 
mission set the pattern that would dominate the program’s implementation in Vinh: almost all 
actors involved were part of state organisations or of institutions closely associated with the 
                                                          
173 That it was administratively part of the People’s Committee is evident from official documents of the Local 
Team, for example (People's Committee of Vinh City, Local Team of LA 21, 30.9.1997).  
174 See page 164-165 for a detailed description of ACVN. 
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Party or the state. Indeed, the local priorities had “been identified by different political and 
technical levels of the People’s Committee of Nghệ An Province and Vinh, but there has 
been as yet little consultation with non-governmental urban actors” (email 11.3.1997). In 
addition, the actors that were more loosely connected to the state, such as universities, were 
located in Hanoi, not in Vinh. When later on research centres that were not part of the state 
were contacted, these were also located in Hanoi and contacts did not lead to further 
cooperation (LA 21, 1.12.1997: p. 43). However, the NGO ENDA-Vietnam (Environmental 
Development Action in the Third World), located in Hồ Chí Minh City, would later on become 
involved in the program. 
The issues on which the program’s activities focused were the update of the current Master 
Plan, the rehabilitation of Quang Trung Housing Complex, improvement of solid waste 
management, and the organisation of training activities for urban planners and managers. To 
address these issues in accordance with the approach of Strategic Structure Planning 
workshops were organized on the different topics and strategic projects were identified 
through which the new approach was demonstrated. According to Shannon and Loeckx 
“Seminars took the role of brainstorming sessions and the new ideas brought forth by foreign 
experts were politely listened to and welcomed while simultaneously kept at arm’s length 
from the existing planning complexities“ (Shannon, Loeckx, 2004: p.133). However, by 
opening up workshops to new actors such as the Women’s Union or the Fatherland Front, 
issues of urban development were discussed among a larger variety of actors than usual in 
Vietnam (Shannon, April 1999).  
Strategic projects should serve the dual goal of capacity building and solving urgent 
problems. Most attention was accorded to the rehabilitation of the Quang Trung Housing 
Complex. Different solutions were discussed and in March 2001 a strategy for rehabilitation 
was agreed, largely based on work by PGCHS and a Vietnamese consultant, a former 
student of PGCHS.175 They drew heavily on experiences of similar projects from Eastern 
Europe and the former GDR (Shannon, Loeckx, 2004; Shannon, April 2001; April 1999; 
October 1997). When this proposal was presented to provincial authorities in 2001, it was 
revealed that the Prime Minister had taken an interest in the modernisation of the Quang 
Trung Housing Complex and the province had commissioned the Ministry of Construction to 
prepare a study for rehabilitation separate from the one of LA 21. In discussions of the two 
proposals, it was agreed that a third proposal should be prepared integrating the previous 
two. Provincial and city authorities seem to have been in favour of the LA 21 proposal, in 
                                                          
175 Other strategic projects were the redesign of Vinh’s main market and of the city’s riverfront. Work on both 
was mainly carried out by the national consultant and PGCHS. While serving as the basis of discussions on the 
development of the city, none of these have been implemented (Shannon, November 2001; Shannon, Loeckx, 
2004: pp.146-148). 
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which they had been involved. However, a new proposal by the MoC had been adopted by 
the Prime Minister without consultations with LA 21 or the city. Major characteristics of the LA 
21 proposal, such as the inhabitants remaining in the complex after rehabilitation, had not 
been taken up by the MoC. As a result, PGCHS and UNCHS retreated from the project 
(Shannon, November 2001).  
“The local and provincial plans for the rehabilitation of Quang Trung have 
been superseded. The MOC project takes precedence and it appears only too 
typical of urbanism in the hands of some central administrators and their docile 
‘surface designers’.” (Shannon, Loeckx, 2004: p.146) 
As a strategic project the Quang Trung Housing Complex had also been the subject of a pilot 
project as an example for its rehabilitation. After an initial proposal for the rehabilitation of 
one of the blocks had been presented by the Local Team at a workshop in September 1997, 
it was withdrawn by the Local Team in the “light of the workshop and follow-up discussions” 
(Shannon, October 1997: p.1). It was agreed by the Road Construction and Public Works 
Company (RC&PW, the agency responsible for the upkeep of Quang Trung), the Belgian 
Consortium and the Local Team that RC&PW would conduct a feasibility study for another 
block (B6) of Quang Trung. After a review of the study by UNCHS and the Belgian 
Consortium the upgrading project would be carried out in two phases (People’s Committee of 
Vinh City, Local Team of LA 21, 30.9.1997). However, without informing UNCHS or the 
Belgian Consortium, upgrading was carried out by the Local Team and work on the project 
stopped after the first phase (see Figure 28; LA 21, 29.9.1998: p.38).  
Two criticisms about cooperation in the program are recurring themes in project documents. 
The first refers to communication difficulties and a lack of commitment on the side of Vinh’s 
authorities. Language problems were a large problem, since no member of the Local Team 
could speak English and no one on the UNCHS-PGCHS side could speak Vietnamese. 
Project funds were used for English lessons for the Local Team to tackle this problem and 
Vinh’s mayor promised to attach a translator to the Local Team. However, language 
problems persisted throughout the project (email 6.8.1998; Shannon, October 1997). 
Additionally, commitment by the city’s authorities had been low in terms of human resources, 
funds, and work invested; the city’s lack of commitment can also be seen in the episode 
described above, where the Local Team started the upgrading pilot without referring to the 
project partners (Shannon, November 2001; LA 21, 29.9.1998: p.38). Indeed, the case of LA 
21 had been a repeated example of bad communication in urban administration in 
publications of UNCHS/UN-HABITAT (Tuts, 2001; Tuts, Cody, 2000: p.14). 
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The second line of criticism concerns the lack of civil society, NGO, and community 
participation in the program. From the beginning, experts of UNCHS and PGCHS raised 
concerns about the absence of such actors in the program (email 11.3.1997). “Despite 
repeated advice from UNCHS (HABITAT) and the Belgian Consortium, too little effort was 
made by the Local Team to invite representatives of the non-governmental and private 
sectors” (LA 21, 29.9.1998: p.37). The inclusion of such actors had been one of the priorities 
of the donor, the Belgian Development Cooperation. There is surprisingly little information in 
both published and unpublished documentation of LA 21 on its focus on solid waste 
management, given that this had been the area where community and NGO involvement 
was applied. Activities in this area started in late 1997 with external experts, two Vietnamese 
and one from UNCHS, assessing the situation in Vinh and making recommendations (LA 21, 
29.9.1998: pp.38-39; LA 21, 1.12.1997: pp.41-42). ENDA as an international NGO had also 
cooperated with the LA 21 Programme in Morocco; ENDA-Vietnam had already gained 
experience in working with urban communities and consulting in development projects in 
provincial urban centres. As part of the LA 21 program, a solid waste management pilot 
project was carried out by ENDA-Vietnam in four of Vinh’s wards and completed in 2001 
(Shannon, April 2001). This initiative of community based solid waste management was later 
taken up by a project of the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) project 
(Shannon, November 2001). Community based activities were continued with the 
establishment of a Community Development Fund in 2002, with capital provided by UN-
HABITAT, formerly UNCHS (Tran Minh Chau et al., 2003: p.47).  
The program had also been troubled by change of personnel, both in the Local Team as well 
as in UNCHS. As the last months approached, no Junior Professional Officer (JPO) was 
assigned to assist the Local Team as the previous JPO had left the project, with 
consequences on communications between Vinh and the other partners (PGCHS, 2001: 
p.11).176 The project had also come under scrutiny by a newly elected Belgian government 
that evaluated its aid policies, resulting in a lag of activities for nearly one year. As a result, 
the funding phase was extended until the end of 2001 and the project was to be handed over 
to local actors by March 2002 (Shannon, April 2001). 
                                                          
176 The JPO’s were international experts assigned to the Local Teams. However, a new JPO joined the project 
later on. 
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4.2.1.3 Results 
Published accounts of the LA 21 Programme focus on its achievements, but also 
acknowledge some of its shortcomings. Raf Tuts, then coordinator of the Localising Agenda 
21 Programme placed the program in the context of the development discourse described 
above:  
“Local Agenda 21 processes encourage more self-reliant local development 
whereby the key partners include different layers of government as well as the 
civic society and the private sector. In the Habitat agenda the Local Agenda 21 
framework has been reconfirmed as a valuable approach to harmonizing 
urban development and the environment.” (Tuts, October 1998: p.175) 
Regarding Vinh, he blames the hierarchical structure of the state in all aspects of life as the 
reason why strategic planning is not easily understood by decision makers. He adds that “the 
lack of effective participation of civic society in the consultation process is not conducive to a 
balanced strategic structure planning process” (Tuts, October 1998: p.184) He claims that 
one of LA 21’s seminars had helped to change the approach to planning and managing 
public rental houses and that there are immediate physical improvements in housing 
conditions and improved skills of key actors. Qualifying, he adds that “the full impact of such 
changes in policy can only be assessed over a longer period” (Tuts, October 1998: p.186). 
Commenting generally on the process in all the cities, he argues that the involvement of civic 
society needs to be seen in context and that there should be baseline indicators to measure 
such participation. 
Tuts and Cody, writing on HABITAT’s experiences with Local Agenda 21, cite Vinh and 
Vietnam as a negative example with regards to the sharing of information:  
“Too often there is a lack of communication between municipal departments 
and state companies, as in Vinh City, Viet Nam, while information is used as a 
power tool within the organization, or between different public institutions. 
Information on issues such as industrial or residential investments, land 
subdivisions, infrastructure development and related budgets is often hidden 
within one department of the local authority” (Tuts, Cody, 2000: p.14). 
In LA 21’s concluding publication “Urban Trialogues“ a chapter by Shannon and Loeckx is 
reserved for Vinh (Shannon, Loeckx, 2004). They describe the LA 21 Programme as having 
served an “advisory role” in Vinh. While being critical of the planning processes in Vietnam, 
they acknowledge that “the enthusiasm, tolerance and openness towards new ideas from 
individuals at the provincial and local levels were truly remarkable” (Shannon, Loeckx, 2004: 
p.123). They aim their critique at several points that they describe as generally applicable in 
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Vietnam. First is the unwillingness of sharing information, especially maps. Their second 
critique is that “the city is seen neither as a medium for critical debate, research, planning 
and decision-making nor for citizen mobilization” (Shannon, Loeckx, 2004: p.123). Thirdly 
they see the “mini-Singapore model that officials so proudly emulate in the vision for Vinh 
[as] completely alien to the existing typo/morphology” (Shannon, Loeckx, 2004: p.132).177  
 
Figure 28 
Buildings of the Quang Trung Housing Complex in June 2011 (picture taken by author, 14.6.2011). The white, 
renovated part of the building in the foreground is the only visible mark of the LA 21 Programme in Vinh. 
The report presents as the main achievements of LA 21 in Vinh the opening up of 
discussions to a larger set of stakeholders - namely the Fatherland Front, the Association of 
Women, the Farmer’s Association, the Cooperative Alliance and the Youth Union - and the 
revision of the city’s development plan along the lines proposed by the program. The 
problems they mention are language problems that made reliance on interpreters necessary, 
the overruling of local planning on Quang Trung by the MoC that was described above, and 
the non-implementation of the proposal for the market (Shannon, Loeckx, 2004: pp.133-148). 
Despite the apparent problems in implementing the program they maintain that  
“The challenge is to find a complementarity between the control of the 
centrally vested State and localised urban debates. The process advocated 
through the LA21 Programme, specifically the dialectic between urban visions 
and strategic urban projects, can contribute to this search for 
complementarities.” (Shannon, Loeckx, 2004: p.150)  
                                                          
177 They underline this point by including a picture of a planned high-rise apartment project. However, the 
picture shown is of a project in Hồ Chí Minh City, not in Vinh.   
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Apart from half-completed renovation of one of Quang Trung’s blocks178 the LA 21 
Programme left no visible mark in the urban fabric (see Figure 28). Of the strategic projects, 
regarded as triggers for participatory urban development in the LA 21 approach, none was 
carried out. A number of them were unrealistic and the one proposed to the MoC was 
superseded by the centralized, hierarchical planning process. While the program opened up 
discussions on urban planning to more actors, all of these were part of the structures of 
governing institutions.  
Despite extensive research in the provincial archives of Nghệ An, I was not able to locate 
documents on the LA 21 Programme in Vinh. When discussing the program with members of 
the city’s administration who had been involved in the program, answers were dismissive on 
the results of the program, although holding the Belgian and international experts in high 
regard. The proposals of the program were regarded as interesting by the Office for Urban 
Administration, but as difficult to achieve because higher levels of authority would have to be 
involved. The lack of funds provided by the program for concrete projects was also cited as a 
reason of its limited impact on Vinh’s development.179  
Both answers above point to structural and political reasons for the low impact of the LA 21 
Programme in Vinh. These had also been acknowledged by the program’s reports, as shown 
above. The next parts will show how reforms in Vietnam have addressed some of these 
issues, arguably shifting power relations between different layers of government and 
administration, as well as improving the possibilities of participation by the people. Following 
that, findings on a more recent project carried out in Vinh are presented. This project, also 
promoting a Participatory City, profits from institutional and political change in Vietnam that 
opens up more space for the successful implementation of such projects. To provide an 
overview of the mechanisms of the reform process, as well as resulting institutional changes, 
the following part focuses on two major government-initiated programs: the Public 
Administration Reform and the process of Grassroots Democratisation. 
                                                          
178 Significantly, this project was carried out by local actors in defiance of agreements. 
179 Interview 11.5.2011; Personal conversation 17.5.2011 
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4.2.2 Improving Possibilities for Participation 
The Public Administration Reform (PAR) forms part of the overall reform process in Vietnam, 
therefore touching on normative and political issues (Painter et al., 2009; Buhmann, 2007). 
According to Vasavakul, it is “aimed at re-establishing hierarchies of authority lost following 
Vietnam’s move from central planning in the 1980s” (Vasavakul, 2002: p.2). While the Party 
ran even the day to day issues of governance and administration in the time of state 
socialism, the responsibilities and tasks of the state and the Party have become more clearly 
defined and disentangled in the last 20 years; an important marker of this process was the 
amendment of the 1992 constitution in 2001. The leading role of the Party does nowadays 
result in the Party defining the overall political orientation, while the state apparatus 
implements and refines actions (Sidel, 2008; Salomon, 2007: p.200; Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, 25.12.2001: Preamble). The restructuring of organisations and relations between 
agencies takes place, among others, in the fields of: internal authority relations, reform of 
state institutions, reform of administrative procedures, and improving the relationship with the 
non-government sectors and society (Vasavakul, 2002). One of the guidelines of the reform 
process is the decentralisation of responsibilities to levels of government situated closer to 
where decisions are implemented and their effects felt (Vasavakul et al., 2009). Additionally, 
new forms of horizontal organisation and networking have emerged, visible in the creation of 
organisations such as the Association of Cities of Vietnam (UN-HABITAT, 1996: pp.66-67). 
From the 1990s on Vietnam saw the growth of a multitude of “popular organizations” without 
state sponsorship. According to Vasavakul, they filled a vacuum after the state retreated from 
the provision of services, thereby participating in national construction along the lines 
promoted by the Communist Party. International NGOs were also attributed a mainly 
functional role as providing financial assistance (Vasavakul, 2003: pp.33, 51-54; see also 
Wischermann, Nguyen Quang Vinh, 2003). The shifts in power relations between institutions 
of the Party and the state as well as the increasing importance of private activity also made 
new mechanism of social control and regulation necessary to retain the Communist Party’s 
legitimacy. One measure of legitimizing the regime’s activities is the creation of a modern, 
legal-rational bureaucracy under the leadership of the Party (Acuna-Alfaro, 2009). Another 
measure is the Grassroots Democracy process. 
The program to promote Grassroots Democracy is an attempt of central authorities to 
provide more efficient and accountable local governance (Fritzen, 2002). It was introduced 
as a response to popular unrest such as the violent outbreak in Thái Bình in early 1997. 
Dissatisfaction of protesters was due to a mixture of inefficiency, corruption, and illegal 
trading in land rights by local cadres and their families (Dixon, 2004: p.23; Painter, 2003: 
p.265). In 1998, the Politburo issued Directive 30-CT/TW on the building and implementation 
of Grassroots Democracy, which was elaborated by a government decree later that year 
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(Chính phủ, 11.5.1998; Bộ Chính trị, 18.2.1998). In 2007, the decree was superseded by the 
Ordinance on Implementation of Democracy at the Commune Level (Ủy ban Thường vụ 
Quốc hội, 20.4.2007).180 The documents grant people the rights to be informed about issues 
that concern them, their opinions to be heard in discussions, to take part in decision making 
processes and to supervise the implementation of decisions. The areas in which people can 
participate in the respective ways are clearly stated. 
One study expressed the possibility that the Grassroots Democracy Decree might “drastically 
change the power balance between the people and the local authorities” (Center for 
Agricultural Policy, 2008: p.3). However, while the Grassroots Democracy process led to 
more accountable and transparent behaviour by the authorities, changes in power relations 
remain limited (McElwee et al., 2006). The major institution implementing the process is the 
Grassroots Democracy Steering Committee that is formed at the commune level. The 
committee is usually led by the head of the commune’s Communist Party division, its other 
members usually being the heads of the People’s Council and Committee and 
representatives of Mass Organisations.181 Thus, authority control on the overall process 
remains invested in these organisations (Center for Agricultural Policy, 2008: pp.26-27, 39-
43). In many cases, participation is regarded by authorities as a tool in the implementation of 
pre-defined projects or as financial contribution (KAS, ACVN, 2009: p.30; McElwee et al., 
2006: pp.14-17). 
The commune, the administrative unit implementing the activities of Grassroots Democracy, 
is not only the level of administration closest to the people; it is also the one where 
grievances can be contained by preventing the building of geographically wider alliances. 
The legislation on Grassroots Democracy does not only provide legitimate channels and 
instruments of participation, it also rules out other options.182 The emphasis on political 
stability over participation is expressed by the ordering of principles in the ordinance (Ủy ban 
Thường vụ Quốc hội, 20.4.2007): 
1. Ensuring order and discipline in the framework of the Constitution and laws. 
2. Ensuring the people’s right to know, contribute comments, decide, implement and monitor 
implementation of democracy at the commune level. 
                                                          
180 Decrees are passed by the government, while ordinances are passed by the Standing Committee of the 
National Assembly; ordinances are thus higher in the order of political documents. 
181 Mass Organisations in Leninist state theory constitute “transmission-belts” which transmit the policies of 
the Party to the people and in turn serve as officially legitimized channels for the articulation of the interest of 
particular groups in society (Gray, 1946: p. 474). 
182 At a training course on the application of people’s participation in urban management and planning for 
public servants I attended in Đà Nẵng in 2010, the issue of public opposition to the redevelopment of Thống 
Nhất Park in Hanoi was discussed. Attendants voiced their opinion that this had not been proper people’s 
participation, as opinions were not expressed through the channels laid down by regulations. 
  
 
158 4.2.2 The Participatory City: Improving Possibilities for Participation 
3. Protecting the State benefits, legal rights and benefits of organisations and individuals. 
4. Publicity, transparency in implementation of democracy at the commune level. 
5. Ensuring leadership of the Party, and management of the State.183 
In addition to the Grassroots Democracy Decree the Vietnamese government’s Committee 
for Organisation and Personnel issued Circular 03/1998/TT-TCCP adapting the decree’s 
regulations to urban areas. On the “building of communities” it stipulates that “group leaders 
are the representatives of the people in a residential group, under the administration and 
guidance of the ward’s or town’s People’s Committee, they are directly elected by the 
members of the groups and recognized by the President of the ward’s People’s 
Committee”184 (Ban tổ chức cán bộ chính phủ, 6.7.1998: chapter 6). The position of group 
leaders had until then not been formalized. As these circular shows, the structures of 
authority extending into the residential group were formalized as part of the Grassroots 
Democracy Decree (Koh, 2004: p.203).  
Despite these reservations on the Grassroots Democracy process and the Public 
Administration Reform, the possibilities for public participation in Vietnam and the legal 
framework supporting such participation have improved since the late 1990s (McElwee et al., 
2006; Mattner, 2004). This has also had an effect on projects by international agencies 
promoting the participation of civil society in development projects. In the LA 21 Programme 
participation in discussions on urban development had been confined to members of the 
administration and Mass Organisations. The next part will present a project with a very 
different approach to the participation by communities. 
                                                          
183 1. Bảo đảm trật tự, kỷ cương, trong khuôn khổ Hiến pháp và pháp luật. 
2. Bảo đảm quyền của nhân dân được biết, tham gia ý kiến, quyết định, thực hiện và giảm sát việc thực hiện 
dân chủ ở cấp xã. 
3. Bảo vệ lợi ích của Nhà nước, quyền và lợi ích hợp pháp của tổ chức, cá nhân. 
4. Công khai, minh bạch trong quá trình thực hiện dân chủ ở cấp xã. 
5. Bảo đảm sự lãnh đạo của Đảng, sự quản lý của Nhà nước. 
184 “Tổ trưởng dân phố là đại diện cho nhân dân của tổ dân phố, chịu sự quản lý và chỉ đạo của Uỷ ban nhân 
dân phường, thị trấn, do nhân dân trong tổ bầu trực tiếp, Chủ tịch Uỷ ban nhân dân phường thị trấn công 
nhận” 
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4.2.3 The Cua Nam Model (2009 to 2012) 
The Cua Nam Model refers to the processes of community involvement that led to the 
upgrading of a former collective housing area in Vinh’s Cửa Nam Ward.185 The term has 
been coined by the Asian Coalition of Housing Rights (ACHR), an NGO based in Bangkok, 
and the International Institute of Environment and Development in London (IIED), describing 
it as having “re-drafted all the rules” for housing upgrading in Vietnam (ACHR, October 2010: 
p.5). Apart from providing better housing to residents, it constitutes a modern project as it 
aims at triggering social and political change through the application of participatory 
processes in urban development. The following section will describe the project’s 
background as well as the processes and actors that made implementation possible. 
After Vinh’s destruction during the American War, housing in the completely destroyed city 
was often provided by state agencies and state-owned companies to their employees. 
Among these companies was the Hữu Nghị Company, which was responsible for running the 
city’s hotels and restaurants. In 1974 and 1979 the company had built four collective living 
houses in Cửa Nam Ward that formed the Hữu Nghị collective housing area, providing 
housing for employees of the company and their families.186 In line with economic 
restructuring, from 1990 on Hữu Nghị Company had sold many of the housing units to its 
inhabitants; other residents continued to rent their units. While the new land law of 1993 
practically allowed for the trade in land rights, inhabitants of the former collective housing 
area were only able to buy the houses and did not acquire the respective land use rights.187  
In accordance with national policies188, Nghệ An’s provincial authorities decided in 2007 that 
all collective housing areas in the city would be destroyed and rebuilt, in line with the city’s 
goal to become civilised and modern. At that time, 142 collective housing areas existed in 
Vinh (UBND Nghệ An, September 2007). Some residents had already rebuilt their housing 
themselves; these were to be given land-use rights in accordance with legal regulations. 
Other areas were to be rebuilt, while some of the residents had to be relocated depending on 
population density in the respective area and legal status of residents (Lê Như Ngà et al. 
2012: 32). As Vinh had grown in importance and been elevated to the status of a first tier city 
as well as the centre of North-Central Vietnam, regulations prescribed a minimum size of 
70m² per individual land plot (Lê Như Ngà et al., 2012: p.34; Bộ Xây Dựng, Viện Kiến trúc-
                                                          
185 As an administrative unit I refer to Cửa Nam Ward in the Vietnamese writing with diacritics, as a project or 
model, I refer to it in the way of respective publications and reports as Cua Nam. 
186 By the time the upgrading was carried out 29 registered households lived in these buildings. 
187 Interview 29.6.2011 
188 See above. Decree 61-CP of July 1994 had established a legal framework for the sale of state owned housing 
to its inhabitants, as the maintenance (or rather the lack thereof) had become a considerable financial burden 
and the provision of housing for employees was not the responsibility of companies and agencies anymore. It 
was also perceived that when people would own their own living quarters, they would improve their housing 
standard themselves.  
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Quy hoạch đô thị nông thôn, August 2008; Thủ tướng Chính phủ, 30.9.2005). Such an 
ambitious plan would involve considerable financial and social costs and the project initially 
made little progress (Lê Như Ngà et al., 2012: p.33).189 Therefore, in February 2009, a 
workshop was organized by the city’s People’s Committee, the Association of Cities of 
Vietnam (ACVN) and the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR), which introduced a 
community based way of upgrading in the framework of the Asian Coalition for Community 
Action (ACCA) to representatives of the collective living areas.  
 
Figure 29 
Buildings of the Hữu Nghị housing area before and after upgrading (left picture provided by Lê Viết Hùng, right 
picture taken by author, 1.7.2011). 
A retired resident of the Hữu Nghị collective housing area, Lê Viết Hùng had been elected as 
one of its representatives in the implementation of the destruction program of the province. 
Attending the workshop in February 2009 in this capacity, he recognized “community 
upgrading” to be an opportunity for his resident group to participate in the re-design of their 
neighbourhood and for all its residents to remain in the area. He attended a number of 
training courses and workshops in Vietnam as well as Thailand, during which he became 
familiar with the concepts and methods of community planning. With this knowledge, the 
support of the ward’s and city’s People’s Committees, Community Architects, ACHR, ACVN, 
and ENDA-Vietnam, the inhabitants made a plan for reconstructing their housing area. 
However, due to the small size of the area and the 70m² set by provincial authorities as the 
minimum size for individual land plots, some residents would have to be relocated. After 
                                                          
189 Cửa Nam Ward authorities had hired an architect to re-plan the site of Hữu Nghị collective housing area in 
August 2008, but had not carried out any work since (Interview 19.8.2008). 
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lobbying by ACVN and the city’s People’s Committee, the provincial People’s Committee 
lowered the plot size to 47m² on the condition that upgrading would follow the community 
based approach. Thereafter, the ground-breaking ceremony took place on 5 March 2010 and 
the project was finished ceremoniously on 3 October 2010 (Lê Viết Hùng, 4.5.2011). The 
project had provided the 29 households of the Hữu Nghị housing area with comfortable 
housing at costs much lower than in other redevelopment projects carried out in Vinh (see 
Figure 29). The following table compares figures from Hữu Nghị and the redevelopment of a 
housing area in Bến Thủy Ward (ACVN, 4.5.2011a). 
  Bến Thủy Cửa Nam 
1. Average housing plot size  
before/after redevelopment (m²) 27.89 / 89.31 30 / 47.30 
2. Number of households  
before redevelopment 114 29 
3. Number of relocated  
households 45 (40%) 0 
4. Number of households  
receiving new plots in the area 69 (60%) 29 (100%) 
4.1 Number of households  
able to construct a new house 42 (61%) 28 (97%) 
4.2 Number of households not  
able to construct a new house 27 (39%) 1
190 (3%) 
5. Infrastructure costs per household 1166 US$ 303 US$ 
6. Average costs per m² of  
housing space (in two-storey 
buildings) 
140 US$ 77 US$ 
Table 1 
Comparison of financial and social costs of the Cua Nam Model and redevelopment of a housing area in Bến 
Thủy Ward according to the original project of the city’s authorities. 
After this brief overview of the upgrading project in Cửa Nam Ward, the next part will turn to 
the main actors and their respective roles in the ACCA program. This involves a history of 
community based development activities in Vinh as well as an analysis of the structures and 
forms of cooperation which made the successful implementation of the project possible. 
                                                          
190 This household did construct a new one-storey building. It is listed here as not constructing a new house as 
this building does not follow the design of the other buildings.  
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4.2.3.1 Actors 
The Asian Coalition for Community Action (ACCA) is a project of the Asian Coalition for 
Housing Rights (ACHR) implemented in collaboration with the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED)191 and funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation (11 Mio US$). The first ACCA Program Committee Meeting took place in 
February 2009, after an initial grant of 7 Mio US $ had been pledged by the Gates 
Foundation. The program was to upscale the experiences of ACHR, mainly from Thailand, in 
community-led upgrading (Boonyabancha, 2009, 2005, 2003; Lê Như Ngà et al., 2012: 
pp.33). Through its experiences and activities in many Asian countries since the late 1980s, 
ACHR could draw on a large network that would facilitate implementation. Below the 
important actors of the Cua Nam Model are presented. 
Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR) 
The Asian Coalition for Housing Rights is a network of organisations and individuals 
promoting community-led urban development; the organisation’s office is located in Bangkok. 
It traces the roots of its community focused approach to Father Jorge Anzorena192, who 
promoted community-led development when working with the Belgian foundation SELAVIP193 
(ACHR, January 2000: p.4). In the 1970s, Anzorena was influenced by developments in Latin 
America, where debates about the role of housing in social change took place, and 
communities were more organized and more politicized than in Asia.194 He subsequently 
joined SELAVIP to promote its work in Asia, concentrating on documenting and 
disseminating experiences of housing improvements by low-income communities. Through 
this work, networks were established between different organisations in Asia. Over time, his 
work has increasingly focused on mechanisms for financing low-income housing (Anzorena, 
27.1.2011, 1993). 
ACHR’s origins lie in the Asian People’s Dialogue on Housing and Shelter in Seoul that 
brought together “community leaders” and NGOs from eleven countries, in light of large scale 
evictions in Seoul in the lead up to the Olympic Games. ACHR had been founded at this 
meeting; its secretariat was established in Bangkok in 1989 (Environment and Urbanization, 
1993). Participants saw ACHR’s main activity as facilitating exchange between grassroots 
groups through mutual visits (ACHR, January 2000). From the early 1990s, ACHR became 
active in community-led upgrading in Thailand, where the organisation and its members were 
                                                          
191 IIED served as a channel to transfer funds in several instalments to ACHR. 
192 Anzorena is a Jesuit holding a PhD in architecture from Tokyo University, and winner of the Ramon 
Magsaysay Award in 1994, see (http://www.rmaf.org.ph/newrmaf/main/awardees/awardee/profile/153, 
accessed 24.9.2013).  
193 Servicio Latino Americano y Asiatico de Vivienda Popular (Latin America and Asia Low-income People’s 
Housing); (Anzorena, 1993: p.124) 
194 See above on participation in urban development.  
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successful in influencing national policies (Anzorena, 27.1.2011). In 1992 the Urban 
Community Development Office (UCDO) headed by ACHR’s general secretary was set up 
under the National Housing Authority by the Thai Government to support people-led 
improvements in the living conditions of poor people in Thailand (Boonyabancha, 2005, 
1999). In October 2006, UCDO merged with the Rural Development Fund and became the 
Community Organizations Development Institute (CODI). This step made CODI a public 
organisation formally under the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security. CODI’s 
governing board included “representatives from poor communities, government, NGOs, 
academia and the private sector, and it institutionalizes the presence of community leaders 
at CODI's highest decision-making body” (ACHR, June 2001: p.17). One of CODI’s main 
activities is to run a network of funds on which communities can draw to implement 
upgrading projects (CODI, 2008; Boonyabancha, 2003). 
In the early 1990s, visits between communities also started in a number of Asian countries 
and contacts were strengthened with organisations outside Asia. From 1993 on the 
Department for International Development of the United Kingdom (DFID) funded ACHR’s 
Training and Advisory Programme (TAP). “TAP begins looking around the region at 
programmes that work for the poor and facilitates visits of community leaders, NGOs and 
officials involved in these programmes to other cities and countries to advocate these 
strategies. In its first six years, TAP supports 120 international exposures” (ACHR, January 
2000: p.5).  
Activities of ACHR in Vietnam started in the early 1990s, when the organisation supported a 
Project of United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(UNESCAP) and the People’s Committee of Hồ Chí Minh City. This project resulted in 
“Vietnam's first community loan for slum upgrading activity in the historical process of urban 
development in Vietnam” (Tran Minh Chau et al., 2003: p.25). It also led to the first 
Community Development Fund (CDF) in Vietnam and promoted self-managed savings and 
credit groups in urban areas (Tran Minh Chau et al., 2003). ACHR as subcontractor also 
advised and assisted the “Support for Five Provincial Cities Project” funded by United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to set up Community Development Funds in 
participating cities in June 2001. The project’s goal was to support poor urban communities 
and to strengthen the capacity of authorities to promote participatory community 
development. When it ran into funding difficulties, ACHR took over its activities (ACHR, 2005, 
May 2000, n.d.; Tran Minh Chau et al., 2003: pp.25-27). Thus, from early on ACHR has been 
an important actor in community-led projects and the introduction of CDFs to Vietnam. 
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Environmental Development Action in the Third World (ENDA) 
Another very active champion of community-led development is ENDA-Vietnam. The 
organisation is a local satellite of ENDA, an organisation which grew out of a project of the 
Institut Africain de Développement Économique et de Planification (IDEP) that started in 
1972, financed by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Sudanese 
Agency for International Development. The organisation later on became a NGO active in 14 
countries on four continents; it is located in Dakar, Senegal.195 ENDA-Vietnam was 
established in the early 1990s and soon became a partner in a number of projects by the 
UNDP and UN-HABITAT. It had carried out a preliminary study for the “Support for Fiv 
Provincial Cities Project” described above and had implemented the solid waste 
management component of the Localizing Agenda 21 Programme in Vinh.  
With its focus on environmental issues, ENDA-Vietnam aimed at achieving “sustainable 
community development, enable self-management of community savings and credit groups 
so that poor communities can more efficiently use external financial resources” (Tran Minh 
Chau et al., 2003: p.25). This approach led to the establishment of a Community 
Development Fund (CDF) in Vinh, funded by UN-HABITAT. However, some of ENDA-
Vietnam’s projects in urban areas have been criticized for allegedly not achieving their goal 
of targeting the poorest residents because of their reliance on loans that the poorest cannot 
repay (Canadian International Development Agency, 2001: p.19). Since the 1990s, ENDA-
Vietnam and ACHR have closely collaborated in community development projects (ACHR, 
April 2005, January 2000: p.27; n.d.).  
Association of Cities of Vietnam (ACVN) 
The Association of Provincial Cities was established in 1992 and was renamed Association 
of Cities of Vietnam in 2000. Its membership today comprises 96 cities and towns. It sees its 
role as that of a facilitator of exchange between its members as well as that of a link to 
strengthen international cooperation in urban management and development. “Today the 
ACVN is the only organisation representing the interests of local governments in Vietnam 
and operates both as a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) and as a Social Professional 
Organization” (ACVN Website196). As the only association of local governmental bodies it is 
approached by numerous international development actors. Among its most important 
international partners and donors are the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, the German 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and ACHR.197 Among the projects which ACVN has 
implemented in cooperation with foreign agencies and donors, some have promoted the 
                                                          
195 See ENDA Website: www.endatiersmonde.org, accessed 25.9.2013.   
196 http://www.acvn.vn/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=120&Itemid=47&lang=en, accessed 
24.9.2013. 
197http://www.acvn.vn/index.php/Index/index/name/17/10/http:/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl
e &id=101&Itemid=62&lang=en; accessed 22.11.2014. 
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participation of civil society as well as communities. One of these is the ACCA program that 
led to the upgrading project in Vinh’s Cửa Nam Ward outlined above.   
4.2.3.2 Approach 
In ACHR’s approach to community-led upgrading applied by the Asian Coalition for 
Community Action, communities and Community Development Funds play a dual role. 
Firstly, they provide a way of true “bottom-up” development, as opposed to “top-down” 
(government authorities) or “middle-down” (NGOs) development, which might promote the 
same principles of “participation” or “empowerment”, but fail to address the true issues and 
interests of the poor (ACHR, February 2009, p.14). Secondly, CDFs and the projects that are 
implemented with them are not ends in themselves; they are means to achieve goals of 
community empowerment. It is argued that CDFs would increase the abilities of the poor to 
manage and decide on their own community’s interests, thereby raising their self-esteem and 
self-consciousness. In addition, it would also strengthen communal identity and ties. 
Increased management skills and self-esteem would in turn lead to an improved position in 
negotiations with authorities and ultimately lead to structural changes that would make 
authorities more accountable and decision-making truly “participatory” (ACHR, December 
2009, November 2007, February 2002; Boonyabancha, 2001). In this approach, achieving 
the goals of empowerment and structural change is seen as usually being hampered by a so-
called “project-oriented” design of most development interventions. In contrast to this, ACCA 
promotes a “strategic approach”:  
“ACCA’s intervention in a city is not intended to be only a way of channeling 
resources into poor communities to fund a few specific community-driven 
drainage or housing projects. The idea is to use those resources more 
strategically to make a greater impact on the city, by creating new structural 
platforms at city (and national) level which can allow communities to work as 
equals with other urban partners and can help mainstream community-driven 
development and large-scale change by urban poor communities. So the way 
the upgrading and housing projects are selected, planned, implemented, 
visited, learned from and repeated in other places are all planned explicitly and 
strategically to become opportunities to build the negotiating power of the 
poor, to strengthen working partnerships between the poor, their local 
governments and other stakeholders in the city, and to create a city-wide 
problem-solving mechanism with roots in the city that are deeper than any 
short-term development intervention […]” (ACHR, December 2009: p.8) 
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Two kinds of concrete projects were introduced: Small Projects would be funded by a grant 
of 3,000 US$, addressing mainly infrastructure needs such as roads or drainage. These 
projects are seen as a first step to the process of community empowerment by setting 
concrete examples of ACCA’s methods and their results. Ideally, these projects should also 
generate (financial) commitment by other actors. While many groups received the money as 
grants, others have converted them into loans that are to be repaid into a CDF (ACHR, 
December 2009: p.8). In contrast, Big Projects are housing projects implemented with the 
real participation of communities. They are intended to strengthen the city-wide process.  
“The big projects are also important because they demonstrate a more 
comprehensive approach which includes all the key issues of poverty, and 
they show that total change is possible: houses, infrastructure, land tenure, 
income, welfare, environment - the works. If the big projects are to have any 
impact, it is extremely important that they not be stand-alone initiatives done in 
isolation. They need a fertile soil of relationships and links (between 
communities and other actors within the city and between cities in that 
country) that have been built and are growing through many other activities 
and through the small projects.” (ACHR, December 2009: p.10) 
Usually the contributions of ACCA to these Big Projects, maximum 40,000 US$ per project, 
served as capital for a city-wide CDF, in some cases they took the form of grants, especially 
in post-disaster situations. One of the major advantages cited by ACHR is the contribution of 
land by local governments for Big Projects, either for free or at subsidized rates, triggered by 
ACCA contributions (ACHR, December 2009: p.11). Each participating city was eligible for 
one Big Project (40,000 US$), five Small Projects (3,000 US$ per project, could be stretched 
to more than one project), and 3,000 US$ for coordination in the city. In addition, a budget of 
10,000 US$ was transferred to the national implementing organisation (ACHR, November 
2012: p.3). 
In addition to CDFs, participation of communities in the planning process is regarded as 
furthering the goal of empowerment. Community Architects and advisors from ACHR support 
these participatory processes. Community Architects are described as important actors in the 
ACCA process of community building and transformation through planning and housing 
construction (Luansang et al., 2012; ACHR, 2010). In an application of Turnerite ideas on 
urban development that became influential in Latin America and from there spread to other 
developing countries198, Community Architects apply participatory planning instruments to the 
                                                          
198 Note the above described role of Father Anzorena and Christian organisations in this process, as well as in 
(Anzorena, 27.1.2011, 1993). 
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design and construction process (Hall, 2002: pp.272-293).199 Community Architects are 
professional and trained architects who bring technical expertise to ACCA’s projects. Special 
“community architecture” techniques were taught at workshops, exchanges, and meetings 
financially supported by the Rockefeller Foundation. To facilitate exchange and 
dissemination, the Asian Community Architects Network (CAN200) was formed in June 2010.  
The structures of ACCA differed between countries and cities. To be eligible for ACCA-funds, 
a community had to have a savings group to which the funds are transferred. These were 
either newly established or already existing groups. Where the funds have to be repaid into a 
Community Development Fund, this revolving fund was to be managed by community 
representatives and other actors, including the local ACCA partners and authorities. These 
CDFs were supposed to create among the poor awareness about their management abilities 
and their community (ACHR, December 2009: p.7). On the national level a National Joint 
Committee was in charge of communication with the ACHR secretariat and establishing links 
between the different cities in a country. In a Regional Process, ACCA Meetings and 
exchange visits took place so as to connect poor communities as well as members of 
participating organisations and city authorities (ACHR, December 2009: p.15). Thus, on each 
level mechanisms were in place intended to connect communities. In this process, Small and 
Big Projects serve to mobilize people with the goal of empowerment of communities, and 
ultimately, structural change. ACCA’s approach thus combines physical redevelopment with 
participatory processes and management instruments in a modern project that aims at 
constructing a social communal identity of “the poor”, thereby triggering “empowerment” and 
subsequent institutional change.  
The scope of the ACCA program shifted during its implementation. In the beginning, the 
implementation of 500 Small Projects and 50 Big Projects in 150 cities in 15 countries was 
envisaged. The program was scheduled to end in October 2011. In November 2009, the 
Gates Foundation added a further 4 Million US$ grant to the program’s budget, which thus 
increased to 11 Mio US$ (ACHR, April 2010). By March 2011, only 58% of the program’s 
budget had been spent, the implementation period was therefore extended by 6 months until 
May 2012. Additional funds by SELAVIP (90,000 US$) were attached to the ACCA program 
as “The Decent Poor Program”. Later on, the program was further extended until July 2012 
(ACHR, May 2012).201 In ACCA’s final report, the numbers given for actually carried out
                                                          
199 ACHR has published handbooks describing these techniques: The Community Mapping for housing by 
people Handbook (ACHR, 5.5.2013) and the Comprehensive site planning Handbook (ACHR, 28.2.2012). 
200 See CAN’s website: communityarchitectsnetwork.info, accessed 25.9.2013 
201 Although different proposals for a second phase of the project were prepared, so far no funding for a new 
phase or a similar project under a new heading seems to be forthcoming (ACHR, March 2012). 
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projects are 1,185 Small Projects and 110 Big Projects. In all, 165 cities had participated in 
the program (ACHR, November 2012: p.28).  
After having introduced the actors and approach of the ACCA program, the next parts will 
focus on the Cua Nam Model that had been implemented as a Big Project. They will present 
the structures of the ACCA program in Vietnam with a focus on Vinh and the roles of actors 
involved in the upgrading project. 
 
4.2.3.3 Implementation  
As mentioned above, ACHR and ENDA-Vietnam had been engaged in community-led 
development projects in Vietnam since the 1990s. Over time and driven by donor-policies, 
CDFs had been established in a small number of Vietnamese cities. They were largely 
dependent on donor funds, as local governments’ contributions were not forthcoming (Tran 
Minh Chau et al., 2003; ACHR, June 2001). However, individual saving groups were not new 
to Vietnam and the Women’s Union, a Mass Organisation, had been implementing a policy to 
promote savings groups since the early 1990s (ACHR, April 2005; Tran Minh Chau et al., 
2003). The idea behind introducing city-wide CDFs was, as in the ACCA program, to link 
different savings groups so as to pool resources as well as to link communities with each 
other. In contrast, a report for Homeless International found that CDFs largely followed the 
usual governmental structures and that their impact on policy had been marginal (Tran Minh 
Chau et al., 2003: pp.33-37). In general, CDFs “have not been intended to meet the diverse 
needs of communities and households since the ward authorities have set out rules which 
allow them to be used only for financing infrastructure projects. When groups have 
completed these projects, they must repay the funds” (Tran Minh Chau et al., 2003: pp.38-
39). Additionally, city-wide processes and the involvement of communities were restricted, as 
existing saving groups were often not connected to CDFs (Tran Minh Chau et al., 2003: 
pp.40-44). 
ENDA and ACHR had also worked to form a national network of cities which had a CDF. In 
October 2007, after several months of discussions, ACVN, ENDA, and ACHR signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding, formally introducing ACVN as an actor in the CDF network. 
With its membership of 96 towns and cities at that time, ACVN was “to broaden the process 
around the country” (ACHR Website, n.d.). Although ACVN was seen by ACHR as needing 
capacity strengthening, its strategic importance was acknowledged:  
“[ACVN] could be very powerful because it links all the cities in the country and 
has a very good back up from the government. In Vietnam, you need some 
link with the government and the official system like this - without it, they may 
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not cooperate that well, and so we think this ACVN is a very important 
strategic partner”. (ACHR Website, n.d.)  
Partnership with ACVN was seen as a step towards upgrading and making the CDF process 
“part of the larger whole” (ACHR Website, n.d.). In the following years, membership of cities 
in the CDF network grew considerably due to networking activities of ACVN (ACVN, 
25.12.2008). In 2011, 29 cities were participating, with 11 more having applied for 
membership (ACVN, 4.5.2011b). 
When the ACCA program started in early 2009, a special body, the national CDF Steering 
Committee, was created under ACVN to act as the national coordinator and channel funds 
from ACHR to projects and cities. Vinh and Việt Trì were chosen as pilot cities in the ACCA 
program, because “there are evictions of communities going on in both of them” (ACHR, 
February 2009). In Vinh, these would potentially take place as part of the program of 
demolishing the collective living areas described above. It was agreed early on that Vinh’s 
Big Project would be implemented in Cửa Nam Ward. 
Already in August 2003, Vinh had become a member of the CDF network. Upon entering the 
network, Vinh was praised as “a good example of City Development Vision/Strategic 
Planning (development of 5-year project under UNCHS framework - LA 21202) and how 
community participation can contribute toward city development plan as a whole” (ACHR, 
n.d.). The funds (150,000 US$) in Vinh’s CDF had initially been supplied by UN-HABITAT, 
the activities carried out with loans from the fund included environmental infrastructure and 
economic projects. Vinh could draw on a large number of already existing saving groups 
managed by the Women’s Union. The city’s CDF management board was from early on 
chaired by Nguyễn Văn Chỉnh, Vice-President of Vinh’s People’s Committee (Nguyễn Văn 
Chỉnh, 18.5.2008). By 2007, the Women’s Union had become another important actor in 
Vinh’s CDF process (ACHR, November 2007: p.27). When in 2009 Vinh became a member 
of the ACCA program, decision making in its city CDF was divided between the city’s 
Women’s Union and its People’s Committee (ACHR, February 2009). 
When choosing Vinh as a pilot city, ACHR was much aware of the shortcomings of its CDF 
and the obstacles to community participation in Vietnam: 
“the CDFs in each city are a little stiff because of the process which has been 
more controlled by the municipality and the Women's Union than by the 
communities themselves. If we are going to help these funds to address the 
housing needs, how can we do it in such a way as to adjust the existing 
                                                          
202 The LA 21 project described above.  
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system so that it can open more space to people and create a kind of 
collaboration that is more a partnership of equals than like a vertical 
hierarchy?” (ACHR, February 2009)  
“Unlike most other countries in Asia, Viet Nam is still under a socialist system. 
And because of this tight Socialist system, it is not so easy for communities to 
go here and there, and to do this and that in Viet Nam.” (ACHR, April 2009)  
The workshop in February 2009 in Vinh, mentioned above in the description of the Cua Nam 
Model, brought together stakeholders of the ACCA program. Representatives of the city, 
which needed to carry out the policy to redevelop housing areas in a Modern and Civilised 
style, ACCA representatives, who wanted to promote community participation and implement 
a Big Project in Vinh to pilot its efforts in Vietnam, and representatives of the communities 
who faced dangers of eviction. The attending community leaders agreed on a catalogue of 
requirements the pilot community would have to fulfil. Cửa Nam and another ward were later 
chosen out of 16 collective housing areas as potential sites for the pilot project (ACCA, 
20.4.2009).203  
The process of community planning for the project in Cửa Nam Ward included the assistance 
of two local architects as well as a CODI team from Thailand.204 After the city had approved 
the proposal for upgrading, the provincial People’s Committee initially refused approval, 
because the plot size was smaller than the provincial regulations allowed for and officials 
feared that smaller plot size would result in a “new slum”205 (Lê Như Ngà et al., 2012: p.34). 
With lobbying by ACVN and the city’s People’s Committee, the provincial authorities finally 
agreed on 15 September 2009 under the condition that the project would be carried out as 
laid down by the ACCA program.  
To be eligible for funding from ACCA, people living in the Hữu Nghị housing area formed a 
saving group with Lê Viết Hùng as its head and an accountant supporting him. Each month, 
each family paid 600,000 Đồng into the group’s account. By November 2010, this group had 
saved 216,009,000 Đồng; however, it did not have to use these for construction of their 
houses. As former employees of Hữu Nghị Joint Stock Company they were holding some of 
the company’s stock, which they were able to sell to raise the money needed for the 
                                                          
203 The ACCA program in Vinh also included five Small Projects. To select communities for their implementation, 
the city CDF board and the wards’ administration drew up a list of ten communities that were “stable” , 
representatives of these ten communities chose among themselves where the project should be implemented. 
While they reached agreement on one project, they drew lots for the other four. All projects were 
infrastructure projects and the communities would have to pay back the loans they received into a revolving 
fund (ACCA, 20.4.2009). 
204 One of the architects had initially been hired by the ward in August 2008, only afterwards had the 
neighbourhood leader been informed of this decision. Interview 29.6.2011. 
205 “khu ổ chuột mới“  
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project206 (Lê Viết Hùng, 2010: pp.39-40). Additionally, they borrowed 40,000 US$, which 
ACHR had contributed to the city’s CDF, and which they had to repay in monthly 20 Mio 
Đồng instalments (Lê Viết Hùng, 4.5.2011; Đức Ngọc, 11.5.2010).  
The new houses were inaugurated on World Habitat Day in October 2010, attended by 
representatives of communities and administrations from Vietnamese cities as well as from 
Thailand, Cambodia, and the Philippines. Speeches were given by representatives of the 
Ministry of Construction, the Provincial People’s Committee, and ACHR. Housing cost about 
150 Million Đồng per unit and was thus much cheaper than upgrading in other areas that was 
undertaken by a developer or individually (see Table 1; ACHR, October 2010). The costs 
could be reduced by collectively buying materials and hiring workers, as well as by sharing 
walls and roofs, re-using materials and by the residents doing as much work as possible 
themselves. However, not all the families could afford to build in the proposed design, their 
new houses were smaller, and one house has three stories instead of two.207 Some of the 
resident families had previously occupied larger land plots; they had to give up parts of these 
in order to implement the project.208 
After upgrading was finished, residents were able to buy the land-use rights to their 
respective lots. In line with legal regulations those who had bought their houses before 1993 
were to be given land-use titles without having to pay for them, those who had acquired the 
houses between 1993 and 2004 would have to pay a fee reduced by 50%, and others would 
have to pay the full fee (Nguyễn Văn Chỉnh, 4.5.2011; Chính phủ, 7.9.2006). According to Lê 
Như Ngà et al., successful upgrading of the Hữu Nghị Housing Area has convinced 
authorities to adjust their policies, allowing plot sizes smaller than official regulations if 
residents of housing areas follow the Cua Nam Model, especially as it resulted in a more 
uniform street façade than individual upgrading209. However, this applied only to five 
additional housing areas (out of 142) in 2012 (Lê Như Ngà et al., 2012: pp.35-36).  
In Cửa Nam, the interplay of local, national, and international actors has resulted in the 
upgrading of Hữu Nghị housing area and improved living conditions of 29 households. It had 
achieved upgrading that was responsive to the demands and suggestions by residents, 
which was difficult in light of existing policies and the vision to create a Modern and Civilised
                                                          
206 It is thus questionable if the residents needed a savings group to collect money for the project. Also, the 
funds raised by selling stocks and the high monthly instalments indicate that these households were not among 
the poorest.  
207 Interview 29.6.2011 
208 Interview 30.6.2011. According to the interviewee, this prompted a prolonged conflict during the planning 
process that could be solved with mediation by Thai experts. While all of the registered residents were able to 
stay, another source indicated that some of them had previously rented out rooms in the old structures to 
migrants who had to relocate when the project was carried out. Interview 7.7.2011 
209 One might also say more civilised and modern. 
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City. In addition, the ACCA program had aimed at triggering social and political change by 
implementing the project. The next part will describe ACCA’s structures in Vinh and their 
interaction with the existing institutional framework.  
 
4.2.3.4 Structures 
After the initial workshop in January 2009, the city-wide process in Vinh started. It consisted 
largely of meetings in which the experiences with housing projects were discussed and 
opinions collected. Those attending were representatives of communities in which housing 
projects (not in the framework of ACCA) had taken place, representatives of the communities 
selected for ACCA projects, as well as Community Architects and volunteers of the Women’s 
Union. A report on the city-wide process lists 28 people as having been involved, with no 
mention of participants who were not directly involved in the management of ACCA in Vinh, 
members of the city’s administration or community representatives (ACCA, 20.4.2009: p.9). 
The city-wide process was largely dominated and organized by the Women’s Union and 
People’s Committees.  
The same report gives an account of the structures that were established to run the CDF in 
Vinh. It mentions that CDF activities were consolidated and the role of the authorities and 
Mass Organisations strengthened, while the autonomy of individual saving groups was 
increased. The saving groups were represented by a management board of two members. 
On the level of the neighbourhood, a management committee was composed of three to five 
members. The ward CDF Steering Committee consisted of one member of the People’s 
Committee’s leadership, a member of the Women’s Union and an accountant (ACCA, 
20.4.2009: p.18).  Vinh’s City CDF Steering Committee consisted of a Vice-President of 
Vinh’s People’s Committee, the head of the People’s Committee Office, the respective 
Heads of the Offices for Natural Resources and Finance, the Head of the City’s Tax 
Department, and the Vice-Head of the Office for Urban Management, as well as four 
members of the city’s Women’s Union, among them the Union’s president and one member 
serving as the Committee’s secretary.210 Thus, the CDF Steering Committees on all levels 
were composed of members of the respective People’s Committee’s and the Women’s 
Union. 
Communication did usually not take place horizontally between different saving groups, but 
was channelled through and coordinated by the neighbourhood Steering Committee, which 
would in turn deal with the ward level. Communication on higher levels is also described as 
mainly following established vertical administrative hierarchies. According to the report, 
                                                          
210 Interview 30.6.2011 
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communication between the different institutions of the ACCA program took place as part of 
the regular monthly working sessions between hierarchically connected administrative bodies 
(ACCA 20.4.2009: pp.18-19). Decision making on the CDF loans and activities thus exactly 
mirrored the hierarchical structures of administration and authority (see Figure 30). 
The usage of the terms “community leader” and “communities” obscures another aspect that 
furthers the prevalence of “old structures” of authority through which the ACCA program in 
Vinh is implemented. The groups referred to as “communities” are resident groups (in urban 
wards) or villages (in rural communes). While these are not formal units of state 
administration, as they have no People’s Committee and are no legal entities, they serve as 
the lowest level of officially recognized organisation and form the basis for groups of Mass 
Organisations (Parenteau, Nguyen Quoc Thong, 2010: p.175; Koh, 2004: p.203). The 
success of the Cua Nam Model has been attributed to the fact that Hữu Nghị’s residents 
were a community and not just a resident group. The application of the Cua Nam Model in 
other areas, however, has faced problems exactly because communal ties between 
members of resident groups were low (Lê Như Ngà, 4.5.2011).211   
According to “communities” being resident groups or villages, those referred to as community 
leaders in the case of Vinh were usually village heads or resident group heads. As stipulated 
by Circular 03/1998/TT-TCCP they are the “representatives of the people in a residential 
group, under the administration and guidance of the ward’s or town’s People’s Committee, 
they are directly elected by the members of the groups and recognized by the President of 
the ward’s People’s Committee” (see page 158). This position thus forms the officially 
formalized link between the residential group and the neighbourhood leadership. The second 
member of the saving group’s management board is usually a representative of the Women’s 
Union (Xã Hưng Hòa, 5.5.2011).212 In ACCA publications these are referred to as community 
representatives. When delegates from Vinh participated in ACCA activities in Vietnam or 
abroad, “community representatives” were thus often members of the Women’s Union or 
officially recognized village/resident group heads (Lê Quang Thông; May 2012: p.26; Xã 
Hưng Hòa, 5.5.2011; ACHR, April 2010).213  
                                                          
211 Interview 3.7.2011 
212 Interview 30.6.2011 
213 This point is not raised to discuss if village/resident group heads of the Women’s Union can claim to truly 
represent the interests of “communities”, or if they are part of civil society. It does show, however, that the 
ACCA program is implemented relying on the established structures of authority. For discussions of this topic 
see (Wells-Dang, 2012; Parenteau, Nguyen Quoc Thong, 2010; Thayer, 2009; Hannah, 2007; Wischermann, 
Nguyen Quang Vinh, 2003; Gray, 1999). 
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Figure 30 
The Community Development Fund structures in Vinh mirrored the hierarchical structures of state authority. 
On all levels they were dominated by members of existing administrative bodies and the Women’s Union 
(VWU).  
Both ACVN and ACHR were aware of this situation. ACVN, in its role as an advisor to 
participating cities, promoted structures for the implementation of CDFs mirroring those of 
the city administration (Vũ Thị Vinh, 4.5.2011; ACVN, n.d.). However, ACVN also 
acknowledged the assessment of an external evaluator who criticized the dominant role of 
the administration and the Women’s Union in many of the participating cities. Critique was 
also levelled at the issue of saving groups remaining unconnected to city CDFs, as this was 
regarded as hindering the creation of a city-wide process (Lê Quang Thông, May 2010: 
p.58).
ACHR saw the need to work closer with authorities in Vietnam than in other countries. The 
organisation was, however, also aware that this might pose problems:  
“Viet Nam is still a bit centralized, with a proper unified system. When we work 
in any city in Viet Nam, there is a system in the city where the communities 
have to link to the ward authority, the ward to the district, the district to the city, 
  
 
175 4.2.3.5 The Cua Nam Model (2009 to 2012): Results 
the city to the province, etc. It's a system with many tiers and it works very well 
in Viet Nam.” (ACHR, October 2009: p.31)  
The following quote also shows ACHR’s perception of the relationship between authorities, 
the Women’s Union, and communities: “Verticals and horizontals: We can talk about city-
wide saving and community-driven development, but it’s not so easy to change the 
relationships in a city to make that possible, especially in Vietnam, where the relationships 
between the people and the city authorities and the Women’s Union are still overwhelmingly 
vertical” (ACHR, December 2009: p.67). The approach taken to overcome these restrictions 
was to implement a large number of projects in Vietnam to create city-wide processes:  
“The reason that so many cities are being brought into the national savings 
and ACCA process is that there is a need for a platform of people-to-people – 
both within cities and between cities in Viet Nam. If these platforms are there 
and have a stronger dynamism, the city-to-city dynamic, which is being 
supported by ACVN, can make this country's stiff, vertical systems softer and 
more relaxed. So all these cities are going to use the small ACCA projects in 
order to make this dynamic link between communities – within the city and 
between cities - stronger and more active. They will start the savings activities 
at the same time. This new community-to-community platform at local and 
national levels will probably make the vertical systems in the cities and in the 
country soften and relax. That's the strategy, and that kind of strategic thinking 
is the [reason the] Vietnamese won wars with both the French and the 
Americans!” (ACHR, October 2009: p.34) 
 
4.2.3.5 Results 
Working closely with authorities and replicating the existing structures of the state has 
stripped the ACCA program in Vinh of much of its ambitions for structural change. As will be 
shown below, city authorities presented the ACCA program largely as a tool to achieve pre-
defined goals and agendas such, as the “destruction of collective housing areas” policy as 
part of the creation of a Modern and Civilised City or the construction of infrastructure. The 
dominance of infrastructure projects, especially roads, is seen by ACHR as a sign that ACCA 
projects can mobilize additional contributions by the state (ACHR, December 2010: p.38).  
“Local governments often want to show they are doing something for poor 
communities in their cities, and roads are something that is visible to 
everybody. That's why they contribute so much more to the road projects. 
Also, in most Vietnamese cities, rural areas surrounding the city have been 
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brought into the municipal boundaries, but these areas (which comprise a 
large portion of the urban territory) are still mostly rural, without much 
infrastructure. So in many cities, the government's action plans put 
infrastructure development in these rural communes on top of the priority list. 
In these projects, the money from the city comes to the community directly, 
and they manage the budgets themselves. There is a long history of this kind 
of small, local joint ventures between local governments and communities like 
this in Vietnamese cities - it's not something new. But it used to be that the 
local government managed the money and the projects and the people would 
contribute - here in ACCA we're turning this equation around!” (ACHR, 
October 2009:  p.34) 
However, due to the reliance on vertical structures and the involvement of authorities and the 
Women’s Union it is not surprising that conventional projects of public service delivery where 
chosen, to which the ACCA budget was added. Furthermore, the reliance on vertical 
structures has hampered the city-wide approach of ACCA, promoted as the major factor for 
overcoming “project-based thinking” and contributing to structural change. While arguably a 
city-wide process took place in Vinh, it remained in the hands of the People’s Committee and 
the Women’s Union. Funds of saving groups did not contribute to the city CDF (ACHR, 
November 2012: p.8). Leaving individual saving groups unconnected to each other, the 
structures of ACCA in Vinh fell even short of the Grassroots Democracy process that allows 
for participation on the ward level. On the other hand, events and activities organized by 
ACVN indeed introduced new forms of interaction between community representatives and 
members of the authorities, for example a community leader bitterly complained about the 
behaviour of the People’s Committee of Hải Dương City, confronting its present Vice-
President in front of the audience of the National CDF Conference. 
The achievements of the ACCA program as a modern project are mixed. While claims such 
as “having altered all the rules” are exaggerated, participation of residents in the upgrading of 
the Hữu Nghị housing area went further than in the originally proposed approach of 
authorities. Additionally, the experiences of the Cua Nam Model have been applied in other 
housing areas in Vinh. However, the number of other areas in which the model was applied 
remained very low in comparison to the overall number of housing areas to be redeveloped 
in Vinh. Thus, city-wide impact of the program has been limited. Impact on institutions and 
resulting change has been limited especially because implementation of the program relied 
on already existing structures of power and authority. Depending on these vertical 
hierarchies, the program was unable to establish horizontal connections and communication 
between different groups.  
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Additionally, reliance on existing structures also opened up possibilities for co-optation of the 
program’s achievements by local authorities. When the resident group leader found that after 
upgrading of his housing area some funds were left, he decided to buy a red flag with a 
yellow star in the middle for each household in his residential group. When the project was 
officially inaugurated on World Habitat Day in October 2010, the national flag of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam flew on the new houses (see Figure 31).214 This symbolism is indicative 
of the complex interplay of actors and the application of their modern projects in the 
institutional setting of Vietnam as it marks a modern project aimed at participation and 
empowerment as an achievement of the state. The next part will conclude this chapter on 
modern projects introduced to Vinh by recapturing this interplay. 
 
 
Figure 31 
Like on Habitat Day in October 2010, the national flag of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam decorates new 
buildings in the Hữu Nghị housing area as international and national attendees of the National CDF Workshop 
in May 2011 visit the project (picture taken by author, 4.5.2011; for a similar picture taken on World Habitat 
Day 2010 see Vũ Thị Vinh, 2010: p. 38). 
                                                          
214 Personal conversation 4.5.2011 
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4.3 The Enabling De-Politisation of Modern Projects 
Cooperation between GDR and Vietnam in the creation of a Socialist City had on both sides 
been informed by the same modern project. In contrast, urban development in Vinh since the 
1990s is subject to the promotion of different, often contradictory or conflicting modern 
projects. The following part analyses the strategies of involved actors to deal with this 
situation, after providing a short review of the different visions informing urban development 
projects in Vinh. 
The vision promoted by national, provincial, and municipal authorities for Vinh’s development 
is expressed in the slogan “Civilised and Modern City“. This slogan is translated into images 
of an orderly city of consumer culture, represented in New Urban Areas215, apartment, office 
and hotel high-rises, as well as shopping centres. In the present official vision, these markers 
of economic development go hand in hand with symbolic and spatial references emphasizing 
Vinh’s revolutionary history and thereby the legitimacy of the Communist Party. In the case of 
Vinh, this also amounts to the celebration of a local, not only national, history of revolutionary 
struggle. Continuity of national history is emphasised by heritage sites such as the Vinh and 
Phượng Hoàng Trung Đô citadels. However, reminders of the difficult years of reconstructing 
the country and building216 socialism, such as collective housing areas and the Quang Trung 
Housing Complex, have no place in this politicized urban landscape (see Figure 32). While 
this vision in large parts relies on market mechanisms and individual initiative, especially in 
the housing sector, the planning process implies that the legitimate formulation of overall 
development goals and visions is reserved for the Communist Party and the state. Despite 
the importance of different actors and the market in bringing about this vision, they are 
ideologically relegated to a functional role of contributing to the fulfilment of this official vision, 
but have no role in its formulation.217 This vision regards the city, like in the previously 
promoted modern project to build a Socialist City, as an area in which different functional and 
symbolic spaces and buildings are arranged by a centralized planning system so as to arrive 
at an ideal outcome. This does not constitute a modern project in the sense that it aims at 
social or political change. Instead, it is a conservative modern project as it aims at securing 
the Communist Party’s constitutional role as “the force assuming leadership of the State and 
                                                          
215 The investment license for one of the largest of these has only recently been revoked because the investor, 
PVNC, was slow to implement the project (Nguyễn Đình Cát, 25.7.2013). PVNC has, however, been granted a 
license for redeveloping Zone A of Quang Trung. It remains to be seen if this projects fares better.  
216 “Building” here refers to construction activities that aimed at creating a socialist urban environment as well 
as to attempts to create the institutions and management apparatus of a socialist state.  
217 The distinction between the state and market actors, however, should not be taken too rigidly. Importantly, 
many of the prominent construction companies in Vinh, like Handico 30 or PVNC, are former provincial 
construction companies that became part of larger state-owned enterprises. In many “privatized” companies, 
such as Vinh City Infrastructure Development and Management Joint Stock Company, province or city still hold 
a controlling interest (WWM Advisory Team, April 2007: pp.3-5). 
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society” by creating symbols of its legitimacy through conscious urban design (Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, 25.12.2001: Chapter 1, Article 4). 
 
Figure 32 
In 2011 the Housing Complex Centre constructed as part of GDR cooperation was demolished to make way for 
the Nguyễn Thị Minh Khai Memorial House (picture taken by author, 26.6.2011) 
In the official vision of Vinh top-down planning by experts implements political goals that are 
formulated by central authorities (see for example Thủ tướng Chính phủ, 30.11.2011). In this 
view, the civilised and modern character of the city is expressed by orderly “modern” physical 
structures representative of the Party’s and the state’s achievements. In contrast, the 
presented projects promoted by international actors see the modernity of a city not in its 
physical appearance but in those institutions, structures, and power relations that govern it; 
their modern projects aim at making these more participatory. Both the LA 21 and the ACCA 
program regarded their physical projects as triggering change through the application of 
participatory methods. Like the model of a Socialist City had to be adapted to local 
circumstances, these international actors had to adjust their approaches to urban 
development to the institutional and political setting of Vinh. Taking concrete achievements 
as a measure, the ACCA program was more successful in this regard than the LA 21 
program. To deal with the institutional and political particularities of Vinh (and Vietnam as a 
whole), actors promoting these modern projects had to develop particular strategies to make 
cooperation with Vietnamese actors and implementation of their projects possible. Thereby, 
the political program informing the modern project of a Participatory City was partly given up 
and became open for co-optation.  
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The case for development as “The anti-politics machine” has most famously been argued by 
James Ferguson (1994). Participation and civil society have a clear political connotation in 
the field of development (see pages 143-147). However, according to Fowler terms such as 
“transformation” or “participation” were stripped of their political significance when NGOs 
promoting these concepts became increasingly co-opted by and depended on donors in the 
1980s. When civil society became en vogue in the 1990s, many NGOs’ work became further 
detached from politics as they were directed to “small-p” politics by donors, on whom they 
depend financially (Fowler, 2011: p.47). Edwards sees a general pattern, in which concepts 
of the social sciences such as “participation” or “development” are appropriated by different 
actors, thereby losing their clarity (Edwards, 2011: p.4). On civil society he writes “what was 
once a conversation about democracy and self-expression has become increasingly 
technocratic, dominated by elites who seek to shape civil society for their own ends and 
increasingly mimicking the language and practices of businesses and market-based 
investment” (Edwards, 2011: p.5). According to Harriss the discourse on civil society, 
participation, and good governance “represents problems that are rooted in differences of 
power and in class relations as purely technical matters that can be resolved outside the 
political arena” (Harriss, 2002: p.8). He argues that those actors chosen for participation and 
funding are at times chosen because they “offer the possibility of a kind of democracy 
through ‘popular participation’, but without the inconveniences of contestational politics and 
the conflicts of values and ideas which are a necessary part of democratic politics” (Harriss, 
2002: p.8).   
However, according to Hewison and Jayasuriya, this de-politisation masks the political 
agenda behind the use of a technique or a tool. Behind that, they see the promotion of a 
technocratic form of development that presents itself as neutral, while reducing civil society 
organisations to activities that ensure the smooth implementation of economic reform. In their 
view, the de-politisation is “instrumental for neo-liberal market programs and strategies; it 
becomes a means of instantiating the discipline of the market in the core of the individual 
participation in civil society” (Hewison, Jayasuriya, 2004: p.7). Furthermore, as civil society 
and “good” modes of participation become associated with a specific form of institutional 
setting, namely a liberal market economy, political decisions and debates on the forms and 
goals of development are removed from civil society’s scope. Its use is then to bring about 
and maintain such a system, not to argue if it is desirable (Jenkins, 2001: p.11). Thus, the 
cultural program informing many development projects is merely covered-up by the use of 
technical terms. In the following this process is analysed as enabling cooperation between 
numerous actors promoting different modern projects. 
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Meyer and Rowan have argued that organisations which employ rationalized concepts of 
work increase their legitimacy and thereby become more successful (Meyer, Rowan, 1991). 
However, what is perceived as rational is not necessarily effective. This leads to the de-
coupling of the formal structures from the internal working activities that really take place in 
the organisation. Formal structures then become a way to maintain an organisation’s 
“ceremonial conformity” with the institutionalized perceptions of rationality.218 They refer to 
these institutionalized perceptions as myths. “Institutionalized products, services, techniques, 
policies, and programs function as powerful myths, and many organisations adopt them 
ceremonially” (Meyer, Rowan, 1991: p.41). By ceremoniously referring to these myths an 
organisation increases the legitimacy of its actions. Such myths are the result of 
institutionalized rules in society which may be taken for granted or might be supported by 
public opinion or the force of law. They are not only powerful in the immediate field of work of 
an organisation but often spring from wider public opinion and “knowledge legitimated 
through the educational system”. As such they are beyond the discretion of individuals and 
their truth is established beyond evaluation (Meyer, Rowan, 1991: p.42-44).  
While initially applying this concept to the structures of organisations, Meyer and Rowan go 
beyond this notion by stating that “Modern societies are filled with institutional rules which 
function as myths depicting various formal structures as rational means to the attainment of 
desirable ends” (Meyer, Rowan, 1991: p.46). Thus, their argument can also be applied to 
features of an organisation that are not necessarily part of their structures, for example the 
goals they pursue or the partners they work with. By ritually referring to myths established 
around certain goals or actors in its field of action an organisation raises its legitimacy and 
credibility. Using the right language and terms are an important technique in this (Meyer, 
Rowan, 1991: p.50). The enactment of myths is especially important in contexts where the 
output of an organisation is difficult to assess and its relations with other organisations have 
therefore to be based on confidence and good faith (Meyer, Rowan, 1991: pp.55-58). 
As described above, an orthodoxy has been created that sees the promotion of good 
governance and civil society as a way to achieve both better implementation of development 
policies and more democratic governance. Despite, much criticism levelled at these 
assumptions and their interconnectedness by a virtuous circle, the view that participatory 
development and working with civil society actors yields better results and is morally superior 
largely persists (Cooke, Kothari, 2001). This institutionalized discourse might be called the 
myth of participatory development. Actors in the development field ritually refer to this myth 
by professing their adherence to its principles of working with civil society actors and 
implementing projects in a participatory way. They do so not only to compete for funding, but 
                                                          
218 For examples from Southeast Asian politics see (Helbardt et al., 2012). 
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also to be part of the wider field of development and to make their actions and methods 
understood in this field. Although DiMaggio and Powell refer by “isomorphism” to changes in 
organisational structures, the mechanism of “coercive isomorphism” does also aptly describe 
the relation between actors in development: “Coercive isomorphism results from both formal 
and informal pressures exerted on organisations by other organisations upon which they are 
dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which organisations function. 
Such pressures may be felt as force, as persuasion, or as invitations to join in collusion” 
(DiMaggio, Powell, 1991: p.67). Indeed, the co-optation of NGOs by donors has led to 
isomorphism (Fowler, 2011; Craig, Mayo, 1995: p.7), but donor’s control of resources and 
continued cooperation between the two kinds of actors has made the ability to present one’s 
actions in the right terms and using the buzz-words of the time one of the critical abilities for 
successful actors in development.  
Problems arise, however, as development projects and programmes involve numerous 
actors from different “societal sectors” (Scott, Meyer, 1991) or “organizational fields” 
(DiMaggio, Powell, 1991). These different sectors or fields have their own myths that 
legitimize actions and organisations, possibly contradicting each other’s (Meyer, Rowan, 
1991: p.55). This is often the case with development projects that are presented as 
conforming to the goals of the donors, to those of the receiving country as well as to those of 
“the people”. Ideally, a project should be able to appear legitimate to all its stakeholders. To 
achieve this, “translating” of actions is necessary to link to different myths.219 In the following, 
the translation strategies of the LA 21 and the ACCA program are analysed. 
 
In Vinh, the first program that became active with a focus on participation and civil society 
was the Localising Agenda 21 Programme. Throughout the writing on the LA 21 Programme, 
calls were repeated for the participation of “civil society” and “civic actors” (for example 
Verschure, Tuts, 2004; van den Broeck et al., 2004). It remains unclear, however, what these 
are, and what role they played in planning and urban development. The following quote 
provides an example of this vagueness: “The LA21 process has identified the contested 
territories in the supported cities and stressed that these very sites are ideal vehicles for 
negotiation — between private investment and the public realm, between the international 
donor community and local governments, between global pressures and civil society” 
(Loeckx, Shannon, 2004: p.163). The idea conveyed here was of civil society as something 
local, able to mitigate global pressures (but probably not from global actors such as UN-
HABITAT or LA 21) and that the involvement of civil society in “negotiations” would somehow 
                                                          
219 Processes of translation have for example been the subject of work by Lewis and Mosse or Bierschenk 
(Lewis, Mosse, 2006; Bierschenk, 2000) 
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lead to better results. The general thrust of the argument regarding the involvement of civil 
society in urban planning was expressed by van den Broeck et al. who argued that 
participation of civil society would result in changes in the political system where the state 
becomes an “enabler”, “sometimes taking on an ‘entrepreneurial’ style” (van den Broeck et 
al., 2004: p. 201). While acknowledging that power relations and “cultural backgrounds” can 
prevent participation of civil society, van den Broeck et al. relegated the solution of this 
problem to new “policy arrangements”, “tools”, or “informal forums and policy agreements”.220 
Finally, “The pursuit of better democratic decision-making and better government therefore 
constitutes the main justification of the approach” (van den Broeck et al., 2004: p.209). The 
inclusion of civil society, Non-Governmental Organisations, Community Based Organisations 
(CBO), etc. legitimized the approach taken by LA 21 with “Strategic Structure Planning”, 
while it remains largely unclear what the contributions of such actors to the “negotiations” 
and the overall process were. However, the lack of involvement of civil society and NGOs 
has been a constant threat running through reports on the program in Vinh. Also, contrary to 
the final report on the other two cities, Nakuru and Essaouira, the chapter on Vinh does not 
refer to the involvement of NGOs or CBOs or civil society organisations (Loeckx et al., 2004; 
de Meulder, Loeckx, 2004). The final report on Vinh stipulated that the involvement of NGOs 
as external investors would be required for the revitalisation of Quang Trung, thereby 
keeping in line with the general view on the positive role of NGOs in project implementation 
(Shannon, Loeckx, 2004: p.143). Furthermore, at least one unpublished Progress Report 
referred to Mass Organisations, namely the National Front of Vinh City and the Women’s 
Union as NGOs (LA 21, 1.12.1997: p.41).221 
Throughout its implementation, the program had faced serious communication problems. 
Furthermore, LA 21’s approach did not sufficiently take Vietnam’s institutional settings and 
structures into account. Even perfect participation at the city level would not yield results if 
this level is not the one where decisions are made. These are important reasons for the 
shortcomings of the program. Additionally, it was the lack of concrete action that could be 
translated into the Vietnamese policy discourse that was responsible for a lack of 
commitment from the Vietnamese side.222 As outlined above, in the context of Grassroots 
Democracy participation in Vietnam is seen as a tool contributing to the implementation of 
                                                          
220 This argument is reminiscent of early approaches to development that blamed internal factors for under-
development and regarded external intervention as necessary to overcome these restraints, see pages 11-12. 
221 Progress Reports were prepared for Steering Committee Meetings, which served as a link to the Belgian 
Administration for Development Cooperation and thereby to the Belgian Government, the main donor of the 
program. A draft application for follow-up funding also lists the Association of Provincial Cities as a NGO 
(UNCHS HABITAT, LA 21, 31.8.1998: p.24). 
222 Where such concrete action took place, namely in the field of solid waste management, the international 
actors did apparently not take much interest in it, as indicated by the absence of any reference to that 
component in the program’s final report. 
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already defined goals and policies, a point it shares with the view of participation prevalent in 
the development discourse. In contrast to this discourse, however, in the Grassroots 
Democracy discourse participation is not regarded as a means to achieve political and social 
change. Correspondingly, participation in the LA 21 Programme went furthest in solid waste 
management activities that have no apparent connection to social or political issues, thereby 
relegating participation to activities supporting the vision to create a Modern and Civilised 
City. Participation of actors, especially of civil society, in questions that refer to larger social 
units or to power politics such as urban master planning is difficult to express in the official 
discourse on participation and urban development in Vietnam. This does not represent a 
failure to translate the approach taken by LA 21 into Vietnamese planning or policy language. 
Instead, there was no discourse present to which the program’s approach and activities to 
urban development could legitimately attach itself because the official view of cities in 
Vietnam continues to see urban areas as objects of central planning by experts, not as a 
public sphere in which different visions of the city can be freely formulated and discussed. 
Even without many tangible results to show for its activities, LA 21 could still be expressed as 
a legitimate initiative in the international discourse. Its ritualistic adherence to the importance 
of cooperating with civil society and of participation connects the program to this discourse. 
As concepts such as civil society and NGO are not clearly defined, the program can lay claim 
to their involvement, even if the respective actor’s status is highly debatable. Because 
negotiations with and the involvement of stakeholders are generally regarded as something 
good, the LA 21 Programme could still be presented as successful. These achievements 
were described as even more important in a situation where the program had to struggle with 
top-down planning and “confusion between a ‘map’ and a ‘plan’” (Shannon, Loeckx, 2004: 
p.123).  
Given its ambitions to start a locally rooted Agenda 21 process and implementing strategic 
projects to underscore its capacity building activities, the program largely failed. However, 
the program opened up discussions on urban development to a larger number of 
stakeholders. However, those organisations involved in those discussions can all be 
considered extended structures of the state. A number of actors involved in the program 
would later on become involved in the ACCA program, including the then head of the Office 
for Urban Management, later to become a Community Architect, and the second head of the 
Local Team and Vice-President of the City’s People’s Committee who would later become 
chairman of the city’s CDF Steering Committee, or ENDA-Vietnam, the NGO that ran the 
solid waste management component of the program and would later on become an important 
actor of the ACCA program.  
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In contrast to the LA 21 Programme, the project in Cửa Nam Ward is presented as 
successful by both international and Vietnamese actors, although in very different ways. In 
the brochures and reports of the Asian Coalition for Housing Right on the Cua Nam Model, a 
clear emphasis is put on the actions of the people in Cửa Nam Ward in driving forward and 
implementing the project. “They used these redevelopment plans, which will be partly 
financed by ACCA, to negotiate - first with the city government, and once they got the city's 
support, they used the force of that approval to negotiate with the provincial authority” 
(ACHR, October 2009). This is presented as a “breakthrough”, as “municipal government 
keen on modernizing their cities are now on the warpath” (ACHR, October 2009). The roles 
of all other actors, ACCA, ACVN, and the city’s authorities, are played down in these 
descriptions (ACHR, October 2010). One of the most important factors presented is the 
community’s social ties: “Like all the others [inhabitants of housing areas), they were a 
tightly-knit community and they wanted to stay” (ACHR, October 2010). Examples of the 
application of the Cua Nam Model in other communities do not mention difficulties because 
of internal conflicts, keeping up a myth of community based problem-solving free from 
internal conflict.223 The impact of the Cua Nam Model on Vinh’s policy to demolish collective 
housing areas is presented as having brought about a general change in policy and that the 
approach would be replicated in all or a large number of other cases (ACHR, December 
2010: p.17; ACHR, October 2010: p.6).224  
Writing by ACHR highlights the impact of ACCA on existing structures. Significant changes 
are said to have taken place in communities in Vietnam and their relations to the authorities:  
“The process in Vietnam has led to real and perceivable changes already. 
After just two years, people in the communities clearly have more confidence 
in their ability to solve problems, manage their own development and 
negotiate with their local government agencies for resources and support. The 
city and provincial authorities in ACCA cities have opened up planning 
information and investment plans to communities affected by them. The 
government authorities are also more appreciative of community people’s 
capacity to solve serious urban infrastructure problems and redevelop their 
own communities, more willing to partner with communities and contribute 
funds to their projects and more able to listen to the needs of communities and 
                                                          
223 Because of conflicts the Cua Nam Model could not be replicated in other housing areas where income and 
power differences existed (Interviews 29.6.2011, 1.7.2011).A prolonged conflict in the Hữu Nghị housing area 
developed around the issue of equally sharing formerly unequally distributed land and could only be solved 
with assistance of Thai experts (Interview 30.6.2011). 
224 However, the province had agreed to the reduced land plot size in those housing areas that replicate the 
Cua Nam Model, not in general. According to Lê Như Ngà et al., this applies to only 5 additional housing areas 
out of total number of 142 to be redeveloped (Lê Như Ngà et al., 2012: pp.35-36). 
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to alter the planning and building regulations to make them more flexible and 
more appropriate to the realities of the urban poor.” (ACHR, December 2010: 
p.38) 
Appadurai has described savings as having “a profound ideological, even salvational status” 
in NGOs (Appadurai, 2001: p.33). He describes the actions, rituals and language 
surrounding their work on community participation and savings as means for mobilisation 
and identity-building. In its reports and brochures, the achievements of the ACCA program 
are connected to a highly political, even revolutionary discourse:  
“We want a revolution! After discussing among yourselves for about an hour, 
we will ask each country to report - what are you going to do when you go 
back? How can you make best use of the ACCA Program to strengthen and 
scale up your people's process? We want a revolution! From now on, we want 
people to take care of themselves. We want to change things. We want to go 
forward and we want to do it in a big way.” (Boonyabancha cited by ACHR, 
April 2009, bold in original) 
ACCA distances itself from other development projects and actors, precisely with the claim 
that through real participation by the poor real empowerment and subsequently structural 
change is possible. The program’s internal discourse creates tensions when interacting with 
outsiders. In the case of ACCA, the revolutionary tone has to be scaled down in two 
contexts, namely the international as well as the Vietnamese discourse on development and 
participation.  
In an April 2005 report, ACHR wrote on its relationship with the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED):  
“[IIED] continues to be an important link for ACHR in the Northern academic 
side of development. ACHR continues to work very closely with IIED on a 
variety of projects to document and disseminate the stories of people-driven 
development that is happening in various Asian cities.  It is very often the case 
that some of the most important, innovative and change-making processes 
happening on the ground in Asian countries are being led by groups with little 
time to document their work, or without English skills which make it difficult for 
them to translate their experiences into language the Northern development 
audience can understand.  Because of this, a lot of this very important work 
does not become known, and is therefore prevented from being legitimized in 
the global development arena. IIED (and especially its semi-annual scholarly 
journal, Environment and Urbanization and Diana's Hi-Fi News - Housing 
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Finance Newsletters) continues to be energetic partners in the attempt to 
bridge this documentation gap, and to bring the experiences of Asian people's 
processes to the world.” (ACHR, April 2005: p.21).  
In October 2012, IIED published its journal Environment and Urbanization with a special 
focus on the ACCA program entitled “Addressing poverty and inequality – new forms of 
urban governance in Asia”. It contains a range of articles describing different aspects of the 
ACCA program.225 The program is praised for showing a new way that involves true 
participation of communities, reaching the poorest groups and building city-wide processes226 
(Mitlin, Satterthwaite, 2012). This is positively contrasted with other approaches of the 
“international development community”, as so far in the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals “the importance of local government and of grassroots organisations and 
other civil society organisations for meeting the goals got little attention” (Mitlin, 
Satterthwaite, 2012: p.398).  
In an article by Boonyabancha et al. titled “How poor communities are paving their own 
pathways to freedom”, the salvational discourse on communities and CDFs described by 
Appadurai is reflected by the use of terms such as “liberate”, “force”, or “awakening” 
(Boonyabancha et al., 2012). According to Leonhardt’s article in the same issue, the ACCA 
process is a “political process” and this process depends on the networks between people as 
well as the number of people involved. The article then goes on to state that  
“The power of people and their mass organization continues to be 
demonstrated, most recently in the Arab Spring and the Occupy movement. 
ACCA participants believe centrally in the need to support a people’s process 
of urban development” (Leonhardt, 2012: p.495).  
The article by Boonyabancha and Mitlin describes ACHR as a “coalition [that] was formed in 
1988 so that civil society groups active in the field of human settlements could improve the 
effectiveness of their work through collaboration” (Boonyabancha, Mitlin, 2012a: p.404). 
While they see an important role for civil society in solving urban problems, they use the term 
in the classic way of the development discourse described in an earlier chapter: it remains 
unclear what they refer to. However, they present the ACCA program as exemplary in 
                                                          
225 This publication provides an interesting study object, as it includes both descriptions of the ACCA program 
by its practitioners and involved communities in their own terms as well as articles linking the program to the 
mainstream development discourse, written with the participation of professionals of IIED. 
226 One of the editors, Diana Mitlin, was a member of the ACCA / ACHR Committee (ACHR, April 2010). 
  
 
188 4.3 Multiple Modern Projects in Vinh: The Enabling De-Politisation of Modern Projects 
bringing about those changes that the promotion of civil society in development promises227 
(Boonyabancha, Mitlin, 2012a: p.419).  
As cited above, the International Institute for Environment and Development plays the role of 
legitimizing many of ACHR’s activities in “the global development arena” (ACHR, April 2005: 
p.21). It is in publications of IIED or its staff that the buzz-words of the development 
discourse are brought up as interpretations of ACCA’s activities and the involved actors. 
Linking activities to the larger development discourse is not only a legitimizing strategy, 
however. Expressing activities in the language of shared myths, even if only ceremoniously, 
enables others to understand these activities and to incorporate them into a system of 
meaning. This strengthens bonds of commonality between actors with highly different social, 
political and professional backgrounds. When such bonds have to stretch from political 
cadres and poor communities to international experts to make the implementation of a 
project possible, legitimizing concepts have to be sufficiently flexible. This enables them to 
connect to the institutionalized myths in the relevant societal sector (see Figure 33).  
Vietnamese representations of the ACCA program and specifically the project in Cửa Nam 
Ward follow a very different thrust. They place the actions and actors surrounding both firmly 
in the processes on Grassroots Democracy and Public Administration Reform in Vietnam.228 
In its yearly report, ACVN describes its own and ACHR’s role: “At the moment ACHR and 
ACVN are helping the three cities Việt Trì, Vinh, and Lạng Sơn to implement Small Projects 
to improve housing and infrastructure in poor urban areas”229 (ACVN, 2009: p.8). ACVN 
presents the role of ACCA as a way to help poor communities to improve their housing and 
infrastructure through CDFs, and a way to connect poor people so that they can help each 
other. In the words of, ACVN’s Standing Vice General Secretary ACCA’s projects aim at 
“creating consensus, solidarity, and confidence of the people in communities, to enable them 
to take initiative in implementing the process of improving their housing”230 (Vũ Thị Vinh, 
2010: p.37). The  General Secretary of ACVN described the approach and success of the 
ACCA program by citing Hồ Chí Minh: “A hundred times easier things are still difficult without 
the people, a thousand times more difficult things can still be achieved with the people”231 
(cited in Lê Quang Thông, 2011: p.30). Lê Viết Hùng stressed the importance of “solidarity” 
for the upgrading project, linking it to a general perception of the term:  
                                                          
227 In another article, focusing on the Cua Nam Model, Boonyabancha and Mitlin argue that the success of the 
Cua Nam Model was due to the actions of civil society organisations (Boonyabancha, Mitlin, 2012b). 
228 See pages 156-158. 
229 “Hiện nay ACHR và ACVN đang giúp 3 thành phố Việt Trì, Vinh và Lạng Sơn thực hiện các dự án nhỏ về cải 
thiện nhà ở và hạ tầng tại các khu nghèo đô thị.” 
230 “tạo được sự đồng lòng, đoàn kết và tự tin của người dân trong các cộng đồng để từ đó họ có khả năng chủ 
động trong quá trình thực hiện các hoạt động cải thiện nơi ở của mình.” 
231”’Dễ trăm lần không dân cũng chịu, khó vạn lần dân liệu cũng xong’.” 
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“Dear Uncle Ho has written: ‘Solidarity is an extremely precious tradition of our 
Party and our people. The comrades from the Centre to the cells have to 
preserve the solidarity and unity of the Party like their own eyes.”232 (Lê Viết 
Hùng, 2011: p.35)  
At the National CDF Conference that took place in Vinh in May 2011, the Vice-President of 
the City’s People’s Committee presented CDF and ACCA activities as contributing to the 
implementation of Grassroots Democracy according to Ordinance 34/2007, explicitly linking 
the program to the official program of “building a democratic, equal, prosperous, and civilised 
society”233 (Nguyễn Văn Chỉnh, 4.5.2011).  
Newspaper articles in the regional and national press focused on technical aspects of the 
project, stressing the contributions of the new model to the national development agenda 
(Nghệ An Online, 1.12.2010; Đức Ngọc, 11.5.2010; Văn Đoàn, 24.3.2010; Hoàng Vĩnh, 
18.3.2010). While the assistance of ACVN and ACHR is acknowledged in these articles, the 
focus is on the positive cooperation between authorities and residents.  
 
 
Figure 33 
The process of linking to discourses by adherence to myths.  
The role of ACVN in legitimizing the ACCA program and specifically the upgrading project in 
Cửa Nam Ward in the official discourse on participation in Vietnam is evident from the 
description above. In this context, the ACCA program is presented as contributing new 
mechanisms to the toolbox of policy-implementation. The references to Hồ Chí Minh-thought 
                                                          
232 “Bác Hồ kính yêu đã viết ‘Đoàn kết là một truyền thống cực kỳ quý báu của Đảng và của dân ta. Các đồng chí 
từ TW đến các chi bộ phải giữ gìn sự đoàn kết nhất trí của Đảng như giữ gìn con ngươi của mắt minh’.”  
233 “xây dựng xã hội dân chủ, công bằng, giàu mạnh, văn minh” 
Development Discourse 
“Post-Washington consensus” 
 
Vietnamese Discourse 
“Hồ Chí Minh-thought” 
Participation as Tool 
for implementation 
Linking by adherence to myths 
Cua Nam Project 
Translation by IIED Translation by ACVN 
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are the most striking examples of translating the project’s activities into a national myth, one 
on which the legitimacy of the Communist Party and the Socialist State rest.234  
As outlined above, organisations operating in highly institutionalized settings rely on the 
perception that their work is legitimate. They do so by ceremoniously enacting legitimizing 
myths because the output of their operations is not easily accounted for. Organisations face 
difficulties when they operate in different societal sectors or organizational fields, as these 
might require ceremonial pledges of allegiance to conflicting legitimizing myths. Among a 
number of different strategies that can be employed to cope with this dilemma, the de-
politisation of concepts such as civil society or participation in development has enabled the 
cooperation of a large number of actors from different contexts. In Vinh, both the LA 21 and 
the ACCA program have adapted their approaches of participatory urban development to the 
local setting, at the same time both have translated their activities in a language that re-
enacts the myths of the international development discourse. The ACCA program, in 
addition, has been successful in connecting to legitimizing myths of the local political setting. 
Thereby, however, it was open for co-optation by actors whose approach to urban 
development is informed by visions of a Modern and Civilised, rather than a Participatory, 
City.  
 
A twist to the representation of the project in Cửa Nam Ward and the role of the city’s 
authorities came with the participation of Vinh in the Partnership for Democratic Local 
Governance in Southeast-Asia (DELGOSEA) project of the German Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation. The project was co-funded by the European Union and aimed at promoting 
exchanges between city authorities in Southeast Asia to learn from best practices. One of the 
principles of the European Union’s development aid is the promotion of civil society and the 
cooperation with civil society actors, funding DELGOSEA is part of this agenda (European 
Commission, 2012; DELGOSEA, 2012a).  
Each of the participating cities was called upon to propose one “best practice” to be 
disseminated to the other cities. Vinh’s best practice was called “Community Participation in 
Upgrading the Old Collective Housing Areas” (DELGOSEA, n.d.a). The best practice 
document builds heavily on the experiences in Cửa Nam Ward as its model for upgrading.235  
                                                          
234 These references are also visibly expressed, see Figure 31, p. 177. 
235 Vinh also implemented one of the best practices from another city, the Eco-Savers Project from Marikina in 
the Philippines. This project is described as an “innovative recycling scheme, drawing on the cooperation with 
local schools to help collect recyclable waste, for dealing with the problem of householdwaste and encourage 
environmental awareness in the younger generation” (DELGOSEA, 2012b: p.5). One of the results achieved in 
Vinh is that “A communication plan and cooperation agreements have been developed and set up, ensuring 
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“The community was asked to participate in the urban planning process. The 
model aimed to promote the role of the community in urban planning and 
development. It mobilized resources and strengthened the cooperation from 
economic sectors and the community. It aimed to improve the living quality of 
people and achieve sustainable urban development. Aside from the support 
from the community, the model strengthened the cooperation between the 
provincial and city governments and civil society organizations. Flexibility was 
allowed in the implementation of state regulations” (DELGOSEA, n.d.a: p.4).  
The document also states that people’s participation did not only take place in the case of the 
Hữu Nghị Housing Area, but also in the preparation of the Master plan for the project.236 
Additionally “government and civil society organizations organized campaigns and 
propaganda to collect ideas, money, and other resources for the project” (DELGOSEA, n.d.a: 
p.7). 
In this account, the achievements of the upgrading project in Cửa Nam Ward with regards to 
participatory urban development are exaggerated and generalized to other planning and 
decision-making processes. Through the use of terms like “civil society” and “people’s 
participation”, urban planning in Vinh is presented as an exemplary “best practice” in the 
development discourse language (DELGOSEA, n.d.a). This is made possible by the 
vagueness of terms such as civil society and participation. However, the very vagueness of 
such concepts enables cooperation between the numerous actors promoting different 
modern projects for urban development in Vinh since the 1990s. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the involvement of the media, civil society, other departments and the private sector in the innovation 
process” (DELGOSEA, 2012b: p.6). This “result achieved” is, however, a simple copy-paste sentence from the 
report on Lạng Sơn, another Vietnamese city that participated in DELGOSEA (DELGOSEA, n.d.b: p.8). 
236 However, it is not clear what “the project” actually is.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
Vinh’s urban history has to a large degree been influenced by international factors. Under 
French colonialism, the former centre of imperial administration was elevated to the rank of 
an urban centre and became a place where change due to modernity was articulated. During 
the first and the second Indochina Wars, Vinh was repeatedly destroyed as a result of anti-
colonial struggle and Cold War politics. From the 1960s on, Vinh became subject to modern 
projects advanced by actors to contribute to their respective cultural programs. In the city’s 
reconstruction in the 1970s, the German Democratic Republic assisted in implementing the 
vision of Vinh as a Socialist City. From the 1990s on, diverging and conflicting visions of the 
city were promoted, on the one hand the Modern and Civilised City propagated by 
authorities, on the other the Participatory City advanced by international actors such as UN-
HABITAT or the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights. This difference is also expressed in the 
organisational structures of modern projects aiming at the realisation of the respective vision: 
cooperation between the GDR and Vietnam during the city’s reconstruction relied on 
hierarchical structures of both states, in contrast to the networks of actors brought together 
by projects since the 1990s. 
During the Vietnamese-German cooperation, actors from both countries followed a view of 
the city as expressing and furthering socialist development. In this view, the city is subject to 
centralized planning by experts who incorporate different, often politically defined, functions 
into a whole urban body. This plan would be implemented by the state through its centralized 
structures of command and coordination. However, the Vietnamese state lacked the 
resources and capacities to establish such structures and apply them in the creation of a 
Socialist City in Vinh. Recognizing this inability, reforms opened possibilities to rely on 
sources and actors outside the Party and the state, while attempting to maintain control and 
coordination over the implementation process. The view that the party-state was the sole 
legitimate source of a cultural program and modern projects was retained. Thereby, the 
modern projects advanced by other actors were relegated to a second rank; in contrast to a 
view of a Participatory City that theoretically regards all visions of the city that are based on 
free and equal participation in a public sphere as legitimate. Eisenstadt has argued that the 
major division line between cultural programs runs between pluralistic and totalistic visions. 
The modern project to create a Modern and Civilised City implies a shift from the totalistic 
concept of the Socialist City. However, this remains a partial move towards a pluralistic 
concept as other modern projects are selectively accepted based on the possibility to 
contribute to the Modern and Civilised City.  
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Modern projects as conceptualized in this work are advanced as agents of urban change. 
The contemporary local setting in Vinh, in contrast, is highly institutionalized. At the same 
time, the successful implementation of a modern project, the Cua Nam Model, relied on the 
flexibility of the project’s approach as well as the versatility of terms such as participation, 
communities, structural change, etc. Due to relying on established structures its impact on 
the institutional setting was limited. Authorities in Vinh were to a large degree able to co-opt 
the project and implement it through existing hierarchical structures without participation of 
autonomous centres of power. They were sufficiently flexible to incorporate a new approach 
to urban development and adjust it so as to contribute to the creation of a Modern and 
Civilised City.  
The modern projects presented in this work relied on general conceptualisations of the city 
and methods to bring about urban change. These conceptualisations were to a large degree 
the result of national institutional settings, national histories and politics, as well as 
experiences gained in the respective actor’s home country. The vision of a Socialist City 
promoted in Vietnam and Vinh resulted from the specific point in time, namely after re-
orientation of urban design and construction in the USSR under Khrushchev, when this 
vision became influential in Vietnam. While the GDR contributed to the implementation of an 
already existing modern project, its assistance resulted in an outcome that is reflective of 
GDR policies that emphasised the construction of housing on the expense of representative 
public buildings and city centres, as well as the design of apartments for two-generation 
families. Additionally, the specific forms of cooperation are reflective of GDR-DRV/SRV 
relations, the experiences of cooperation between the two countries, as well as of concerns 
for the national prestige of the GDR. The approach to bring about change towards a 
Participatory City advocated by the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights largely built on the 
experiences of that organisation from Thailand, where close cooperation with state agencies 
was able to achieve more pronounced institutional change than in Vinh. Similarly, the 
transformation of modern projects in their application in Vinh was largely due to the national 
institutional framework, as well as Vietnam’s history and politics. Most generally, the 
country’s pre-colonial and colonial history created an urban centre linking its surroundings to 
larger networks of power, communication, and exchange. The national history of anti-colonial 
and post-colonial struggle impacted the city in cycles of destruction and reconstruction. From 
the 1960s on, a centralized apparatus transmitted policies and visions for urban development 
formulated by central Party and state authorities to urban centres in Vietnam, prescribing 
lines of development as well as the respective city’s place in the urban hierarchy and its 
regional functions. Generic, centrally proclaimed visions are complemented in Vinh with 
symbols of local contributions to this national history and of locally manifested achievements 
resulting from national policies. However, the development of Vinh also shows specific 
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elements. As a medium sized, regional centre, political changes on the national level are 
manifested in Vinh not as pronounced as in the largest urban centres of Vietnam; both the 
Socialist City and the Modern and Civilised City are expressed more prominently in Hanoi 
(Socialist City, Modern and Civilised City) and Hồ Chí Minh City (Modern and Civilised 
City).237 As Vinh does not receive as much attention by donors and state funds as these 
cities, it is more reliant on those resources available, thereby opening opportunities for 
programs such as the Asian Coalition for Community Action and its project in Cửa Nam 
Ward that offer incentives for Vinh’s authorities by supplying funds. 
The cultural programs articulated by central Vietnamese authorities are translated into 
generic modern projects of urban development that are applied in Vinh. In both cases of the 
Socialist City and the Modern and Civilised City, this resulted in the formulation of unrealistic 
plans unsuitable to local conditions. Existing hierarchical structures created incentives for 
planners and the administration to produce plans conforming to politically defined ideals, not 
to local realities and available resources. This is especially prominent in the reconstruction of 
Vinh as a Socialist City where Vietnamese decision makers continued to insist on the 
application of international models of industrialized construction. Also the projects to 
redevelop the Quang Trung Housing Complex or to destroy collective housing areas as part 
of the creation of a Modern and Civilised City conform to central guidelines but were not 
implemented according to their original formulations because of high economic and social 
costs. In all three cases, the contributions from international actors in cooperation with local 
authorities resulted in more realistic projects better adapted to existing conditions.  
The contributions of international actors in Vinh’s history have resulted in ambivalent urban 
change. In the case of GDR cooperation, housing has been supplied to thousands of 
inhabitants, materials and experts from the GDR have helped to create construction 
industries as well as planning and other professional capacities. However, the goal to create 
a Socialist City has not been achieved, and today the most visible contribution of GDR 
solidarity and aid in Vinh, the Quang Trung Housing Complex, is regarded as a burden in 
light of changing modes of legitimacy. Modern projects aimed at advancing a Participatory 
City have resulted in improved housing for a small number of Vinh’s inhabitants and 
demonstrated new forms of participation by citizens in the planning and implementation 
process. However, they also offered opportunities for authorities to strengthen their 
legitimacy and have relied on outside actors instead of establishing city-wide processes. 
The promotion of modern projects in Vinh has resulted in path-dependent urban change. As 
modern projects are concretized in the urban fabric, projects subsequently put forward have 
                                                          
237 A partial exception is Vinh’s reconstruction until 1975, when it was the most important city in the DRV’s 
south.  
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to take previous projects into account. Furthermore, as construction in and design of urban 
areas requires high investments, a once chosen path of change can create increasing 
returns. Actors involved in the reconstruction of Vinh in the 1970s had little influence over the 
city’s destruction and subsequent decision to construct a Socialist City, as both resulted from 
international and national politics. The decision to invite the GDR as a partner in 
reconstruction proved a critical juncture.238 Decisions taken with participation of the GDR put 
reconstruction on a path that created increasing returns throughout the 1970s because 
leaving that path would have incurred high costs due to a mixture of re-productive 
mechanisms proposed by Mahoney (see page 20 and Mahoney, 2000). Focus on the Quang 
Trung Housing Complex followed a utilitarian and functional mechanism. Focusing on the 
provision of housing had from the beginning been controversial, but leaving the complex 
even less finished than it was would not only have resulted in a waste of funds, but would 
also have incurred high political and ideological costs, due to its function as a symbol of 
socialist development and solidarity. Secondly, the wish of GDR decision makers and 
experts to help in the reconstruction of Vinh and socialist development in Vietnam was due to 
the perception that they were contributing to a morally just cause, thus continued and 
extended cooperation in the light of difficulties and slow progress follows Mahoney’s 
legitimation explanation. In addition contracts and agreements between the two states 
resulted in a form of reproduction through contractual obligation.  
The vision to reconstruct Vinh as a Socialist City in cooperation with the GDR created a 
frame of reference for all following development. It resulted in two legacies: Firstly, the 
structures of planning established in that time continued to impact urban development, partly 
because cadres working with the experts would later come into prominent positions, partly 
because urban planning continues to be conducted as a hierarchical process.  Secondly, the 
Socialist City created physical, concrete legacies. The urban layout and the projects that 
were created opened up possibilities, precluded others, and made actions in some areas 
necessary in the following decades. For example, machinery and training provided to 
construction enterprises or the rationalisation of construction material industries created 
resources on which the provincial construction economy could build. On the other hand, the 
size of the Quang Trung Housing Complex and the large number of its inhabitants make 
necessary costly and long term solutions for its future.  
  
                                                          
238 This is, however, not to say that it was the only or most important impact, nor are the legacies resulting 
from this decision the only ones present in Vinh. As I have shown, urban planning according to this model had 
already started without involvement of the GDR and incorporated aspects of Vinh’s colonial development.  
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A path dependent process, however, does not preclude path change when following an 
existing path becomes too costly. Realizing that the focus on housing in the reconstruction of 
Vinh diverted funds and materials from other projects, priority of Vietnamese actors shifted. 
However, the GDR insisted on a continued focus on the housing complex as investments 
had already been high. Therefore, this shift in policy is represented with a time-lag in urban 
development. Similarly, the political and economic reforms in Vietnam can be regarded as 
path change or adjustment resulting from too high costs for path-maintenance. Again, as 
urban design and construction involve large investments, this path change was expressed in 
Vinh only some years later. The large number of former collective housing areas constructed 
during the 1970s makes re-development costs so high that a window of opportunity opened 
up for a modern project advanced by the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights that aimed at a 
Participatory City.  As the organisation aimed at social and political change, this presented a 
risk that can be expressed as costs resulting from a path change. However, these costs were 
apparently regarded as lower than those of maintaining these housing areas in light of the 
new vision to create a Modern and Civilised City, especially since the risk could be reduced 
by relying on established structures in the implementation of the project.  
 
The Quang Trung Housing Complex’ history has been expressive of the Modern Projects 
promoted by different actors in Vinh as well as of a shift in the cultural program promoted by 
the Communist Party and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Current redevelopment plans 
present a much larger project than the upgrading of the Hữu Nghị housing area, involving big 
national construction companies as well as large sums of investment, compensation, and 
potential profit. In this light, the future of the complex, and most importantly its inhabitants, 
will indicate the extent of the shift from a totalitarian conception of the city dominated by the 
Party and the State towards a view of urban society in which participation in not merely a tool 
for the implementation of already defined goals. 
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6. Appendix: Socio-Political Principles for the Reconstruction of Vinh  
 
1. Reconstruction of Vinh City as the political, economic, and cultural centre of Nghệ An 
Province is an undertaking in the process of the country’s socialist industrialisation. 
The reconstruction of Vinh City is of significance for the provinces from Thanh Hóa to 
Quảng Bình as well as for neighbouring central Laos and is connected to the 
development of industrial and agricultural production centres in the delta, the low-
lands, and the highlands. These are, apart from Vinh/Cửa Hội/Cửa Lò, especially 
Nghĩa Đàn, Đô Lương, and Quỳ Hợp.  
 
2. The reconstruction of Vinh City as a beautiful, well-functioning, modern equipped city 
worthy its revolutionary traditions is to be carried out based on a long-term urban 
development concept (General Development Plan). This concept includes traffic 
networks and is the basis for planning of technical and social infrastructure networks. 
It is the General Development Plan’s goal to coordinate contemporary tasks – 
including provisory and immediate measures – with future demands, to facilitate the 
designation of reconstruction phases, and to ensure urban development according to 
the plan. 
 
3. The reconstruction of Vinh City considers the most economical use of construction 
land. It restricts itself to the use of already built-up or formerly built-up areas and 
agriculturally not or difficult to use sand- and wasteland. Of these 800ha are available 
in Vinh and 830ha in Cửa Hội/Cửa Lò. 
The immediate proximity of urban and agricultural areas remain characteristic in the 
city body, it represents the immediate cooperation between workers and peasants. 
 
4. The reconstruction of Vinh as an industrial city – as a centre of the working class – 
will be characterized by the following urban functions and city shaping factors: 
- Transport-, traffic- and handling industries 
- Maritime and harbour economies 
- Light industries 
- Maintenance and repair industries 
- Construction industries. 
 Vinh is the site of industries of the local, provincial, and central levels. 
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5. The reconstruction of Vinh City as a centre of authority and administration, of culture 
and education and revolutionary traditions is characterized by provincial 
administrative institutions, by locally and centrally important establishments, and by 
numerous colleges and professional schools. 
Historic sites of special importance, such as Vinh citadel, Quyết Mountain, and others 
will be accorded important roles in the new urban design. 
The Square of Victory and the political, military, and administrative centre will be 
located at “Crossroads 6”. The establishments and facilities of culture, education, of 
trade, of sports, and of recreation will be developed along the southern axis. 
 
6. The reconstruction of Vinh is envisaged for a population of 120,000 to 150,000 
inhabitants. Of these, about 80,000 will be in the immediate urban area. 
The suburbs Cửa Hội, Cửa Lò, Mi Li and the Hà Tĩnh-banks are part of Vinh City. 
These suburbs are part of the city, as are connecting transport and infrastructure 
lines. They are part of comprehensive administration and planning. 
The reconstruction of Vinh City observes the relations to Hồ Chí Minh’s home Kim 
Liên and fosters its further development. 
 
7. The reconstruction of Vinh City should step-by-step contribute to the creation of 
distinct urban areas for industrial- and work places, for housing, for education, care 
and recreation. Thereby, the entanglement of work- and housing spaces connected to 
small-scale production should be overcome. This is to be achieved in all permanent 
new buildings and to be aimed at in provisional solutions. 
Examples have to be planned, realized, and evaluated, this first concerns the 
industrial zones Vinh-North and Vinh-Bến Thủy, the Quang Trung Housing Complex, 
and the recreational centre Vinh Citadel. 
 
8. The reconstruction of Vinh City takes place in new residential areas according to the 
principles of complex housing construction. Facilities necessary for provisions and 
support of the inhabitants are to be constructed in parallel to residential buildings. 
New buildings are to be designed considering future demands. 
Multistorey apartment buildings are principally not to be constructed as solitaires but 
in housing complexes. 
 
9. The reconstruction of Vinh City should follow construction phases according to 
economic planning. 
  
 
199 6. Appendix: Socio-Political Principles for the Reconstruction of Vinh 
This allows for concentrated and coordinated preparation of building activities, 
effective realisation and use, and has positive impact on necessary technical and 
traffic facilities. 
For each construction phase both permanent projects as well as temporary and easy 
construction measure are to be coordinated. The advantages of territorial, technical, 
and temporal coordination of investments are to be fully realized. 
 
10. The reconstruction of Vinh City ensures good conditions for national culture and the 
hygiene of the city. The urban climate will be improved through water bodies, planting 
trees, green and recreational and agricultural areas. The “healthy urban structure” 
has to be ensured by proper ventilation and use of shadows and favourable rain 
water drainage. This is an important expression of the cultural state of the 
environment. 
 
11. The reconstruction of Vinh City requires substantial development of construction 
industries. On the basis of the urban development concept it allows for long-term 
development of cadres, capacities, techniques and technology in construction and 
construction material production according to plans. This is to be used. 
 
12. The reconstruction of Vinh City serves the gradual improvement of living and working 
conditions of its citizens. This is an important motivation for citizens to mobilize high 
contributions in the reconstruction of their city. 
 
13. The reconstruction of Vinh City puts high demands on urban construction, 
architecture and visual arts. 
Vinh will then be ten times more beautiful than before if social authorities 
consequently pursue this goal, if those designing and those implementing at all times 
struggle for the beauty of their buildings and if all citizens daily contribute their part for 
a clean and neat city. 
 (Verwaltungskomitee Nghe An, 30.5.1975: pp.6-8) 
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